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FROM:

Dated: 14th February, 1960.

Rec'd: 19th February, 1960.

Australasian Embassy,
WASHINGTON.

(Via air mail)

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Office of Current Intelligence Summary.

Middle East Highlights.

Following is extract from O.C.I. Weekly Report dated 11th February, 1960.

Iraq:

Three Iraqi political parties presumably have attained legality this week. Following the required 30-day waiting period in which the Interior Ministry can interpose objections to a Party's application for legal status, the Socialistic National Democratic party, (N.D.P.), the United Democratic party of Kurdistan (U.D.P.K.), and the splinter Communist faction by Daud Sayigh received implicit recognition. Parties do not attain full legal status until their programmes have been published in the Official Gazette.

2. The Orthodox Communist Party, however, was turned down probably on Kassem's orders, but ostensibly because phraseology in its application troubled the authorities. The Group immediately re-submitted its bid for recognition, omitting from its description of the Party the word "revolutionary", which now is apparently pre-empted by Kassem to describe his own Regime - and describing Marxism-Leninism not as a "dogma" but as a "scientific theory" guiding the Party. At the same time, the Party press has attacked the Interior Minister Yahya for partiality toward the Sayigh Group, which it claims is far less qualified for recognition.

3. The orthodox Communists now may have to wait an additional 30 days for the Ministry to accept or again reject them, and they appear fearful that they may not be recognised at all. Kassem by this manoeuvre would seem to be trying to aid the faction led by Sayigh, who has a long record of deviation from the Party and recently has been preaching an "Arab Nationalist" brand of Communism closer to Kassem's apparent view of what Iraqi Communism should be.

4. Sayigh's splinter group, despite the withdrawal of several founding members, has called for a "national front", and

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reportedly has reached an agreement for co-operation with the U.P.D.K. However, the U.P.D.K. is said to be willing to form an alliance with any Communist group that attains legal status.

5. If the orthodox Communists eventually are denied a license, they may attempt to take over the Sayigh faction, which has little organisation or following. In any case, the Iraqi Communists cannot yet be considered seriously weakened.

Israeli-Syrian Border:

6. The crisis along the Israeli-Syrian border has abated at least temporarily, and the controversy has become more of a Diplomatic battle, with the United Nations Truce Supervision Organisation (U.N.T.S.O.) trying to bring the two parties together at a meeting of the Israeli-Syrian Mixed Armistice Commission. The U.A.R. says it is willing to discuss the situation in the Demilitarised Zone, but Israel has refused, declaring the Zone is an integral part of Israel and therefore not subject to negotiation. The United Nations and American position is that sovereignty over the Zone remains in abeyance pending a final peace settlement.

7. As of 8th February the U.A.R. had compromised its position somewhat by refusing to facilitate an inspection by the U.N.T.S.O. of Syrian-held areas around the Demilitarised Zone, while the Israelis were permitting United Nations observers to inspect Israeli-held parts of the Zone and adjacent areas in Israel.

8. The United Nations inspection on the Israeli side indicated that Israel apparently has moved a large part of its forces out of the border area. There are, moreover, no signs of a military build-up along Israel's Egyptian frontier. The U.A.R. has moved the equivalent of two brigades into Sinai, apparently as contingent support to the troops - about 11,000 - normally stationed on the Peninsula.

9. At Port Said, the unloading of the cargo of Israeli origin from the "Inge Toft" began on 9th February. A spokesman for the Danish owners in Copenhagen said the order to unload had been given "out of consideration for the crew and maintenance of the ship", which has been detained since May 1959. So far the Israelis have reacted moderately to the order, "more in resignation than in anger". The Greek-owned "Astypalea", whose charter contract reportedly was renewed on 8th February for two months, remains interned at Port Said with its cargo from Israel.

Arab League Meeting:

10. The Arab League Council convened in Cairo on 8th February to discuss the many facets of "the Palestine question" as well as the situation in Algeria. The presence of General Ali Amir, Chief of Staff of the U.A.R. Armed Forces, underlines the Council's concern with the Israeli Border fighting. Iraq and Tunisia are boycotting the meeting because of their differences with the U.A.R.

11. Kassem has attempted to "steal the thunder" from the meeting by "acceding to demands" by Iraqi workers to give

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one hour's pay to a fund for the establishment of a Palestino Republic. Army officers also have added 30,000 dollars to the 1,400,000 dollars with which the Government has endowed this fund.

Sudan:

12. The Abboud Military Government in the Sudan continues to be plagued by dissension within its highest body, the Seven-Man Supreme Council of the Armed Forces. Influential religious and political leaders are reiterating their demands for a planned transition to civilian Government. So far, mutual suspicion has prevented concerted action by the leaders of two key groups - the ANSAR religious leaders and the National Unionist Party (N.U.P.).

13. The Government will soon issue a law permitting the resumption of labour union activity, suspended in November, 1958. Workers will again be allowed to form Trade Unions, but Union Federations, largely Communist-controlled in the past, will not be permitted. Strikes and lockouts will be legal, but when workers and employers cannot reach agreement, compulsory arbitration procedures will be mandatory.

14. Having committed itself to several major development projects, the Government is running into difficulties trying to obtain Western financial assistance for all of them. Sudanese officials had expected that the agreement they reached with the U.A.R. on 8th November on sharing the Nile Waters would quickly lead to a World Bank loan for much of the cost of their 100,000,000 dollar Reservoir Dam project. This important project would add a minimum of 1,500,000 acres of irrigated land to the Sudan's present irrigated area of some 2,800,000 acres.

15. The insistence by World Bank officials on further detailed study both of the project itself and of the Sudan's general financial outlook has caused Sudanese officials to believe the Bank is "stalling". The Sudanese Foreign Minister, impressed by recent big Soviet loans to the U.A.R. and Ethiopia, has said that he intends to approach the U.S.S.R. for aid.

Libya:

16. King Idriss made several minor changes in the Libyan Council of Ministers on 6th February. He appointed a tripolitanian official with no experience in military matters to replace Defense Minister Ibrahim Ben Shabaan, who has been at odds with the Army Chief of staff. As a reward for past services, he named the former House of Deputies President, who was defeated in the 17th January elections, to the vacant post of Minister of Education. He dropped the Minister of Health from the Cabinet, shifted the Minister of Finance to that post, and named as new Finance Minister Muhammad Ben Uthman, a Pizzanese businessman who is a veteran of earlier Libyan Cabinets.

17. The King is expected to make further Government changes after there has been practical experience with the political temper of the new House of Deputies. Its first meeting is scheduled for 15th February. Prime Minister, Kubaar, whose own position is temporarily assured, will probably increase his pressure for a modification of the Wheelus Air Base Agreement to provide for substantially larger United States payments of

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DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS
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"ront", i.e. financial aid without controls on its expenditure.

Min. & Dept. External Affairs.

19th February, 1960.

SEC A/Ss MR.EASTMAN MR.B.HILL MR.UPTON DR.CUMES MR.JOCKEL
MR.B. DEXTER MR.NUTTER MR.GILCHRIST

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I.3685.

Sent: 20th February, 1960
2220.Recd: 21st February, 1960
1430

(Via leased channel)

FROM:

Australian Embassy,
WASHINGTON.SAV.89 SECRET.

Office of Current Intelligence Summary.

MIDDLE EAST HIGHLIGHTS.

Following is extract from O.C.I. Weekly report dated 18th February, 1960-

IRAQ.

1. The Iraqi Communists have suffered their second jolt in two weeks as a result of the dismissal on 16th February of Pro-Communist Ibrahim Kubba, Minister of Agricultural Reform and Acting Minister of Oil Affairs, from the Kassem Cabinet. Kubba's dismissal followed a long struggle between Kubba and the Anti-Communist Minister of the Interior, Brigadier Yahya, for control of the Agricultural Reform Programme. Yahya, a confidant of Kassem, has been made Acting Minister of Agrarian Reform in addition to his other duties. Another extreme Leftist, Minister of Planning, Shaybani, has taken over the oil portfolio on an acting basis.

2. The dismissal may presage an attempt by the Kassem Regime to lay the blame for agricultural disasters and disorganisation at the door of Kubba and Communist-Dominated Peasant Organizations which he favoured. However, the general disorganisation of agriculture is likely also to furnish the Communists with a handle to criticize the Kassem regime. Discontent in the countryside will probably rise in any case, since 1960 crop prospects appear unusually poor.

3. The orthodox communist faction, whose application for legal recognition as a party was turned down last week, has resubmitted its application and changed its name from the Communist Party of Iraq to the Union of the People. Apparently fearing a second rejection, the Communist press has begun a campaign for a "National Front" and is claiming support from the Communist Parties of the U.S.S.R., Lebanon, Syria, Bulgaria, and Czechoslovakia. Meanwhile, another Communist Front Group has tendered its application for recognition. This Group, calling itself the

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Republican Party, includes the Pro-Communist Director General of Oil Affairs Abd Al-Fattah Ibrahim, among its leaders.

4. Moscow has reacted to Kassem's rejection of the application of the "orthodox" Iraqi Communists by extensive press and radio publicity of this faction's "platform", and indication of Moscow's concern over Kassem's recognition of the Splinter Group. Nevertheless, the U.S.S.R. is continuing its efforts to expand its ties with the Kassem Regime, as exemplified by the announcement on 10th February that the U.S.S.R. is willing to help Iraq by building a 330-foot-high hydroelectric dam on the Tigris and several water control projects in the Tigris-Euphrates basin.

5. The expectation that sentences will be handed down next week to those accused of attempting to assassinate Kassem may have accelerated plans among army elements to overthrow his regime.

ARAB LEAGUE.

6. Unconfirmed press reports virtually all the news of the progress of the sessions of the Arab League which began in Cairo on 8th February. The delegates appear to have split over a U.A.R.-supported plan for some form of Palestine "entity". A three-man Committee representing Morocco, Libya, and Saudi Arabia has been formed to create "a Palestine Entity", involving a charter for Palestine, admission of Palestine to the Arab League, and a permanent Palestinian delegation to the United Nations.

7. The Jordanian representative, Foreign Minister Nassar, left Cairo for Amman on 16th February for consultations. The Jordanian charge in Cairo has stated that the plan for Palestine as outlined in one press would be unacceptable to his government. King Hussein has already offered Jordanian citizenship to all Palestinian refugees, and is unalterably opposed to the creation of a separate state likely to be under U.A.R. influence.

8. The positions of other representatives are unclear, but it seems certain that no practicable programme for a solution of the Palestine problem will emerge, and it is likely that intensified inter-Arab antagonism and bickering may be the chief result.

ISRAEL-U.A.R.

9. The Israeli-Syrian mixed Armistice Commission, which met on 16th February without the Israelis, condemned Israel for violating Syrian air space and attacking the village of Tawafiq on 1st February. The United Nations Chairman of the Commission voted with the Syrian representatives.

Israel boycotted the meeting because it claims sovereignty over Tawafiq and the rest of the demilitarized zone and accordingly denied that the Commission had any jurisdiction over the zone.

10. The dispute now may move into the United Nations Security Council if Secretary-General Hammarskjöld decides to call a Council meeting on his own authority. Prior to such a meeting however, there probably would be a "reaffirmation" of the United Nations position on the status of the demilitarized zone, perhaps in the form of a letter from Hammarskjöld to Israel and the U.A.R..

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11. The U.A.R., however, is fearful of a resumption of the conflict. There is no evidence of Israeli preparations for any large-scale military action, although the latest incident along the border, on 12th February, when two Israelis were killed, has again raised the prospects of reprisals. Israeli Chief of Staff, Laskov is quoted previously as having threatened new moves if the Syrians "start anything else".

12. According to an Israeli Foreign Ministry official, Israel has no intention of relaxing the dispute over Israeli shipping via the Suez Canal, despite the unloading of the "Inge Toft" and its departure from Port Said on 15th February after almost nine months of detention. "From time to time", the official said, other ships with cargoes from Israel will appear at Port Said under conditions of the formula Hammarskjöld arranged with the U.A.R. last fall. Such tests assertedly will be made "as a matter of principle" and in order to divert Nasser's attention from Israeli use of Eilat and the Gulf of Aqaba. The Israelis presumably also expect to benefit diplomatically and to embarrass Nasser by keeping the Canal issue alive.

MIN. & DEPT. E.A.

22nd February, 1960

SEC A/Ss MR.EASTMAN MR.B.HILL MR.JOCKEL DR.CUMES
MR.R.HAMILTON MR.TROENOVE MR.DEXTER MR.NUTTER MR.MCMILLAN
MR.GILCHRIST.

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the First Secretary and
Consul of Israel*

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ARAB COMMENT ON CURRENT AFFAIRS

6 September 1959

SPECIAL ISSUE

ON PIERRE JUMAYEL'S PROPOSAL
FOR A 'PALESTINIAN GOVERNMENT'

The Arab League Council is meeting in Casablanca, Morocco, amid signs of a serious rift on a number of major issues among the member states.

The refusal of Iraq and Tunisia to attend the session and the fact that only half of the attending delegations are headed by Foreign Ministers are symptomatic of the split in Arab ranks.

Even on such topics as Israel and the Arab refugees - frequently represented as the issues capable more than any other of uniting the Arabs - basic differences have manifested themselves, differences that were already revealed during the preparatory inter-Arab talks in Beirut last month.

The following excerpts from official Arab reactions to the recent proposal to set up a "Palestinian Government" speak for themselves.

1. Jumayel's Statement

The following statement was made on 22 August 1959 by Pierre Jumayel, Lebanon's Minister of Public Works:

"It is inconceivable that Lebanon should continue to bear the burden of the 130,000 Palestinian refugees, representing 12% of her population... A final disposition of the Palestine problem is possible only through the establishment, in that part of Palestine that is occupied by the Arabs, of a Palestinian Government with an army of its own... It is incumbent upon the Arab League Council meeting in Casablanca to formulate a positive policy with regard to this problem. It is no longer enough to say 'No' and wait passively for something to happen. Time works against the Arabs, who are liable one day to be faced with a plan for the integration of the refugees that will be carried out in full."

(Pierre Jumayel, Lebanese Minister of Public Works, quoted by "L'Orient", Beirut daily, 23 August 1959)

Majali's Rejoinder

On 23 August 1959, Radio Amman broadcast the following reply to Mr. Jumayel's proposal by Jordan Prime Minister Hazza al Majali:

"We are the Government of Palestine, the army of Palestine and the refugees of Palestine, and our leader is King Hussein... This is a fact documented (a) by the unity of Jordan - willingly accepted by most Palestinians in Jordan, and (b) by the full participation of Palestinian Arabs in the legislative, executive and judicial branches of the Jordanian administration - as well as in the army... For us Jordanians it is difficult to distinguish between Palestinians and Jordanians..."

"The setting-up of a Palestinian Government for purposes of ostentation cannot contribute to the Arab effort. On the contrary, such a Government is liable to hinder this effort. Nor is there any point in establishing a show-piece Palestinian Government when most of the Palestinians are Jordan citizens."

(Jordan Premier Majali, quoted by Radio Amman,
23 August 1959)

3. Other Statements by Majali

"Jordan's gates are open to every Palestinian Arab who wants to come and settle down in this Kingdom as a citizen and not as a refugee, as in the case with our Palestinian brethren here, who are citizens of the Jordanian Kingdom."

(Premier Majali, quoted by "Falastin", Jordan daily, 25 August 1959)

"On his arrival at the Beirut airport, en route to Casablanca, Prime Minister Majali declared that he was astonished at the very raising of the subject of the establishment of a Palestine Government under the present circumstances, because the Palestine problem is clear enough, and the only way to solve it is through the return of the stolen lands to the refugees. The principal step in the direction of this solution is uniform Arab planning that will safeguard the Arabs' legal rights in Palestine. But to re-open the discussion on the Partition Resolution is tantamount to recognition of the State of Israel!"

(Quoted by Radio Ramallah, Jordan, 31 August 1959)

Radio Ramallah's comment on the above:

"We do not imagine that from the time of the Palestine catastrophe to the present day any leading Arab personality has made a statement such as this one of the Jordanian Prime Minister... All the other responsible Arabs are concentrating their efforts these days on trying to reap some benefit from the Partition Resolution - as though this were the grand objective for which the Arabs have been fighting for over 30 years."

(Radio Ramallah, Jordan, 31 August 1959)

"During Majali's stay in Beirut, certain Lebanese circles asked him to proclaim, in Casablanca, the readiness of his country, as the representative of Palestine, to take in all the refugees. Majali said he was prepared to do so, adding: 'But if Jordan agrees to take in all the refugees living in other Arab countries, she is afraid these countries

will then wash their hands of the refugees, and the whole burden will fall on Jordan. If, however, Jordan should receive guarantees from all the Arab states concerning their willingness to share the burden of the refugees and the Palestine problem, then she, on her part, will be prepared to do this."

("Al-Hayat", Beirut daily, 1 September 1959)

4. Differences at Casablanca

"Ahmad Hilmi, Prime Minister of the All-Palestine Government (at Gaza), spoke at Casablanca of the need to raise a Palestinian army with divisions in the host countries, such as Jordan, Lebanon and Syria, and in the Gaza Strip."

("Al-Hayat", Beirut daily, 2 September 1959)

"It is learned from several members of Arab delegations that Dr. Farid Zayn ad-Din, head of the UAR delegation, has notified the Political Committee that the UAR has implemented the League's decision with regard to the establishment of Palestinian army units."

("Falastin", Jordan daily, 3 September 1959)

"Hazza al-Majali, speaking before the Arab League's Political Committee at Casablanca, expressed his doubts concerning the recognition of an independent Palestinian organization of Palestinian military units. Majali said that a part of Palestine had united with Jordan as a result of the free will and choice of its inhabitants. Jordan will not recognize any foreign organization that will be set up to represent the Palestinians who associated themselves with Jordan of their own volition. Majali added that a large number of Palestinians are serving in the ranks of the Jordanian army, are camped on the borders and equipped with modern arms."

("Falastin", Jordan daily, 3 September 1959)

ARAB COMMENT ON CURRENT AFFAIRS

No. 18

31 August 1959

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(In connection with Hammarskjold Report on Refugees)	

ISRAEL MINISTRY FOR FOREIGN AFFAIRS - INFORMATION DIVISION - JERUSALEM

HAMMARSKJOLD REPORT ON ARAB REFUGEES

"Hamarskjold suggests the possible integration of the refugees in the economic life of the area... This is an old idea which has frequently been discussed and for which Zionist propaganda has done its utmost to rally support... The Arab States have categorically rejected all ideas aiming at this, whether they come from international figures affected by Zionist propaganda, or from a clique of traitorous Arab rulers such as Nuri Said and others."

("Saut al-Arab", Damascus daily, quoted by Radio Damascus, 25 June 1959)

"The Arab people can never accept the conversion of UNRWA's mission from grant of aid to economic integration. The Palestinians will never accede to the widening of UNRWA's powers in this manner."

("An-Nasr", Damascus daily, quoted by Radio Damascus, 25 June 1959)

"Among the characteristics of talkativeness is the fact that it reveals the truth about the one who talks, no matter how he may try to cover the truth with lies, as Hamarskjold did when he made his statements and as Salah Salim did when he commented on those statements. They want to preserve the secrecy of their attempts to liquidate the Palestine question. They want to betray the cause of the Palestinian people and serve the Zionists, but they do not want this betrayal to be exposed, nor do they want to lose their popularity among the peoples."

("Al-Istiklal", Baghdad daily, quoted by Radio Baghdad, 3 July 1959)

"...If Hamarskjold has private views on the subject, let him raise them at his private meetings and not at press conferences..."

("Al-Gomhuriya", Cairo daily, 27th June 1959)

"The Hamarskjold Report tries to regard Israel as an integral part of the Middle East entitled, in his view, to equal rights - though not so with regard to obligations... The Report removes the burden of compensation to the refugees from Israel and places it on the oil royalties,... ignoring the fact that the peoples of the oil states are poor and destitute and that the expenditure of the oil royalties on these peoples is an Arab problem the solution of which will take decades."

("Ad-Difaa", Jordan daily, 28th June 1959)

"This report by Hamarskjold disregards all UN resolutions, and neglects even the partition and compensation resolution, which was rejected by the Arab countries and the Palestinian Arabs."

("Al-Wahdah", Damascus daily, quoted by Radio Damascus, 11 August 1959)

Voices in Favour of Integration:

"We would not oppose the regrouping of all Palestinian refugees on our territory. Whatever Arab country they come from, they will be received as if in their own land."

Beirut daily,

• (Jordan Premier Majali, in interview for "L'Orient", quoted by Reuter 29th August 1959)

"The refugees' natural inclination - despite the noisy chorus all about them - is to immediate integration. Until our Governments get up the courage to look at things in this light, time does its work and pulls us along with it."

("Al-Hayat", Beirut daily, 14 Aug. 1959)

"In the wave of comment that came in the wake of the Hammarskjold Report, the most prominent feature once again was the Arab spirit of negation - criticizing, accusing, threatening... The Arabs are the last people in the world today who are taking an interest in the refugees or trying to do them justice... Eleven years have already passed. During this time the Arab Governments have not moved a finger in order to do justice to the refugees, even when they had the opportunity to negotiate on an international level."

("Al-Hayat", Beirut daily, 24 June 1959)

"In the Arab states - particularly in the Syrian Region and in the oil-rich states - there are vast unsettled areas in need of exploitation and working hands. The UN is prepared to finance a programme that will assure the refugees an honourable livelihood. Why, then, do these countries (the Arab states opposed to the Hammarskjold Plan) demand that the refugees remain a heavy burden on Lebanon, with its small area and limited resources?"

("Al-Amal", Beirut daily, 25 June 1959)

(More excerpts from "Al-Hayat" and "Al-Amal" - in Appendix)

THE CAMPAIGN AGAINST ISRAEL

"The object of the establishment of Israel is the destruction of the Arab world and its disintegration... It is our duty to meet aggression with stronger aggression."

(Abdul Nasser, Radio Cairo, 8 August 1959)

"We want a decisive battle in order to annihilate that germ, Israel. All the Arabs want a decisive battle!"

(Abdul Nasser in Alexandria, Reuter, 26 July 1959)

"We look forward to the coming round, in which the decisive battle will take place, so that we shall be able to get rid of Israel and the crime of Israel."

(Abdul Nasser at Idfina, Radio Cairo, 28 July 1959)

"When Abdul Nasser said that we want this decisive battle in order to get rid of Israel, we knew that, at the grave moment those whose voices are loudest in time of leisure would be silent and those who only bluster in time of peace would flee from the battle. We knew that in this battle we would be able to depend only on God and ourselves and the Arab people, not on those who believe in the right to swerve away when the decisive hour comes..."

"When we threaten Israel we are fully conscious of our action and aware that we depend on ourselves, our army and the Arab people..."

("Al-Akhbar", Cairo daily, quoted by Radio Cairo, 29 July 1959)

"Israel forgets that her very existence is an aggression in itself... The coming decisive battle will rid us once and for all of the illegitimate Israel."

("Al-Gomhouriya", Cairo daily, quoted by Radio Cairo, 2 August 1959)

"Israel...is nothing but a black spot which all the Arabs must unite to face its threats, and then to remove it once and for all... All the Arabs, from the Gulf to the Ocean, fully support President Nasser. They are prepared for the decisive battle."

(Imam Ghalib Bin Ali of Oman, Radio Cairo, 8 August 1959)

"Jordan and the UAR are close to Israel, constituting a kind of pincers around the gangster state. Our highest interests, therefore, oblige us to cooperate on a basis of mutual respect."

("Al-Bilad", Jordan weekly, 19 July 1959)

"Every factory built by the Arabs is a grave for a part of Israel. Israel sees the signs of its doom behind the Arabs' revival."

("Al-Akhbar", Cairo daily, quoted by Radio Cairo, 1 Aug. 1959)

"Arab agents have declared that they see no reason why negotiations should not be held with Israel, within the framework of the UN, to solve outstanding problems. From this we learn that a new plot is afoot to settle the refugees in order to liquidate once and for all our hopes of liberating Palestine."

("Voice of the Arabs", Cairo, 22 June 1959)

SUEZ IMPASSE

'Our Canal'

"Israel wants to impose on us... its will to use our Canal, but Israel can never use the Suez Canal."

(Radio Cairo, 8 Aug. 1959)

'Our Region'

"This problem is considered a vital one, since the closing of the Canal means the cessation of trade between Israel and all the countries of Asia and Africa... This is our region."

(Radio Cairo, 2 July 1959)

Defiance of UN - in Advance

"The UAR will not respond to any request, no matter how much she is pressed or what resolutions will be passed by the UN."

(Radio Cairo, 14 August 1959)

'AGGRESSION' DEFINED BY EMIR FEISAL

From interview with Emir Feisal, Prime Minister of Saudi Arabia:

Feisal: "The Arab states are united in their opposition to Israel aggression in the Gulf of Akaba."

Interviewer: "What is the nature of this aggression?"

Feisal: "The Gulf of Akaba has been an Arab gulf for the past 1,300 years. This gulf was closed to our sworn enemy, Israel, from the time of her establishment until the Sinai Campaign. Since then the Gulf has been opened to her by force, and ships have begun to ply its waters from the Far East to the Jewish port of Eilat and back."

"The opening of the Gulf revived this Jewish port, which had been paralysed for eight years and, as a result, breathed life into the Negev region (southern Israel). Furthermore, the Jews, financed by the Zionist Rothschild Family, laid a big pipeline for transporting oil to Haifa for refining: thus Israel will become an oil-trading state..."

"It is incumbent upon Saudi Arabia, the UAR and Jordan to recover this stolen Arab gulf - even if this will require the use of force."

(Quoted by "Falastin", Jordan daily, 24 July 1959)

THE INNER-ARAB CONFLICT

1. UAR vs. Iraq

"The Arabs received the shock of their lives and history when, only a few months after the (Iraqi) revolution had broken out, some of its leaders divided Iraq into two camps, waging a fierce war... Instead of joining the Arab procession to fight the real enemies, instead of raising their arms in the face of imperialism, Zionism and reaction, these Iraqi leaders pointed their weapons at the breasts of us Arabs and even at the breasts of nationalist Iraqis who want liberty for the Arabs, unity and progress."

("Ash-Shaab", Cairo daily, quoted by Radio Cairo, 14 July 1959)

"The policy imposed on the Egyptian and Syrian press has been distinguished by its skill in creating news... Iraqi public opinion mocks this press, which is controlled by the Egyptian intelligence service and the Syrian Deuxieme Bureau, publishing lies until it has become an expert in spreading rumours about events of its own imagining: false battles, victims and injuries inflicted in Baghdad streets and in other towns of the Iraqi Republic."

(Radio Baghdad, 26 June 1959)

"Now, one year after the revolution of Arab Iraq, what do the rulers of Iraq wish to do? The Arab people's demands in Iraq are clear and well known. Anyone who tries to annex Iraq to the Arab caravan and to the Arab procession which is moving towards liberation and sovereignty does good for the Arab nation and the Arab people of Iraq..."

"But, to plot against the principles of Arab nationalism, to impose domination on the Iraqi people by force, and to prevent the Arab people of Iraq from attending to their Arab liberation cause - all these are wrong and

will bring nothing but defeat and failure to the plotters and deviationists."

(Radio Damascus, 13 July 1959)

"No hope should be held out for any positive result from the attempted mediation of any Arab country between Iraq and the UAR, so long as the latter feeds the fires of this dispute by means of its propaganda organs and hired press..."

"It is to be regretted that some Arab newspapers accept sums of money to give great prominence to defamatory material copied from the Cairo press. This propaganda game of the UAR against Iraq follows the line of her activities, in the past, against most of the Arab countries, all of which resulted in shameful failure. The UAR and all the world are now suffering the consequences of her verbal wars, her lies, intrigues and attempted coups d'etats..."

"The lack of understanding prevailing in the Arab camp today is but the outcome of the UAR's activities and the hysterical attacks of her boastful dictator."

("Hawl al-Islam", Amman (Jordan) weekly, 9 July 59)

2. Criticism of the Israel Boycott...

"The feeling that guided the activities of the boycott (of Israel) on certain occasions caused more damage to the Arabs than to Israel. By prohibiting transactions with firms having dealings with Israel, the boycott offices have undermined world confidence in the Arab markets and, in many cases, led to the alienation of foreign capital from the Arab states. The boycott offices have devoted the major part of their energies to finding negative and superficial solutions to the problems that face them, in order to impose a foolish siege (on Israel) that, in effect, saps the strength of the Arabs and attracts foreign capital to Israel..."

("Al-Jarida", Beirut daily, 12 August 1959)

3. ...And of the Arab League

"The impasse in the activity of the Arab League stems from the pan-Arab tendencies initiated by Iraq and the UAR, which are not eager for a revival of the League, serving as it does to maintain the status quo in the Arab world..."

"After the Egyptian Revolution and the start of the struggle between Cairo and Baghdad, the League gradually turned into an Egyptian tool. The chorus of opponents to this phenomenon spread from North Africa to Jordan and Iraq, and the demand was raised that the League's seat be transferred from Cairo to a neutral Arab capital such as Beirut or Khartoum and that the post of Secretary-General be given, on occasion, to someone from another Arab country (than Egypt)."

("Al-Hayat", Beirut daily, 9 August 1959)

"What can we do when Egypt has made up her mind that the Arab League is to remain in the nature of an Egyptian club, restricted in its scope of activities?"

("Hawl al-Islam", Jordan weekly, 23 July 1959)

"The Arab League has failed in the realization of the aims for whose sake it came into being. The League has not succeeded in implementing a thing - neither in the Arab world nor in the international arena - since

it is under the influence of a certain one of its members."

(Radio Amman, 20 June 1959)

4. Israel as a Goad

"Nasser said he would purge Palestine of Zionism. What have you done during the past seven years? If the Iraqi Revolution were seven years old, Israel would not exist... Abdul Karim Kassem is a true Arab and will liberate Palestine."

(Fadel Mahdawi, President of Iraqi Military Tribunal, Radio Baghdad, 25 July 1959)

"Majid Amin alleged that the present regime in Iraq was the only one which could ensure the restoration of Palestine to its people... Tell us, Majid Amin, do you really want to retrieve Palestine and eliminate Israel, at a time when the Israel radio praises you and attacks the UAR? Answer, Majid Amin, for all I can see is just bluster, not action."

("Voice of the Arabs", Cairo, 4 August 1959)

"Why does the UAR remain silent about the matter of navigation through the Gulf of Akaba, when she is able to do something about it? Why are the UN forces still in Gaza?"

(Radio Amman, 8 July 1959)

5. General

"The Arabs have competed to harm each other for a long time. It is time they competed in doing good to each other."

("Ad-Difaa", Jordan daily, quoted by Radio Amman, 12 July 1959)

"Why is Gamal Abdul Nasser interested in the Yemen? It is a neighbour to Saudi Arabia, and Gamal intends to infiltrate into Saudi Arabia from Yemen. He knows that he cannot establish an empire without oilfields. But the Saudi Arabian King and his brother Feisal know Gamal's ambitions, and they need no warnings."

("Voice of Free Egypt", 16 June 1959)

AGITATION FROM CAIRO

"The UAR...is a bastion for the Arab struggle throughout the Arab nation."

(Abdul Nasser, Radio Cairo, 22 July 1959)

1. 'From the Ocean to the Gulf'

"The 'Voice of the Arabs' will continue with its mission, giving expression to the Arabs' holy war and holy march. It will remain a beacon for Arab awareness... This is our call and the call of the free Arabs. It is the call which the 'Voice of the Arabs' has reiterated and will continue to reiterate until the free flag of Arabism is raised over the liberated Arab homeland from the Ocean to the Gulf."

("Voice of the Arabs", Cairo, 1 July 1959)

"Remember those enemies who exploit your country's wealth and suck your blood, remember those enemies who render homeless your brothers abroad and rejoice in your disaster: always remember those people, because they are your enemies and our enemies. Indeed, they are the enemies of all the peoples - the enemies of progress, freedom and humanity."

("Voice of the Arabs", Cairo, 6 July 1959)

"Mujahidin!(1) We require more activity and solidarity; continue your struggle in the same spirit of heroism and daring gallantry, and do not give the enemy a single opportunity to rest! Maintain the holy war until you achieve complete victory over imperialism and its underlings in the country!"

("Voice of the Arabs", Cairo, to Oman, 13 Aug. 1959)

2. To Iraq

(1) Fighters of the Holy War

"Heroic Kirkuk, valiant Kirkuk, resisting Kirkuk, Kirkuk is flooded with blood... Sons of the Arabs, Turkmen and Kurdish tribes: your brothers await your help. Go to Kirkuk to support them. Ubayd tribes, Jubur tribes, Sada tribes - take up arms, make sacrifices and support your brothers in bleeding Kirkuk!"

("Voice of Free Iraq", broadcasting from UAR, 21 July 1959)

"The fears of Israel and Britain (with regard to the Iraqi Revolution) were set aside when it became clear that the Iraqi rulers were not working to strengthen the Arab struggle and to unite - or close ranks - with the UAR... My brother in Iraq: it is up to you!"

("Voice of the Arabs", Cairo, 14 July 1959)

"A number of free men whose circumstances enabled them to remain outside Iraq have felt that duty calls upon them to raise high the voice of free Iraq abroad, and command the liberation movement within the country. Hence they have formed the Iraqi National Grouping Organization to continue the struggle to...establish a democratic-socialist-cooperative regime in which citizens will be free from poverty and ignorance and everyone will enjoy complete equality."

(Radio Cairo, 1 July 1959)

"Kassem, the agent, is Iraq's greatest traitor after Nuri. The people who rose on 14th July will crush the traitors and agents. The people who fought imperialism and its agents for 40 years will not rest until they liberate Iraq from the divider of the people. The people will soon rise, and the agents, traitors and opportunists will be made to account for their actions, just as Nuri and his agents were made to account for theirs. The day is close at hand!"

("Voice of Free Iraq", broadcasting from UAR, 28 June 1959)

SOME NASSER FABRICATIONS - AND THE FACTS

Fabrication:

"Ben Gurion told the Knesset that military government restrictions on the Arab minority in Israel would continue, following the recent threats by Abdul Nasser. This shows that Ben Gurion is in a panic and is avenging himself on the Arab minority."

(Radio Cairo, 30 July 1959)

Fact:

The burden of Mr. Ben Gurion's remarks on that occasion was that the Israel Government had decided on a series of far-reaching changes aimed at easing military government restrictions.

Fabrication:

"Moshe Dayan said...that Israel would have to occupy Sinai and the eastern bank of the Suez Canal... He said that Israel should occupy Sinai now."

(Abdul Nasser at Alexandria, Radio Cairo, 26 July 1959)

Fact:

In actual fact, Dayan raised the possibility of such an operation only to reject it on the spot. Here is what Dayan actually wrote: "...This method is available only in theory. A territorial change of this kind can be carried out only as part of a world-wide policy seeking to change the political structure of the area, and when conditions are suitable. It is not worth discussing this scheme at greater length, and no such proposal is being put forward by any of the political parties in Israel."

(*"Jerusalem Post"*, 24 July 1959)

President Nasser on 10 August:

"Israel is a permanent threat... That is why we are building the UAR national army..."

(Abdul Nasser, at Alexandria, Radio Cairo, 10 Aug. 1959)

Vice-President Amer on 11 August:

"Israel...has forgotten all dreams of attacking Egypt."

(Abdul Hakim Amer, UAR Vice-President and C-in-C of armed forces, Radio Cairo, 11 August 1959)

And Nasser himself 5 $\frac{1}{2}$ weeks earlier:

"I cannot imagine that two or even three million people living in Israel could be a danger threatening 50 million Arabs surrounding them..."

(Abdul Nasser, in interview for *"Al-Ahram"*, Cairo daily, 30 June 1959)

"No sensible person could imagine that the Israeli army is capable of carrying out a real military operation in the vast area surrounding it."

(Abdul Nasser in same interview)

APPENDIX

ARAB NEWSPAPERS ON ARAB INTRANSIGENCE

(in connection with the Hammarskjold Report on the Refugees)

'The Arab Spirit of Negation'

"In the wave of comment that came in the wake of the Hammarskjold Report, the most prominent feature once again was the Arab spirit of negation - criticizing, accusing, threatening...

"The Arabs are the last people in the world today who are taking an interest in the refugees or trying to do them justice... Eleven years have already passed. During this time the Arab Governments have not moved a finger in order to do justice to the refugees, even when they had the opportunity to negotiate on an international level...

"The whole Arab mentality is in need of a fundamental change in this matter. Ever since the real struggle between the Arabs and the Jews in Palestine began, in the second decade of this century, the Arabs have known nothing but the negation that is concentrated in the word 'NO', without linking this with a practical policy. We demand what we want, but we do not think about what we are able to do; and thus we have achieved nothing since we rejected the White Paper (of Britain, concerning the limitation of Jewish immigration to Palestine) in 1939... Thus for more than a third of a century we have been living in false hopes - hopes not founded in logic or capacity, will or loyalty - and in an illusion of lies and ignorance.

"When are we going to have a practical policy, based on the facts of the Arab world, the region and the international scene?... In the Palestine problem, history will say tomorrow - the Arabs were the victims of themselves: their ignorance, their blindness and their arrogance."

• ("Al-Hayat", Beirut daily, 24 June 59)

'A Further Example of Our Hypocrisy'

"The Lebanese Foreign Ministry has instructed its representative at the UN to notify Hammarskjold that it does not agree with his remarks concerning the settlement of the refugees in the Arab countries. Similar statements will no doubt be issued by the other Arab states.

"Here we have a further example of our hypocrisy. For is there an Arab country in which there has been a greater absorption of refugees than in Lebanon? Of the 120,000 refugees who entered Lebanon, not more than 15,000 are still in camps. Taking into account a natural growth of 15,000, we may conclude that 120,000 refugees have been absorbed in Lebanon and have become an integral part of her inhabitants, her society and her economy.

"Yet we refuse to settle the refugees - but we do it in the Arab way: the way of the ostrich!

"The Arab states, the refugees and the whole world know that, in our present position, on the basis of our present policy, we Arabs are not going to do a thing for the refugees - except their continued absorption, without Israel and the Great Powers having to pay a price for this. Yet

we 'reject' resettlement, we brand every stranger who dares to mention the word 'resettlement' as being guilty of treason, imperialism and plotting - even if he wants to do us or the refugees a service.

"Finally, those who have no compassion for themselves can expect none from others. The time has come for us to shake off this hysteria of verbal heroism and of the raising of false visions in our hearts and in the hearts of the refugees. The time has come for the Arab states to get rid of the ambition to win over the masses in a contest of words about Palestine. Let them pass from their policy of shedding crocodile tears to one of planning means and end."

("Al-Hayat", Beirut daily, 25 June 1959)

Arabs Also Rejected Partition, Then Changed Minds

"The Arab states vehemently condemned the UN when that institution adopted resolutions concerning the partition of Palestine and the internationalization of Jerusalem. They rejected these resolutions, subsequently changed their minds and demanded their implementation.

"The same states have now taken a unified stand of passivity with regard to the Hammarskjöld Plan concerning the settlement of the refugees. Tomorrow, perhaps, they will about-face again, when settlement will have become unfeasible - just as the partition-of-Palestine plan became unfeasible - and then the Arab states will adopt a positive stand (towards the Hammarskjöld Plan) and seek its implementation...

"More than 11 years have gone by since the refugees were scattered in all directions and became a burden on small countries like Lebanon and Jordan and on the UN relief agency. To discuss their settlement today is no crime... In the Arab states - particularly in the Syrian Region and in the oil-rich states - there are vast unsettled areas in need of exploitation and working hands. The UN is prepared to finance a programme that will assure the refugees of an honourable livelihood.

"Why, then, do these countries demand that the refugees remain a heavy burden on Lebanon, with its small area and limited resources? The refugees are threatened with hunger and disease; in winter they suffer from the cold and the floods, and in summer - from the intense heat... Why, if they truly sympathize with these people, do they abandon them to so bitter and cruel a fate?...

"Before these states, separately or collectively, reply 'No' to Hammarskjöld, they should carefully examine his plan, with all its advantages and drawbacks."

("Al-Amal", Beirut daily, 25 June 1959)

Pleasing 'The Street'

"The tendency emerging from the discussions at the Sofar Conference (on the Hammarskjöld Report) is to reject the settlement of the refugees and demand implementation of the partition resolution... That is natural enough, since this is the only subject concerning which we base ourselves on the decision of the UN...

"Assuming that the impossible will come about and the UN will decide to implement that aspect of the partition resolution pertaining to the return of the refugees - what will be the results?

"How many refugees will want to return and live as Israel citizens, as stipulated in the UN Resolution? Will the Arab states accept this stipulation? If the refugees will reject a return of this nature, what are we going to do? And what will be their position in such a case?

"Our Governments are dealing with this matter in a manner that is calculated to please 'the street'; that is why they reject everything. This method will merely lead to the absorption of the refugees in their present places of abode until, a generation hence, the refugees will have disappeared and all that will remain will be the natives of the second homeland - and even the word 'refugees' will pass from the international decisions concerning them..

"Eleven years have passed... and we have done nothing for the refugees - neither in the Arab field nor in the international field."

("Al-Hayat", Beirut daily, 12 August 1959)

'Experts' Must Follow Official Line

"One of the experts at the Sofar Conference has written to us as follows:

"Your call to treat the refugees problem purely from the point of view of experts stands in contradiction to the way of thinking of the Arab Governments and to their treatment of this problem as a purely political one. Even as experts we are not permitted to deviate from the policy laid down by our Governments."

"We conclude, from the words of this expert, that it is his intention to declare openly that no great things are to be expected from this experts' conference, since the experts are bound by Governmental doctrines and are responsible to their Governments."

("Al-Hayat", Beirut daily, 14 August 1959)

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PALESTINE

1947 A. ACTION BY THE U.N. 1947-50

April, 1947, a special session of the General Assembly, requested by the United Kingdom, established the United Nations Special Committee on Palestine, comprising Australia, Canada, Czechoslovakia, Guatemala, India, Iran, Netherlands, Peru, Sweden, Uruguay and Yugoslavia. The Commission visited the Middle East and submitted :-

- (a) a majority plan recommending partition into an Arab State, a Jewish State, and an international regime for Jerusalem, the three to be linked in an economic union;
- (b) a minority (Australia, India, Iran and Yugoslavia) plan recommending an independent federal State, comprising an Arab and a Jewish State, with Jerusalem as its capital.

November, 1947, the 2nd Regular Session of the Assembly voted 33 (Australia, U.S., U.S.S.R.)-13 (Middle Eastern countries, India, Pakistan)-10 (U.K., some Latins) for the majority plan and established the United Nations Palestine Commission (Bolivia, Czechoslovakia, Denmark, Panama and Philippines) to implement the recommendations. It called for termination of the British mandate and withdrawal of British forces not later than 1st August, 1948.

1948 The United Kingdom later announced its intention to terminate the mandate on 15th May, 1948. The Palestine Commission reported to the Security Council on the steady deterioration of conditions, and on the Mandatory Power's policy of not cooperating in the implementation of the partition plan.

March, 1948, the Council called on its permanent members to consult and recommend instructions to the Commission. The United States reported to the Council 19th March that consultations with the other permanent members and Jewish and Arab organizations had shown that in existing conditions partition could not be implemented by peaceful means; the permanent members recommended that the Council :-

- (a) make clear it would not permit the existence of a threat to peace;
- (b) take further action to restore law and order.

(United States, China, and France agreed to all the above. The U.S.S.R. agreed the recommendations though considering them too vague, but did not agree with the findings, particularly that partition could not be implemented by peaceful means. The United Kingdom had not actively participated in the consultations.)

19th March. The United States proposed to the Council :-

- (a) a temporary Trusteeship for Palestine and suspension of the Palestine Commission's efforts to implement partition.

- (b) that this proposal be put to a special session of the Assembly.

1st April. The Council adopted the proposal for a special Assembly session (which met on 16th April). The same day the Council summoned representatives of the Jewish Agency and the Arab Higher Committee for discussions on a truce. It called for a cessation of violence. 15th April the Council President reported no agreement reached.

17th April. The Council called for a truce. 23rd April the Council established a Truce Commission for Palestine (career consular officers in Jerusalem of Belgium, France and the United States) to assist in supervising the (called for) truce.

30th April. The Truce Commission reported a rapidly deteriorating situation.

Meanwhile the special Assembly had been discussing arrangements for Jerusalem and for Palestine. On 5th May the Trusteeship Council (which had previously prepared a draft statute for Jerusalem) recommended, following a request from the Assembly for its views, the appointment of a neutral Special Municipal Commissioner for Jerusalem. One was appointed by the Assembly, 14th May, but as no truce was established, and the Arab authorities refused to co-operate, he never went to Jerusalem.

There was not the necessary 2/3rds majority in the Assembly for the United States proposal for a Palestine Trusteeship. An Anglo-French proposal for a temporary international regime for Jerusalem based on the Trusteeship provisions of the Charter was rejected on 14th May.

14th May. The State of Israel was proclaimed. The Assembly adjourned having left to a Committee of the five Great Powers the appointment of a United Nations Mediator to take over from the Palestine Commission. (Bernadotte was appointed 20th May.)

15th May. The Arab States instituted armed action in Palestine. The Security Council on 18th May sent questionnaires to the parties.

22nd May. The Council called for a cessation of all military activity in Palestine and a cease fire within 36 hours (later extended to 26th May at request of the Arabs).

29th May. The Council called for a four-week cease fire and decided to supply the Mediator and Truce Commission with military observers. The Secretary-General sent 50 observers and Belgium, France, and the United States (members of the Truce Commission) others.

The truce became effective 11th June. On 7th June the Council appealed for the prolongation of the truce. The truce expired 9th July. Israel agreed to extend it, the Arabs refused, and fighting recommenced.

On 15th July the Council ordered a cease fire under threat of enforcement measures under Chapter VII of the Charter and an immediate cease fire in Jerusalem. The Jerusalem cease fire came into effect on 16th July and a general cease fire on 18th July.

The Mediator was assassinated on 17th September and Bunche succeeded as Acting Mediator.

The Third General Assembly on 11th December passed Resolution 194 (III) which :

- (a) established a Conciliation Commission (France, Turkey, and United States) to assist the Governments concerned to achieve a final settlement of all questions;
- (b) resolved that Jerusalem be placed under effective international control;
- (c) resolved that refugees who wished to return peaceably to their homes should be allowed to do so.

Fighting broke out between Egypt and Israel in October. On 19th October the Security Council ordered a cease fire which was accepted by both parties 23rd October. Fighting was renewed in November, and on 16th November the Council called for negotiations forthwith on an immediate armistice throughout Palestine. 22nd December fighting again broke out in the Negev. 29th December the Council called on governments :

- (a) to order an immediate cease fire;
- (b) to implement a 4th November resolution providing for withdrawal to positions held before 14th October;
- (c) to facilitate the supervision of the truce by United Nations observers.

1949

7th January was set as a deadline on all fronts. Armistice Agreements were negotiated and signed, in the presence of the United Nations Acting Mediator and the U.N.T.S.O. Chief of Staff, between Israel and Egypt (February), Lebanon (March), Jordan (April), and Syria (July).

Each Armistice Agreement set up a Mixed Armistice Commission (representatives of the parties under the chairmanship of the U.N.T.S.O. Chief of Staff) to investigate complaints, using observers from U.N.T.S.O. or, if unanimously agreed, from the parties.

The Armistice Agreement recognized that their provisions were dictated purely by military considerations and should in no way prejudice any claims by the parties in the ultimate peaceful settlement. The de facto situation created by the armistice agreements left :

- (a) the territory of the contemplated Arab State in Palestine occupied by Israel, Jordan and Egypt;
- (b) Jerusalem divided between Israel and Jordan.

11th August 1949. The Security Council passed a resolution :

- (a) declaring that the Armistice Agreements superseded the Council's truce;
- (b) relieving the Acting Mediator of further responsibilities;
- (c) providing for continued service of United Nations observers to observe the cease fire and help in the implementation of the Armistice Agreements;
- (d) urging the parties to negotiate a final settlement either directly or through the Palestine Conciliation Commission.

On 9th December the 4th General Assembly, after considering reports from the Commission recommending a form of dyarchy for Jerusalem resolved (303 (IV)) that Jerusalem should be a corpus separatum. The Trusteeship Council would be the administering authority, and was instructed not to allow any action taken by an interested government to divert it from adopting and implementing the Statute.

The Trusteeship Council :

- (a) in December asked Israel to revoke the removal of Ministries to Jerusalem;
- (b) in April 1950 approved a statute;
- (c) reported in June that Israel and Jordan had, in effect, refused to co-operate.

The Fifth Assembly failed to reach a definite decision on Jerusalem.

Resolution 394(V) directed the Conciliation Commission to work out arrangements for repatriation of those Refugees who required it, and assessment and payment of compensation to the rest.

B. ACTION BY THE U.N. 1950-1956

(1) General Assembly

Resolution 512(VI) urged the governments concerned to seek agreement on a settlement in conformity with Assembly resolutions, and requested the Conciliation Commission to remain available and make progress reports. The Seventh Assembly failed to reach agreement on any resolution. A provision for re-affirming

the principle of the internationalization of Jerusalem did not get a two-thirds majority (Australia abstained).

Since then the Assembly has considered Palestine only in the context of U.N.R.W.A.

(2) Security Council

In September 1950 Egypt complained of the expulsion into Egypt from Israel of thousands of refugees. On 17th November the Council resolved to pass the problem to the M.A.C.

In March ^{and April} 1951 Syria complained of Israel irrigation works in the demilitarized zone at Lake Huleh and of an Israeli air raid. The Council censured ^{these} Israeli raids.

In July 1951 Israel complained of the Egyptian blockade of the Canal. On 1st September the Council called on Egypt to terminate the restrictions.

In October 1953 the Council strongly censured an Israeli retaliatory raid on Jordan, but noted border crossings from Jordan.

In October 1953 Syria complained of Israeli works (in the demilitarized zone) designed to divert the Jordan. On 27th October the Council resolved that it was desirable for the works to be suspended pending the Council's urgent consideration of the question, and noted with satisfaction Israeli's undertaking to do this. A U.K./U.S. resolution appealing to Israel to stop the irrigation works and empowering the U.N.T.S.O. Chief of Staff to assist in a reconciliation of Israel and Syrian interests was vetoed by the U.S.S.R. (the first Soviet veto on Palestine) as giving too much power to the U.N.T.S.O. Chief of Staff.

In January, 1954 Israel complained of the continued Suez blockade, and of later restrictions on shipping in the Gulf of Aquaba. In March a New Zealand resolution calling on Egypt to comply with the 1st September Resolution on the Canal, and referring the Aquaba blockade to the M.A.C., was vetoed by the U.S.S.R.

In March and April Israel and Jordan complained of border violations. After five weeks of discussion the Council resolved the procedural difficulties blocking the adoption of the agenda, but did not proceed to a resolution.

From October 1954 to January 1955 the Council considered an Israeli complaint that the S.S. Bat Galim had not been allowed passage through the Canal. No resolution was offered since a Soviet veto was inevitable.

In March 1955 Egypt complained of a major Israeli raid (39 Egyptians killed) on Gaza, and Israel complained of continuous raids from Egyptian territory and of Egypt's assertion of a continuing state of war. On 29th/30th March the Council adopted two resolutions condemning the Israel raid and calling for a strict compliance by all parties with the Armistice Agreements; and calling on the U.N.T.S.O. Chief of Staff to continue his efforts for practical measures to preserve security in the area.

In August/September 1955 Israel and Egypt complained of incidents in the Gaza area. On 8th September the Council adopted a resolution endorsing the Chief of Staff's view that the armed forces of both parties should be effectively separated and calling on the parties to cooperate fully with the Chief of Staff to this end.

In December 1955 Syria complained of an Israeli attack from Lake Tiberias. Israel claimed provocation. A tripartite resolution warning Israel to desist from further violations of the Armistice Agreements was unanimously passed after it had been strengthened to state specifically that Syrian actions in no way justified the Israel action.

In March the U.S. requested the Council to consider the status of compliance with the Armistice Agreements and with the Council resolutions adopted in the last year. The Council on 4th April resolved that the continuance of the existing situation was likely to endanger peace, and that the Secretary-General should make a survey and arrange with the parties and with the Chief of Staff for the adoption of measures to reduce tension. Measures suggested were :

- (a) withdrawal of forces from the Armistice lines;
- (b) full freedom of movement for U.N. observers;
- (c) establishment of local arrangements for the prevention of incidents and the prompt detection of any violations of the Armistice Agreements.

The Secretary-General reported in May that during his visit to the area he had obtained assurances from all the parties that they would unconditionally observe the cease fire subject only to a reservation on self-defense, and that he had obtained various assurances on (a) (b) and (c) above.

The Security Council on 4th June endorsed the Secretary-General's view that "the re-establishment of full compliance with the Armistice Agreements represents a stage which has to be passed in order to make progress possible on the main issues between the parties".

On 27th September the Secretary-General reported that :

"The Governments in the region have so far not only not taken any initiatives which could help to start the necessary developments in the right direction, but also, while in many cases they have made energetic efforts to support the cease fire by appropriate instructions to their forces, they have, seen in retrospect, failed to carry through a discipline sufficiently firm to forestall incidents which, step by step, must necessarily undermine the cease fire."

On 15th October, Jordan complained of military action by Israel, on 25th/26th September and 11th October, against Jordanian border villages. Israel filed a counter complaint of persistent violations by Jordan of the Armistice Agreements and of the cease fire pledge made to the Secretary-General. Consideration of these complaints has been interrupted by the events in Suez.

(3) Conciliation Commission

In August 1951 the Commission convened a conference in Paris between Israel and the Arab States. In September the Commission presented to the Conference a set of proposals providing for :-

- (a) declaration of pacific intentions by all signatories to the Armistice Agreements;
- (b) mutual cancellation of war damage claims;
- (c) Israel to agree to the repatriation of a specified number of refugees able to be integrated into the Israeli economy and willing to live peaceably in Israel;
- (d) Israel to pay as compensation for non-repatriated refugees a global sum evaluated by the Commission;
- (e) mutual release of all blocked accounts;
- (f) consideration of the revision or amendment of the Armistice Agreements especially in regard to :

8.

- (i) territorial adjustments;
- (ii) creation of an international water authority;
- (iii) disposition of the Gaza strip;
- (iv) creation of a free port at Haifa;
- (v) border regulations, particularly in regard to free access to the Holy Places;
- (vi) resumption of economic relations between Israel and her neighbours to promote the economic development of the area.

The Arab delegations argued :

- (a) that the Commission was exceeding its mandate and re-opening subjects already decided by the General Assembly;
- (b) that the Armistice agreements were valid, continuing non-aggression pacts beyond which it was not necessary to go;
- (c) that mutual cancellation of war damage claims was unjust since the Mandatory Power, Jewish terrorists and the United Nations were responsible for the Palestine conflict;
- (d) that there should be no limitations on the return of refugees;
- (e) that Israel and the United Nations shared the responsibility for paying compensation to refugees;
- (f) that blocked accounts should be released immediately;
- (g) Egypt and Jordan had no objection to enlarging the scope of the Armistice Agreements; Lebanon opposed; Syria commented that the proposal seemed to aim at ratifying a fait accompli in defiance of United Nations decisions.

Israel

- (a) accepted the proposal for a declaration of peaceful intentions, but later suggested it be extended to a non-aggression pact;
- (b) did not accept mutual cancellation of war damage claims because the Arab States had been the aggressors;

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- (c) argued that security, political and economic considerations made the return of Arab refugees impossible;
- (d) was prepared to contribute to property compensation bearing in mind that Arab aggression had caused the abandonment, that the Arab economic blockade affected Israel's capacity to pay, and that Jewish property had been abandoned in Arab Palestine and Iraq;
- (e) argued that a settlement of blocked accounts must include blocked Jewish accounts in Iraq;
- (f) welcomed the move to enlarge the scope of the Armistice Agreements.

In November the Commission terminated the conference on the ground that it had been unable to persuade the parties to discuss the proposals in a fair and unrealistic spirit.

In the 6th Assembly the Arabs criticized the Commission's report, as not placing sufficient emphasis on the problem of the nearly a million refugees, and as disregarding Israel's policy of unrestricted immigration, which was indicative of Israel's policy of territorial expansion. The Arabs called for a re-affirmation of the Assembly's past resolutions.

Israel stated the primary reason for the absence of progress was the refusal of the Arabs to engage in direct negotiations with Israel.

The Soviet Union sought to terminate the Commission because it had "exceeded its mandate and acted in the interests of the United States".

The Assembly's resolution (512(VI)) recalled "all the resolutions adopted at previous sessions". It considered that "the governments concerned have the primary responsibility for reaching a settlement of their outstanding differences in conformity with the resolutions of the General Assembly", and asked the Commission to continue its efforts accordingly.

In 1952 the Commission reported that it had received no response to a further offer to meet with the parties, and that it had decided that the most promising way of assisting the parties would be by further efforts to solve the questions of :

- (a) compensation for refugees;
- (b) release of blocked accounts in Israel.

The latest report of the Commission
(October 1956) reports the following progress :

- (a) all governments are extending assistance in the very complicated task of identifying Arab refugee property holdings in Israel and the process can be expected to be completed by mid-1957. However, Israel has informed the Commission (March 1956) that the problem of compensation can not be considered "in disregard of the general context of Arab-Israel relations", and that when Arab Governments loosen their economic blockade and show proof of "readiness to assume an attitude more in conformity with the Charter of the United Nations" Israel will make known its detailed plans for compensation;
- (b) some £2,600,000 of an estimated £3,300,000 in blocked accounts has been released by Israel so far and the scheme is progressing satisfactorily;
- (c) transfer of valuables held in banks and safe deposits is making "slow but steady progress".

1/5/7

Memo No. 1748/53

9th December, 1953.

MEMORANDUM FOR: The Secretary,
Department of External Affairs,
CANBERRA. A.C.T.

Deportation of Palestinians from the Suez
Canal Zone.

For some time now there has been a considerable number of Palestinian nationals working for the British Forces in the Zone mainly in technical capacities, such as interpreters. Most of these Palestinians came into the Zone from Palestine without passports.

From time to time in the past individual members of this group of Palestinians have been arrested by the Egyptian Authorities and imprisoned upon a charge of illegal entry. Over the past few days it appears that these authorities are making a series of attempts to have all the Palestinians removed from Egypt. Last week 14 of them were arrested, convicted of ~~xxx~~ illegal entry and sentenced to 3 months' imprisonment the sentence to be suspended upon deportation. So far as the British Embassy in Cairo is aware, none of these 14 Palestinians have yet been deported nor is the Embassy aware of the country to which they are to be deported. Possibly they will be sent to the refugee camp in Gaza or deported to Jordan although it is difficult to see the Jordan Government accepting them without protest.

In an endeavour to retain the services of the Palestinians who are still at large, the British Authorities in the Canal Zone have now told them that they will be accommodated in army camps if they so wish.

It may be that the serious attempt which it seems is now being made by the Egyptian Authorities to get rid of the Palestinians in the Canal Zone is now more than an endeavour to solve a problem regarded by the authorities as one endangering Egyptian security. Furthermore, these authorities have a perfect right to deport the Palestinians as they are in fact illegal entrants. However, the fact that the rate of the arrests of Palestinians has been stepped up recently would appear to indicate that this is another step in the "cold war" which is now being conducted against the British Forces in the Canal Zone.

A copy of this memorandum is being forwarded to the External Affairs Officer, Australia House, London, for information.

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Sgd. A. P. RENOUF

Ala n Renouf
Secretary.

193/2/1

Note for the file

The Economist August 29, 1953

Persia & Foreigners

US News & World Report August 28, 1953

p. 40

FILE No.:

Right of repatriation

(c) The right of innocent people, uprooted from their homes by the present terror and ravages of war, to return to their homes, should be affirmed and made effective, with assurance of adequate compensation for the property of those who may choose not to return.

Jerusalem

(f) The City of Jerusalem, because of its religious and international significance and the complexity of interests involved, should be accorded special and separate treatment.

International responsibility

(g) International responsibility should be expressed where desirable and necessary in the form of international guarantees, as a means of allaying existing fears, and particularly with regard to boundaries and human rights.

SPECIFIC CONCLUSIONS

4. The following conclusions, broadly outlined, would, in my view, considering all the circumstances, provide a reasonable, equitable and workable basis for settlement:

(a) Since the Security Council, under pain of Chapter VIII sanctions, has forbidden further employment of military action in Palestine as a means of settling the dispute, hostilities should be pronounced formally ended either by mutual agreement of the parties or, failing that, by the United Nations. The existing indefinite truce should be superseded by a formal peace, or at the minimum, an armistice which would involve either complete withdrawal and demobilization of armed forces or their wide separation by creation of broad demilitarized zones under United Nations supervision.

(b) The frontiers between the Arab and Jewish territories, in the absence of agreement between Arabs and Jews, should be established by the United Nations and delimited by a technical boundaries commission appointed by and responsible to the United Nations, with the following revisions in the boundaries broadly defined in the resolution of the General Assembly of 29 November in order to make them more equitable, workable and consistent with existing realities in Palestine.

(i) The area known as the Negeb, south of a line running from the sea near Majdal east-southeast to Faluja (both of which places would be in Arab territory), should be defined as Arab territory;

(ii) The frontier should run from Faluja north northeast to Ramleh and Lydda (both of which places would be in Arab territory), the frontier at Lydda then following the line established in the General Assembly resolution of 29 November;

(iii) Galilee should be defined as Jewish territory.

(c) The disposition of the territory of Palestine not included within the boundaries of the Jewish State should be left to the Governments of the Arab States in full consultation with the Arab inhabitants of Palestine, with the recommendation, however, that in view of the historical connection and common interests of Transjordan and Palestine, there would be compelling reasons for merging the Arab territory of Palestine with the territory of Transjordan, subject to such frontier rectifications regarding other Arab States as may be found practicable and desirable.

(d) The United Nations, by declaration or other appropriate means, should undertake to provide special assurance that the boundaries between the Arab and Jewish territories shall be respected and maintained, subject only to such modifications as may be mutually agreed upon by the parties concerned.

(e) The port of Haifa, including the oil refineries and terminals, and without prejudice to their inclusion in the sovereign territory of the Jewish State or the administration of the city of Haifa, should be declared a free port, with assurances of free access for interested Arab countries and an undertaking

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on their part to place no obstacle in the way of oil deliveries by pipeline to the Haifa refineries, whose distribution would continue on the basis of the historical pattern.

(f) The airport of Lydda should be declared a free airport with assurance of access to it and employment of its facilities for Jerusalem and interested Arab countries.

(g) The City of Jerusalem, which should be understood as covering the area defined in the resolution of the General Assembly of 29 November, should be treated separately and should be placed under effective United Nations control with maximum feasible local autonomy for its Arab and Jewish communities, with full safeguards for the protection of the Holy Places and sites and free access to them, and for religious freedom.

(h) The right of unimpeded access to Jerusalem, by road, rail or air, should be fully respected by all parties.

(i) The right of the Arab refugees to return to their homes in Jewish-controlled territory at the earliest possible date should be affirmed by the United Nations and their repatriation, resettlement and economic and social rehabilitation, and payment of adequate compensation for the property of those choosing not to return, should be supervised and assisted by the United Nations conciliation commission described in paragraph (k) below.

(j) The political, economic, social and religious rights of all Arabs in the Jewish territory of Palestine and of all Jews in the Arab territory of Palestine should be fully guaranteed and respected by the authorities. The conciliation commission provided for in the following paragraph should supervise the observance of this guarantee. It should also lend its good offices, on the invitation of the parties, to any efforts toward exchanges of populations, with a view to eliminating troublesome minority problems, and on the basis of adequate compensation for property owned.

(k) In view of the special nature of the Palestine problem and the dangerous complexities of Arab-Jewish relationships, the United Nations should establish a Palestine conciliation commission. This commission which should be appointed for a limited period, should be responsible to the United Nations and act under its authority. The commission, assisted by such United Nations personnel as may prove necessary, should undertake.

(i) To employ its good offices to make such recommendations to the parties or to the United Nations, and to take such other steps as may be appropriate, with a view to ensuring the continuation of the peaceful adjustment of the situation in Palestine;

(ii) Such measures as it might consider appropriate in fostering the cultivation of friendly relations between Arabs and Jews;

(iii) To supervise the observance of such boundary, road, railroad, free port, free airport, minority rights and other arrangements as may be decided upon by the United Nations;

(iv) To report promptly to the United Nations any development in Palestine likely to alter the arrangements approved by the United Nations in the Palestine settlement or to threaten the peace of the area.

The Times 27. 1. 48.

BEVIN'S CRITICS

THE FOREIGN SECRETARY has been under fire this week. He has found it difficult to justify his policies in Europe and the Middle East by important speeches on successive days; and yesterday, in a position, with MR. CHURCHILL him at the head, made Palestine a party issue for the first time in this Parliament by deciding to divide against the Government. That the division gave the Government a majority of only 90 was largely due to abstentions among Labour members.

MR. BEVIN's defence of his Palestine policy in a tense and crowded House of Commons had some of the same down-to-earth qualities as his shrewd pronouncement on Western Union to the foreign Press the day before. It is fair to say, too, that it showed the same limitations. A man capable of deep feelings himself, the FOREIGN SECRETARY is temperamentally indisposed to attach due weight to the emotional influences which shape the judgment of others, and he finds it uncommonly difficult to discern the honest motives, apart from mere rancour, partisan recrimination, or ideological ebullience, which move his critics—whether it is the demand for a faster and more venturesome approach to European unity that faces him or the aspirations which spring from the passionate hopes and fears which centre upon the appearance of a Jewish State. He has been wrong, MR. CHURCHILL contends, in his "mood." Here is the reason which the critics find for accusing him, as MR. CLEMENT DAVIES and MR. CROSSMAN, as well as MR. CHURCHILL, accused him yesterday, of partiality and prejudice.

It is no doubt MR. BEVIN's most characteristic and practical contribution to policy that he refuses to concede that diplomacy can in practice be guided by emotions, by fears, or by hopes, however genuine. Yet he would probably find the task of persuading his critics, whether political friends or foes, more tractable if he could see more plainly their point of view; and the policies which he pursues, according to his own solid premises, might well be both more flexible and more fruitful as a result. The FOREIGN SECRETARY has a sound grasp of British—and western—interests in the Middle East and of Middle Eastern needs. He knows that policy must strive to create a Middle East peaceful, prosperous, stable, well disposed towards the western democracies, and capable of standing against Soviet penetration. He knows, and has known all along, that these aims cannot be achieved without American cooperation. Until now it has been in the task of securing this broad understanding with the United States that he has been bedevilled by forces which he has been unable to control—but which he has also been either unable to understand or disposed to underestimate. The strength and depth of the attachment felt by the American people, as by many in this country, for the Jewish cause—an attachment often more accurately reflected by the White House than by the State Department—provide no excuse for the American vacillations, which have so often stood in the way of MR. BEVIN's efforts to keep Washington and London in line over Palestine. But this attachment and its strength are at least explanations of the course which Presidential policy has followed. Throughout all these troubled months they have represented the kind of fact with which foreign policy, at its most realistic, must always and inevitably reckon; and the FOREIGN SECRETARY has been slow to recognize them.

MR. BEVIN's chief defence yesterday was the simultaneous approach of a new and firmer accord with the United States and of the early recognition at last of Israel. The House was generally disappointed that recognition had not already been given, but the prospect of these two events—accord and recognition—clearly offers the chance of a new chapter in the Middle East. The Jewish State will have to stand alone in resistance to the

Jew and the "tempestuous disdain of the civilized world." He was on firmer ground when he criticized the blunders of the reconnaissance which resulted in the loss of British aircraft; but, although he gave expression to the disappointment—or indignation—felt by many in this country that Britain has come to be regarded as an enemy by the Jewish State, which she—more than any other nation—has helped to make, he could in fact offer no real alternative course to the policy which MR. BEVIN is now pursuing, with more than a few hopes of success, whatever the failures and shortcomings on the road in the past.

The PRIME MINISTER was entitled to retort in his spirited reply that the LEADER of the OPPOSITION had sometimes seemed to put the blame upon MR. BEVIN for all the mistakes and omissions of all parties both here and in Palestine over many years. MR. ATTLEE gave the full weight of his backing to the FOREIGN SECRETARY; he denied indignantly the charge of inciting the Arabs to take military action against the Jews; and he charged the critics themselves with the pursuit of party aims and a lamentable failure to give any constructive counsel at this critical moment. MR. BEVIN has not come out of the fire unscathed, but in spite of yesterday's Labour abstentions stands more firmly now than he did when the fray began a fortnight ago.

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Mr. CHURCHILL's severest criticism was addressed to the means adopted until now to serve British interests. No doubt the LEADER of the OPPOSITION touched upon real weaknesses in the past approach to policy, but he carried the indictment beyond just bounds when he accused the FOREIGN SECRETARY of incurring the "scorn and hatred" of Arab as well as

stands more firmly now than he did when the fray began a fortnight ago.

Daily Telegraph 27.1.48

SPEAKING OUT

A DUEL between Mr. BEVIN, happily restored to form, and Mr. CHURCHILL, happily never out of form, is substantial stuff. It may, however, be doubted whether they now are, or should be, quite as antagonistic on the Middle East issue as both seemed to think yesterday. On the past handling of this question there is cause for complaint. Mr. CHURCHILL is not alone in contending that partition could have been imposed in Palestine at far less cost in blood, treasure, and trouble than drift actually entailed. Mr. ATTLEE's objection that force is not the way to an enduring settlement in fact glosses over four years of Socialist indecision. What he called impartiality was really a paralysis of judgment. We have managed to get at cross-purposes both with Arabs and Jews, and, at least until recently, with the United States. Other arguable points are whether the fatal despatch of R.A.F. machines over a battlefield was wise or worth the risk; and whether we ought to have given de facto recognition to Israel. Mr. BEVIN seemed yesterday to give a fairly definite though qualified pledge to do this, but in terms which did not satisfy his critics. Indeed, Mr. CROSSMAN attacked him from his own side of the House with all the fire generated by a recent visit to Palestine, and the smallness of the Government majority in the division, despite the Prime Minister's appeal to his own benches to regard the vote as one of confidence, showed that the House did not accept his charge against Mr. CHURCHILL of making a party manoeuvre.

Nevertheless, on the principle of the Middle East question as distinct from its handling, there is much common ground between the Government and Opposition Front Benches. It is quite true that the double and equally binding pledges to Arabs and to Jews, contained in the Balfour Declaration, did not cease to apply when we evacuated Palestine. In default of agreement between Arabs and Jews, they had stultified our efforts under the Mandate, and they may well have contributed to make our policy bewildered and bewildering since. That is why many were convinced years ago that a solution of the Palestine problem must be imposed. We were bound to be objective. Too many Arabs and Jews felt bound not to be objective.

Moreover, it is agreed that past friction with the United States was not solely the fault of the British. That cannot be denied, nor need it now be trumpeted. We can assume that the two countries have now a common policy, as they have always had common and highly important interests. It must, however, be added that any Power or person striving to be impartial during the past year has had a most difficult time. Quite apart from the exigencies of American politics, the United Nations, in Mr. BEVIN's words, "have not done well." They, like ourselves, failed to impose a solution. There remained therefore nothing except for the two sides, if they could not agree sensibly, to fight it out.

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One further point of agreement is the despatch of British troops to Akaba. Mr. BEVIN said this act had contributed to the peace talks in Rhodes. Mr. CHURCHILL clearly believed that there must be observance of treaties with Transjordan and a limit on Jewish expansionism. Thus we arrive at the greatest measure of common ground, namely, the need of concluding and keeping peace. In this country the Opposition may well dissociate themselves from past handling of the question, but we may also achieve harmony and continuity of policy in the future. For if these hopes are realised, and, as Mr. CLEMENT DAVIES forecast, Jews and Arabs can live together in peace, the old bitterness towards ourselves may disappear. Then the whole Middle East may look towards the West, remember what has been done and not only what has been left undone, for both Jews and Arabs, and become a co-operative entity in the free world.

PALESTINE

The British Government has still not recognised the State of Israel. That is the one hard fact which stands out of Mr. Bevin's speech in the House of Commons yesterday. His defence of the delay in recognition was not impressive. He has, he said, invited the comments of those Commonwealth countries which have not yet recognised Israel (that is, of all except Canada and South Africa) and of the Brussels Treaty countries, and he expects their replies within a few days. It is hard to take this seriously. Canada can, without disrupting the Commonwealth, recognise Israel on her own, but Britain cannot (Mr. Bevin seems to say) without consulting New Zealand and Ceylon. France can recognise Israel, and has done so this week, and the Brussels Treaty has not been shaken; but Britain must consult all the Brussels Treaty Powers before taking the same step. Mr. Bevin rightly stressed the importance of Anglo-American co-operation in the Middle East. Yet Britain still hesitates to do what the United States did, perhaps with too little hesitation, eight months ago. No, really, it will not do. As Mr. Churchill said last night, "de facto" recognition is never dependent on "any achievement of territorial frontiers." It could reasonably have been given at the time when Mr. Bevin (and Mr. Marshall) endorsed the Bernadotte Report, with its plain declaration that "The State of Israel exists." Now at last Mr. Bevin has brought himself to declare: "The State of Israel is now a fact." We have not tried or done anything "to undo it." The latter sentence will be received with some scepticism by the Zionists. The former may be welcomed as a belated symptom of grace and as a hint—it is not even a promise—of recognition to come. Even so, recognition will come now so late, so reluctantly, so churlishly that it will pass almost unnoticed. What might once have roused hearts and won friends becomes at last an almost empty gesture. Mr. Bevin, as Mr. Elliot says of history,

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What's not believed in, or if still believed,
In memory only, reconsidered passion.

Mr. Bevin had laid down a perfect wicket for Mr. Churchill to bat on, and Mr. Churchill batted as forcefully yet elegantly as only he can. But it was not, on the whole, a constructive innings. He was at pains to dissociate the Opposition from all responsibility for the Government's misfortunes over Palestine, but one could not draw from it any clear conclusion about what Mr. Churchill himself would have done if he had remained in office (except to recognise Israel sooner) or any indication that he appreciated the real and formidable difficulties which have beset Mr. Bevin's path. Perhaps he is rather sanguine, too, about the difficulties that lie ahead. "I do not think that you will find," he said, "once the fighting stops, peace is established and some kind of partition arranged, any difficulty in the return of the Jewish refugees." One doubts whether that is so.

was not making this time one of the far-seeing and forward-looking speeches of which he is capable.

While this not very useful discussion took its course at Westminster, things were looking better in the Middle East. In Rhodes the talks between Egyptian and Jewish delegates continue; to-day negotiators who have been back to their respective headquarters for fresh instructions will return to Rhodes, and (with Israel's elections out of the way) another step forward should be possible. In Beirut envoys from Iraq—of which the level-headed Nuri Pasha is once more Premier—are discussing Palestine with the Lebanon Government, which has been in negotiation with Israel and which has just received a vote of confidence (forty to eight) in the Legislature. The British oil technicians who were so hastily withdrawn from Haifa after the Sinai shooting have returned; one must hope this means that oil will soon flow through the pipeline from Mosul again. Best of all, the Israeli elections seem to have shown strong support for moderation and the rejection of terrorist methods. With about half the votes counted it looks as if Mapai, the party led by Mr. Ben-Gurion, had won a commanding position—not a clear majority, which was not to be expected, but a solid block of perhaps fifty seats out of 120. This is rather better than Mapai can have hoped. The candidates associated with Irgun and with the Stern Gang appear to have done poorly; Mapam, which stands to the Left of Mapai and is more hostile to the West, has had middling fortune. Mr. Ben-Gurion will have to form another Coalition Government; but he will not have to lean on his partners so heavily as he might have done. If the full count confirms these expectations it is still not too late, as Mr. Crossman said last night, for a more magnanimous policy on the part of Britain to awaken a response in Israel. Not the least reason for such policy is that an Israel friendly to the Western democracies would be of incalculable aid in carrying out the constructive Anglo-American policy referred to by Mr. Bevin in the earlier and more satisfying part of his speech yesterday.

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Both Jew and Arab should have access to the Red Sea through the Gulf of Aqaba. It should be possible to reconcile the conflicting claims. The gulf is what Trieste is to the Adriatic. It should not be the monopoly of either race.

As the stretch of coastline to be shared between Israel and Transjordan at the head of the gulf is only a few miles, with the waterless shores of Egypt and Saudi Arabia on either side, this solution has its practical difficulties; its virtues are more diplomatic than economic. (Perhaps Danzig and Gdynia are in some ways a better analogy than Trieste.) But it is worth thinking about. He rounded off this passage by declaring that, having gone to Aqaba, we should stay there, at least until the frontier award of the United Nations had been "accepted and obeyed" by both sides. That this was his main positive contribution indicates that Mr. Churchill

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ISRAEL

THE British Government believes the time has now come when *de facto* recognition of Israel will contribute to a peace settlement between the Jews and Arabs. The views of Commonwealth countries and our Brussels Treaty Allies are now awaited, and it seems certain that the final act of recognition will take place in a few days.

Thus will end a controversy in which the British Government's attitude has been consistently misrepresented.

Delay in recognising Israel has not been due to "sulkeness," as Mr. Churchill once suggested: still less to anti-Semitism, though that has been maliciously suggested.

To have recognised the new government immediately it had proclaimed its own existence would have been an unwise departure from all practice. It would, for one thing, have created a precedent which might be very embarrassing on some future occasion.

The established custom is based on sound common sense. A new State must have certain qualifications before it is recognised.

It must have established its authority firmly over the territory it governs. It must have set up an orderly and effective administration. It must be clearly stable—have "come to stay."

And for that it has always been customary, and wise, to wait for at any rate a few months before recognition.

By the autumn of last year the new State of Israel evidently fulfilled these normal requirements. But then a new difficulty presented itself.

The Israeli Government had broken the truce in Palestine and had refused to comply with the Security Council's resolutions calling for a cessation of hostilities and a withdrawal of troops to their former positions.

To have chosen such a moment for recognition would have been widely interpreted as implying approval of the Israeli action. It would have had repercussions on our relations with the Arab States. It would have aroused indignation in India and Pakistan.

It was, on balance, clearly desirable to wait until the fighting had stopped again and a new effort could be made for a settlement which would, among other things, decide the frontiers of the new State.

Those conditions now exist. And so the decision has been taken—wisely, and at the proper time.

Comment

CAESAR
BEGAN IT

SOMETIMES we wonder whether words have lost their meaning. This form of intellectual doubt afflicts us after a speech by Mr. BEVIN.

His orations are always long, often personal and emotional, and invariably portentous. They leave people baffled, bewildered, bemused.

Yesterday's speech on Palestine was typical. It was long-winded and indeterminate. It arrived nowhere—not even at a recognition of Israel, to which point, however, Mr. BEVIN seemed to be making a painful and ponderous approach.

He told the House that Palestine is a problem to which there is no real solution. That is indeed a discovery—though other people have known it for 15 years.

But Mr. BEVIN was better informed than all of them in 1945. He then staked his political reputation on solving this problem. How do you solve the insoluble?

Balfour

HE complains that the situation is more difficult now than it used to be. Of course it is. Such matters never stand still. It is a Foreign Secretary's job to handle them as he finds them—and without carting his ego about from place to place.

It is no use Mr. BEVIN trying—at this date—to blame the EARL OF BALFOUR for Palestine. He has been in his grave for 19 years and cannot answer back. In any case, JULIUS CAESAR began it.

In an address on Tuesday Mr. BEVIN declared, with some emotion, that he was determined—if health spared him—to crown his career by establishing European unity. One way of doing that would be to achieve "exchange of travel."

Do we sleep, do we dream—or is this where we came in? Back in 1946 Mr. BEVIN said his foreign policy was to be able to go to Victoria Station, buy a ticket, and "go where the hell I like" without passports or other documents.

Bevin

THOSE were brave words—but how far have we progressed towards the deed? Not one inch. If anything, we have gone backwards.

Three years ago Mr. BEVIN stoutly proclaimed that he was willing to sit with anyone to try to devise a World Assembly for the limited objective of peace.

The French were less ambitious. All they wanted was a European Assembly. But Mr. BEVIN is against it now. He proposes a compromise which would leave matters exactly as they are today.

DAILY EXPRESS

The World's Greatest
Newspaper

Opinion

Defeat so near

HIGH drama in the Commons.

A vote is taken near midnight on Mr. Bevin's conduct of affairs in Palestine. The Prime Minister intervenes to declare the vote one of confidence.

He appeals to "my friends" not to be caught out by a "Churchill election manoeuvre."

In spite of all this only 283 vote for Bevin; 193 against. Seventy Socialists openly abstain. Bevin's majority is cut to 90.

After a similar appeal to "my friends," Mr. Neville Chamberlain, on May 8 1940, had a majority of 81 on a vote of confidence. This was not enough to save him. Chamberlain resigned two days later.

Judge from this how near Mr. Attlee's Government is to eclipse on January 27 1949.

Alarm is sounded

YET what else could Mr. Bevin have expected?

Last week he postponed a debate in the hope that a peaceful settlement in the Middle East would emerge from the Rhodes negotiations.

This week he declares that unless a peaceful settlement does emerge "it will be very difficult to stand by indifferent or inactive."

Such a statement can only have been understood in the Commons as a warning that if fighting breaks out again in Palestine Britain is likely to be in it.

To come to this

THESE are not words to inspire confidence in the handling of Britain's affairs. Nor was there anything else in the Bevin speech to show that he commanded a satisfactory or coherent set of principles on which to base such handling.

The House of Commons would have been without blame if it had rejected outright Mr. Bevin's apology.

He has revealed that the situation is one of grave danger, and he cannot be excused from responsibility for allowing Britain to find herself so deeply and fundamentally involved.

Status changes

THE situation may not have been of his creating. History and the policies of other nations have played their part.

But in politics judgment goes by results. And it is most certain that Britain's

a precedent which might be very embarrassing on some future occasion.

The established custom is based on sound common sense. A new State must have certain qualifications before it is recognised.

It must have established its authority firmly over the territory it governs. It must have set up an orderly and effective administration. It must be clearly stable—have "come to stay."

And for that it has always been customary, and wise, to wait for at any rate a few months before recognition.

By the autumn of last year the new State of Israel evidently fulfilled these normal requirements. But then a new difficulty presented itself.

The Israeli Government had broken the truce in Palestine and had refused to comply with the Security Council's resolutions calling for a cessation of hostilities and a withdrawal of troops to their former positions.

To have chosen such a moment for recognition would have been widely interpreted as implying approval of the Israeli action. It would have had repercussions on our relations with the Arab States. It would have aroused indignation in India and Pakistan.

It was, on balance, clearly desirable to wait until the fighting had stopped again and a new effort could be made for a settlement which would, among other things, decide the frontiers of the new State.

Those conditions now exist. And so the decision has been taken—wisely, and at the proper time.

formed than all of them in 1945. He then staked his political reputation on solving this problem. How do you solve the insoluble?

Balfour

HE complains that the situation is more difficult now than it used to be. Of course it is. Such matters never stand still. It is a Foreign Secretary's job to handle them as he finds them—and without carting his ego about from place to place.

It is no use Mr. Bevin trying—at this date—to blame the EARL OF BALFOUR for Palestine. He has been in his grave for 19 years and cannot answer back. In any case, JULIUS CAESAR began it.

In an address on Tuesday Mr. BEVIN declared, with some emotion, that he was determined—if health spared him—to crown his career by establishing European unity. One way of doing that would be to achieve "exchange of travel."

Do we sleep, do we dream—or is this where we came in? Back in 1946 Mr. BEVIN said his foreign policy was to be able to go to Victoria Station, buy a ticket, and "go where the hell I like" without passports or other documents.

Bevin

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Three years ago Mr. BEVIN stoutly proclaimed that he was willing to sit with anyone to try to devise a World Assembly for the limited objective of peace.

The French were less ambitious. All they wanted was a European Assembly. But Mr. BEVIN is against it now. He proposes a compromise which would leave matters exactly as they are today.

So the rotund phrases pour forth, the cheers are "renewed" and "prolonged"—and the old technique performs its magic again and again. But still we wonder what the words mean.

Mr. BEVIN speaks of the tremendous importance of maintaining the British interest in the Middle East—and he marches out of Egypt.

Britain

HE talks of the vital necessity of forming a single, united defence force for Western Europe—and he allows some of the most modern armaments plants in the world to be transferred from Germany to Russia.

He spoke yesterday about "arms pouring into the other side from Czechoslovakia," who was deliberately sending them against the instructions of UNO.

Yet just before the debate he refused—through Mr. MCNEIL—to give an assurance that we would cease sending war-making material from Germany to Czechoslovakia.

We seem to be living in a Wonderland—or a nightmare—in which one event bears no relation to another. It arises from the fact that Britain has no settled, coherent foreign policy.

The times are far too serious for such a negative attitude. If it is maintained we shall be heading for disaster.

days later.
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Status changes

THE situation may not have been of his creating. History and the policies of other nations have played their part.

But in politics judgment goes by results. And it is most certain that Britain's present impasse represents neither the wishes nor the expectations of the people.

Last night's vote is not a vote of censure but a vote of great misgiving. Mr. Bevin, hitherto the strongest pillar of the Government, now finds himself a source of weakness as the result of the Back Bench revolt.

GENERAL ASSEMBLY - THIRD SESSION 1ST PART

FIRST COMMITTEE

PALESTINE.

Australia was represented for the consideration of the Palestine question in the First Committee by Mr. J.D.L. Hood assisted by Mr. K.C.O. Shann and Miss A.L. Douglas.

1. EVENTS LEADING UP TO CONSIDERATION IN FIRST COMMITTEE

(1) Report of the United Nations Mediator

On 16th September 1948 the late Mediator, Count Fock Bernadotte signed his report on his work in Palestine. This was only a few days before his assassination which threw a cloud over the opening days of the General Assembly in Paris. On the 21st September, the Secretary-General requested that the item "Progress Report of the United Nations Mediator on Palestine" (Document A/648) should be placed on the Agenda for the Session and the General Committee referred the matter to the First Committee for consideration and report on 24th September 1948. Count Bernadotte's report, the conclusions of which are annexed (Annex 1) was made pursuant to his appointment by the special Session of the General Assembly early in 1948, and as a result of functions conferred upon him by the Security Council arising out of the Council's consideration of the outbreak of hostilities in Palestine following the termination of the United Kingdom Mandate area on 15th May 1948. Its importance, so far as the debate in the First Committee was concerned, lay primarily in the departures recommended by Count Bernadotte from the General Assembly's resolution on Palestine of 29th November, 1947, which laid down a plan of partition with economic union together with a precise definition of the boundaries of the Jewish and Arab States.

So far as the boundary provisions were concerned, Count Bernadotte had this to say -

"The boundary provisions of the General Assembly's resolution were also designed within the framework of economic union, which pre-supposes full freedom of transit, and therefore, within that framework, no difficulty was foreseen in providing for separated parts of the Jewish and Arab States joined to their other parts merely at points of intersection of frontiers. This arrangement,

while

that the Mediator was led to propose the territorial arrangements

as follows:

1911/2/1

(11)

rational within the framework of an economic union, is open to serious objections if no such union exists. The assumptions of the Assembly resolution largely excluded military considerations in the determination of the boundaries between the three parts of Palestine. Also the proposed boundaries were related to the then existing distribution of population, a distribution which temporarily, at least, has been significantly affected by the large-scale movements of Arab refugees."

However, while he thus expressed himself as doubtful of the practicability of the Assembly's November 1947 resolution, he went on to point out that the basic proposition of that resolution, which was partition, had in fact come into existence although "not in the manner envisaged in the resolution of 29th November."

In general terms the fundamental change suggested by Count Bernadotte in the boundary provisions was that Negeb should go to the Arabs while Western Galilee should be transferred to the Jewish State. This change, while considerably reducing the area of the Jewish State, increased the extent of those parts of Palestine at present regarded as fertile land within the Jewish State.

(ii) Political situation in Palestine.

The General Assembly, in Paris, was faced with a situation of considerable tension arising primarily from the tragic death of the Mediator at the hands of Jewish extremists, but also from the explosive situation of uneasy truce between the opposing factions. When the State of Israel was proclaimed on the night of May 15th, 1948, the territory of the former British Mandate in Palestine was immediately invaded from all directions by regular and irregular forces from the neighbouring Arab States of Iraq, Syria, Lebanon, Transjordan and Egypt. For some time it appeared possible that the new Jewish State might be obliterated. However, the cessation of active hostilities brought about by the Security Council and the maintenance in the area of a condition bordering on peace enabled Israeli forces to gather strength until it became clear by the time the Assembly took the matter up, that they were in a dominating military position quite capable of defending the areas under their control. It was possibly in consideration of the purely military position obtaining at the time, whereby the Jews in fact did control a large part of Western Galilee and the Arabs were entrenched in large parts of the Negeb, that the Mediator was led to propose the territorial adjustments which he did.

(iii)

(iii) United Kingdom Policy

It was soon apparent that the United Kingdom had no intention of adopting the same passive attitude towards a solution of the problem that had been the case when the matter was before the General Assembly late in 1947. From the outset the United Kingdom Delegation made it clear that they supported revision of the 1947 resolution along the lines proposed by the United Nations Mediator. While in no sense securing the support of the Arab States, who were opposed to any solution based on partition, this policy had the additional characteristic of ensuring the bitter opposition of the State of Israel.

(iv) United States Policy

At one stage, before consideration of the problem in the General Assembly, the United States had indicated general support for the conclusions of the Mediator. However, in late October, during the course of the Presidential campaign, President Truman expressed himself in favour of adherence to the principles of the resolution of 29th November and this latter policy became, in fact, the basis of the work of the United States Delegation in Paris. This divergence of opinion between the United Kingdom and the United States Delegations, coupled with the anxiety of both delegations to act in common in the solution of the problem, was the root cause of the protracted and confused nature of the debates on Palestine. While the desire for a common approach, and the good effect of such an approach on the possibility of putting any solution into effect, was recognised by most delegations, it was not until the closing stages of the debate that it became clearly recognised that attempts were being made to fuse fundamentally opposed approaches, and that the only solution to the dilemma lay in the elimination of references to both solutions and

the handing

the handing over of the final determination of the points at issue to a United Nations Commission endowed with wide and general powers of conciliation.

The date of the Presidential elections also played some part in the debate, in that the United States Delegation was anxious that in such an important matter the Assembly should be able to have a clear picture of what the future policy of the United States Government was likely to be. It was therefore not until after the elections and the return of President Truman and after several postponements and alterations of the Agenda in the First Committee, that consideration of the matter properly commenced.

2. PROCEEDINGS IN THE FIRST COMMITTEE

(i) Progress of Debate

On 15th November, 1949, the First Committee began its detailed consideration of the Palestinian question. After invitations to the Provisional Government of Israel to the Arab Higher Committee and to Transjordan to participate in the debates, the Committee heard first the Foreign Minister of the Provisional Government, Mr. Shertok, and then during the course of a series of meetings, the views of the various Arab States and the Higher Committee. The presentation of the Jewish case, clearly reflecting the satisfactory strategic position in which Israel by this time found itself, was highly confident in tone. The Fundamental assumption was support for the 29th November resolution as fixing the limits of the Jewish State. However, in addition, Mr. Shertok claimed that the question of whether the Jewish State should also hold areas outside the boundaries so fixed should be a matter of separate negotiation. The presentation of the Arab case by the Higher Committee of the Arab States followed closely the

lines of

The Representative of Australia made his opening statement to the Committee on 23rd November and submitted a draft resolution (A/31/376 attached as annex 2) which gave effect to the view expressed that the basic starting point should

effect by negotiations between the parties under the supervision of
5. a Conciliation Commission for Palestine. (The statement of the

Australian Representative is attached as annex 3). While a large
lines of their case in 1947, namely, an absolute denial of the
number of further resolutions and amendments, and the
right of the Jews to establish any State in this area on the
the Committee in the immediately following days by representatives
grounds that the land was Arab land, that the Jews were a
of Palestine, Columbia, Syria and Transjordan. It was argued that
religious and not a national group, and that the national
United Kingdom resolution, as stated by the British Government
home promised to the Jews was never intended to lead to the
and the Australian resolution that the basic consideration of
setting up of a sovereign State.

This stage occupied several of the meetings of the
of groups, was treated and voted upon as a separate
Committee partly because of the number of the Arab States,
but also because many delegations before speaking preferred
to await the outcome of informed consultations then in
progress, particularly between the United States and the
United Kingdom. However, on 18th November a draft
resolution lending concrete direction to the Committee's
work, was tabled by the representative of the United
Kingdom, Mr. Hector McNeill (Doc. A/CI/394). This
supported the conclusions of the late Mediator and proposed
the establishment of a Commission to assist the parties to
reach a settlement based on those conclusions.

The representative of the United States of America on
20th November, made a statement supporting generally some
of the Mediator's conclusions but differing from the
United Kingdom in an important respect in recommending that
changes from the territorial provisions of the 29th

November resolution should be made only by consent of the
parties. Subsequently, the United States submitted
amendments to the U.K. resolution to give effect to
these ideas (A/CI/397).

The U.S.S.R. made it clear that the policy of its
Government was complete implementation of the 29th
November resolution coupled with the immediate withdrawal
from Palestine of all foreign troops and foreign military
personnel.

The Representative of Australia made his opening statement
to the Committee on 23rd November and submitted a draft
resolution (A/CI/396 attached as Annex 2) which gave effect

to the view expressed that the basic starting point should
be the resolution of 29th November 1947. to be put into

effect by negotiations between the parties under the supervision of a Conciliation Commission for Palestine. (The statement of the Australian Representative is attached as annex 3). While a large number of further resolutions and amendments were submitted to the Committee in the immediately following days by representatives of Poland, Colombia, Syria and Guatemala it was around the United Kingdom resolution, as amended by the United States, and the Australian resolution that the main consideration of the Committee revolved. A U.S.S.R. resolution regarding the withdrawal of troops, was treated and voted upon as a separate matter.

At this point, and in accordance with the rules of procedure, it was determined to take the United Kingdom resolution first as the basis of detailed discussion and voting, despite the protests of other delegations that this might result in a large measure in their own proposals being given proper attention. In order to avoid this eventuality a number of delegations, including the Australian delegation, submitted the substantive parts of their resolutions as amendments to the United Kingdom resolution, thereby ensuring that their terms would be voted on before the Rapporteur, should prepare a consolidated tabulation of the various texts presented. This working group was in no sense

This procedure appeared to the Australian Delegation, however, as clumsy and confusing and a further attempt was made at the 220th meeting on 1st December, to reach some order before the voting commenced by the establishment of a drafting committee to attempt to reconcile the various proposals into a single text and,

The production of this document did not however have the effect desired in channelling the work of the Committee towards a conclusion, and led only to a repetition of the general debate with 17 abstentions, and the Committee then proceeded to vote upon the second revised resolution (A/C 1/394/Rev.2) (attached as Annex 7) It was not until the United Kingdom had revised its draft resolution

twice to give effect to the opinions expressed by a number of delegations, including those of the United States and Australia, as to the basis on which the Conciliation Commission should work. The results of the voting were as follows: Syrian amendments designed to defeat entirely the partition principle were all defeated by substantial majorities; a proposal to refer the question of the legality of United Nations intervention to the International Court of Justice was defeated only by a vote of 21 - 23; the United Kingdom eliminated the paragraph endorsing the specific conclusions of the Mediator's

The USSR proposal for the immediate withdrawal of foreign troops and Polish amendments, which in many respects were similar

to those of Australia, 1-7- also defeated by substantial majorities. Mediator's report and took into account both the resolution of the General Assembly of 29th November 1947 and the conclusions of the Mediator, etc. While most of the Australian amendments were defeated, and while not acceptable in full to a number of delegations, including Australia, this revised draft was accepted by the United States, which withdrew its previous amendments. Further confusion followed when those delegations who had based their resolutions and amendments on the original United Kingdom draft, began to submit revised texts based on the new draft.

At this point, and in accordance with the rules of procedure, it was determined to take the United Kingdom resolution first as the basis of detailed discussion and voting, despite the protests of other delegations that this might result in a large measure in their own proposals never being given proper attention. In order to avoid this eventuality a number of delegations, including the Australian delegation, submitted the substantive parts of their resolutions as amendments to the United Kingdom resolution, thereby ensuring that their terms would be voted on before the United Kingdom draft.

This procedure appeared to the Australian Delegation, however, as clumsy and confusing and a further attempt was made at the 220th meeting on 1st December, to reach some order before the voting commenced by the establishment of a drafting committee to attempt to reconcile the various proposals into a single text and, wherever this was not possible, to indicate where agreement was not reached. The proposal (A/C 1/407) was rejected by 16 - 15 votes with 17 abstentions, and the Committee then proceeded to vote upon the second revision of the United Kingdom draft resolution with amendments.

The results of the voting were broadly as follows:

Syrian amendments designed to defeat entirely the partition principle were all defeated by substantial majorities, but a proposal to refer the question of the legality of United Nations intervention to the International Court of Justice, was defeated only by a tie vote of 21 - 21.

The USSR proposal for the immediate withdrawal of foreign troops and Polish amendments, which in many respects were similar

to those of Australia, were also defeated by substantial majorities. The United Kingdom resolution itself, mainly at the insistence of the Australian Delegation suffered an extraordinary change in the voting. While most of the Australian amendments were defeated, and a large number of the paragraphs of the United Kingdom resolution were accepted by varying majorities, the vital paragraphs of the United Kingdom draft, namely, 2(c), referring to the Mediator's report as a basis for the work of the Commission; 4, also referring to the Mediator's report in relation to boundaries; and 5, referring to the disposition of non-Jewish territory, were rejected, thereby leaving in the draft resolution only the establishment of a commission without clear functions and without directions as to the boundaries of the States concerned. However, at the instance of the United States, a wide general provision instructing the Commission to assist Governments and authorities concerned to achieve a final settlement, was inserted which, in part, restored some logical form to the United Kingdom proposal.

Before the resolution was voted on as a whole a Canadian proposal that the permanent members of the Security Council should appoint the members of the Commission was adopted. This was strongly opposed by the Australian Delegation as having no logical basis and as being likely to be unfair and undemocratic as every one knew who would, in fact, under such a scheme, determine the members of the Commission.

The second revised draft resolution of the United Kingdom as amended was voted upon as a whole at the 227th meeting of the Committee on 4th December and was adopted by 25 votes to 21 with 9 abstentions:

In favour: Australia, Belgium, Brazil, Canada, China, Colombia, Denmark, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, France, Haiti, Honduras, Iceland, Luxembourg, Netherlands, New Zealand, Nicaragua, Norway, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, Sweden, Union of South Africa, United Kingdom, United States of America;

Against: Afghanistan, Burma, Byelorussian Soviet Socialist Republic, Cuba, Czechoslovakia, Egypt, Ethiopia, Greece, India, Iran, Iraq, Lebanon, Pakistan, Poland, Saudi Arabia, Syria, Turkey, Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, Yemen, Yugoslavia;

Abstentions: Bolivia, Chile, El Salvador, Guatemala, Liberia, Mexico, Philippines, Siam, Venezuela.

/Subsequently

(ii) Australian Policy in the First Committee

The basis of Australian policy is clearly set out in the statement delivered by the Australian representative contained in annex 3. Briefly, the Australian position was that the 1947 resolution of the General Assembly was arrived at after the fullest and most careful investigation, both on the spot by a Committee of the United Nations and in New York by the ad hoc Committee on Palestine, and that no reasonable grounds had been offered either by the United Nations Mediator or anyone else to go back on that decision. Quite apart from an impartial assessment of the justice of the previous decision, the Australian attitude was also influenced by consideration of the prestige of the United Nations as a whole and the desirability of not producing uncertainty and confusion by going back on justifications consistent with the principle of the resolution might be made to secure the necessary majority.

There is no doubt that the point of view maintained steadily by the Australian Delegation in Paris contributed very substantially to the final outcome. Moreover, events immediately after the Assembly decision, in particular the opening of negotiations between Jews and Arabs, showed that it provided the only possible basis for the restoration of peaceful relations in an area vital to the security of the British Commonwealth as a whole.

(iii) British Commonwealth Attitude

The Australian position throughout received the wholehearted support of the New Zealand representative in the First Committee, who was the Prime Minister, Mr. Peter Fraser. Whilst there was a clear difference of view between the Australian Delegation and that of the United Kingdom, supported by Canada and South Africa, this did not mean that continuous and co-operative consultation did not take place both before and during the debates in the General Assembly and the First Committee. Even though the United Kingdom resolution in its final form did not express in full our original desires, it was supported by the Australian Delegation.

/In the

In the same spirit, a number of Australian amendments were from time to time accepted by the United Kingdom.

3. CONSIDERATION OF MATTER IN THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY

A two-thirds majority is required for the passage of any resolution on an important matter in the General Assembly. The 25-21 vote in the First Committee was clearly insufficient to enable the adoption of the resolution by the Assembly. This would have left a serious political vacuum, and would in any event have dealt a blow to the prestige of the United Nations. Therefore delegations, including Australia, which had taken a prominent part in the debate in the First Committee, worked during the interval between the conclusion of the Committee's work and the taking up of its report in the General Assembly, to see what kind of modifications consistent with the principle of the resolution might be made to secure the necessary support. It was found that by eliminating all references either to the Mediator's report or to the 29th November, 1947, resolution, it might be possible to secure the necessary majority. The delegations of Australia, Brazil, Canada, China, Colombia, France and New Zealand therefore jointly proposed in the General Assembly on 11th December, when the matter came up for final decision, amendments to this effect. The Australian statement in the plenary session on 11th December, is attached as annex 5.

The amendments so proposed were passed and the final resolution of the Assembly as amended was adopted by the necessary two thirds majority of 35 - 15 with 8 abstentions as follows:

In favour: Liberia, Luxembourg, Netherlands, New Zealand, Nicaragua, Norway, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, Philippines, Siam, Sweden, Turkey, Union of South Africa, United Kingdom, United States of America, Uruguay, Venezuela, Argentina, Australia, Belgium, Brazil, Canada, China, Colombia, Denmark, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, El Salvador, Ethiopia, France, Greece, Haiti, Honduras, Iceland.

Against: Iraq, Lebanon, Pakistan, Poland, Saudi Arabia, Syria, Ukrainian SSR, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, Yemen, Yugoslavia, Afghanistan, Byelorussian SSR, Cuba, Czechoslovakia, Egypt.

Abstaining: India, Iran, Mexico, Bolivia, Burma, Chile, Costa Rica, Guatemala.

The final resolution is attached as annex 6.

It remained for the Assembly to choose, by the method

permanent members of the Security Council, the members of the proposed Palestinian Commission. The Committee reported that, by a majority consisting of the United States, United Kingdom, China and France as against the USSR, it recommended the United States, France and Turkey. This recommendation was accepted by the General Assembly.

4. CONCLUSION

There is good ground for hope that the General Assembly of the United Nations will not again be called upon to consider the Palestinian problem in the acute form in which it has been put before it at the last two regular sessions and at the two Special Sessions called for the purpose. It cannot be doubted that the State of Israel has come to stay and acceptance of this fact, if unwilling, is increasingly made by the neighbouring Arab States. It is expected that the new Commission will progressively take over the functions of the United Nations Mediator and will also assume the duties of the truce commission set up by the Security Council to supervise both the truce and armistice between both the Jewish and Arab States in Palestine. While it is undoubtedly true that the putting into effect of the United Nations proposal for the partition of Palestine has been accompanied by bloodshed and bitterness, it is equally true to say that without the work of the General Assembly and the Security Council of the United Nations this bloodshed and bitterness would have been multiplied many times and that the present prospects for a permanent and satisfactory solution might not have existed at all.

UNRESTRICTED

A/C. 1/396

25 November 1948

ORIGINAL: ENGLISH

Third session

Dual Distribution

FIRST COMMITTEE

PALESTINE PROGRESS REPORT OF THE UNITED NATIONS MEDIATOR ON PALESTINE

Australia: Draft Resolution

THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY,

HAVING IN MIND the Resolution of the General Assembly on the future government of Palestine of 29 November 1947;

TAKING NOTE also of Resolution 186 (S/11) of 14 May 1948 providing for the appointment of the United Nations Mediator in Palestine and of the resolution of the Security Council of 16 November 1948 calling for the negotiation of an armistice in Palestine;

HAVING CONSIDERED the progress report of the United Nations Mediator of 16 September 1948 (A/648-Part 1);

BEING OF OPINION that the Assembly's resolution of 29 November 1947 is the basic starting point of settlement by the Assembly of the Palestine question;

BEING FURTHER OF OPINION that the final settlement in Palestine as regards boundaries should be in conformity with the principles of the recommendation contained in the Assembly resolution of 29 November 1947 but should also take into account subsequent proposals, including those in the Mediator's report;

NOTING the establishment since 15 May 1948 of civil and military authority, under the Provisional Government of Israel, over substantially the area which, under the resolution of 29 November 1947 was recognized as delimiting the Jewish State in Palestine envisaged in that resolution;

NOTING FURTHER that the establishment of the Provisional Government of Israel and the exercise by it of autonomous defence and administrative functions is in conformity with the spirit and intention of the resolution of 29 November 1947, and that this Government has been described by the Mediator as "a living, solidly entrenched and vigorous reality";

REQUESTS the Security Council to give sympathetic consideration to an application for the admission of the State of Israel to the United Nations if and when such application will be submitted;

ESTABLISHES a Commission of Conciliation for Palestine composed of not more than five members, with the following functions;

- (1) To assist the interested parties to enter immediately into direct negotiations to reach a permanent settlement, which shall include final designation of the boundaries of the State of Israel and in relation to the rest of the area of Palestine shall take into account the wishes of the people therein;
- (2) To promote good relations between the State of Israel, the Arabs of Palestine and the neighbouring Arab States;
- (3) To appoint under its supervision a boundaries commission which shall draw up the final boundaries of the State of Israel in conformity with any agreement arrived at between that State, the neighbouring States concerned and the people interested, reporting, in the event of failure to secure agreement between the parties on boundaries and related matters, to the General Assembly with a view to final determination by the Assembly of the question;

/(4)

- (4) To consult with all governments and parties concerned, and with the Trusteeship Council, in order to protect and preserve the spiritual and religious interests involved, with a view to the carrying out of the plan for the future government of Jerusalem and Bethlehem in conformity with the principles of the resolution of 29 November 1947;
- (5) To call into consultation all those organs and agencies of the United Nations which may assist in working out plans both for the resettlement of Palestinian refugees and displaced persons and for their repatriation where feasible in the areas from which they have come;

REQUESTS the Commission to begin its functions at once, with a view to the establishment of contact between the Parties themselves and the Commission at the earliest possible date;

CALLS ON the Parties concerned to co-operate with the Commission in the discharge of its functions and of the purposes of this resolution;

AUTHORIZES the Secretary-General to put at the disposal of the Commission such administrative and advisory staff and other facilities as may be required.

EXTRACT from - A/C.1/PV.208, 23 Nov., 1948.

FIRST COMMITTEE

VERBATIM RECORD OF THE TWO HUNDRED AND EIGHTH MEETING

Held at the Palais de Chaillot, Paris,
on Tuesday, 23 November, 1948, at 10:30 a.m.

Representative of AUSTRALIA: What has happened in Palestine since the last regular session of the General Assembly, and especially since the Special Session in April and May of this year, gives the present Assembly an opportunity to take a definite step towards the ultimate settlement of this question.

One thing that has become clear throughout the debates dealing with the Palestine question is that consistency in principle, and resolution in maintaining the authority of General Assembly decisions once they are arrived at, offers the only chance of opening the way to a final and just settlement. Any departure from such ideas means uncertainty and strikes a blow at the United Nations.

Once again, in this present Session, it is the duty of the Political Committee to separate essentials from non-essentials in this problem and to bring out in the clearest possible form the considerations which will have a cardinal influence on peace and justice in the Near East and assist the authority of the United Nations.

This Committee must necessarily keep itself in touch with the developments that have arisen from the current handling by the Security Council of certain military and security aspects of the question. The Council, as it is known, has taken specific steps towards the negotiation of an armistice in Palestine. Should this be brought about in the near future, it would provide a very different background for this Committee's discussions from that which has existed, and the Committee would naturally wish to take every advantage of such a development.

However, the responsibility for the political settlement in Palestine is a matter for the exclusive determination of the General Assembly, which laid down the basis of such a settlement twelve months ago; a basis which should have been accepted, but by one party was not, as the considered judgment of the United Nations derived from the report and recommendations of the Special Committee on Palestine on which very considerable energy was expended with a cost exceeding one million dollars.

The Committee's.....

The Committee's starting point should be the decision of the General Assembly, which has not been altered and which retains full force and effect.

Moreover, this Assembly is bound to recognize the outstanding fact which has emerged since the General Assembly's recommendations in May of this year - namely, the establishment of effective organization of the Jewish State. By every practical test, whether in respect of its capacity for self-defence, its governmental organization, its control of all forms of administration within specified areas, its voice before the Security Council and the General Assembly itself, the fact that the Government of Israel is a reality must by now be clearly apparent to all the world. Count Bernadotte himself recognized this in the following terms:

"....the Jewish State is a living, solidly entrenched and vigorous reality.... The Provisional Government of Israel is today exercising, without restrictions on its authority or power, all the attributes of full sovereignty."

No purpose is to be served by allowing such a fact to lie hidden in the background. On the contrary, there is a definite and tangible advantage to be had from explicitly bringing it into the foreground and considering other aspects of the question in relation to it.

Moreover, these results themselves clearly flowed from the General Assembly decision of last year. In the opinion of the General Assembly at that time, the separation of Jewish territory from the rest of Palestine and its establishment as an independent State was an inescapable act of justice. Now that it has come into being, even though some of the means used were not premediated in this Assembly, it cannot possibly be taken otherwise than a development in full and strict conformity with the intention of the 1947 Resolution, which provided in this respect as follows:

"Independent Arab and Jewish States shall come into existence in Palestine two months after the evacuation of the armed forces of the mandatory power has been completed, but in any case not later than 1st October, 1948."

The proposals of this Committee should, therefore, take into account the existence as an entity of Israel by way of recommendation respecting its admission to the United Nations, or in some other tangible manner. This is also in strict accordance with the November Resolution, which said:

"When the....."

"When the independence of either the Arab or the Jewish State as envisaged in this Plan has become effective....sympathetic consideration should be given to its application for admission to membership in the United Nations...."

Taking this as a starting point, it is clear that the establishment of a Jewish State in Palestine, is a direct consequence, and an intended consequence, of the General Assembly Resolution on Palestine of 29th November, 1947.

It is true that certain parts of that Resolution, intimately connected with the creation of a Jewish State, could not be carried into effect, largely because of the attitude of several of the Arab States. Nonetheless, the establishment of a separate Jewish State in Palestine is an essential part, and in the minds of many delegations, the essential part, of the intention of the 1947 Resolution.

The principles of that Resolution were in no way effected during the Special Session earlier this year, which rejected an unjustified attempt to undermine the previous decision of the General Assembly by a proposal of trusteeship. On the contrary, the November Resolution was the implied basis of the procedure for mediation which that Special Assembly set up. To give any thought now to setting the Resolution aside, or what is even worse, ignoring it, would only lead to confusion of purpose, and occasion doubt as to the determination of the United Nations to follow through consistently a line which it has decided for itself after the fullest consideration and in accordance with basic justice.

Furthermore, the 1947 plan was worked out in an atmosphere conducive to fair and reasonable conclusions. Should the whole issue now be reopened afresh, it would have to be dealt with in conditions distorted by military activities and warlike emotions on both sides, and in the day to day fluidity of armed combat.

The Committee has before it the Report of the United Nations Mediator in Palestine. This is a sincere and valuable document and a tribute to the distinguished personal efforts of its originator. It is, however, quite erroneous to regard the Mediator's Report as having been intended to supplement or take the place of the 1947 Resolution. We are satisfied that nothing was further from the Mediator's intention. The Mediator's work derived from the recommendations of the Special Assembly, which itself was acting within the broad intention of the 1947 Resolution. There is nothing whatever in

the Mediator's.....

the Mediator's Report which was ever intended to or could result in setting aside the principles of the November Resolution as the true reflection of the general will of the Assembly. On the contrary, it recommended as a basis, in strict conformity with the purpose of the 1947 Resolution, first, political partition, comprising a Jewish State, and, second, an international arrangement for the government of Jerusalem. All the Mediator's suggestions deserve to be, and will be taken account of through appropriate means. But we should be entirely misled, if we allowed them at this late stage and in the present disturbed conditions to displace the Assembly's original Resolution, which still stands unamended and of full binding significance.

Therefore, we should not attempt now to make any recommendations, especially as regards the boundaries of the Jewish State, at variance with those contained in the 1947 Resolution, unless this is done with the agreement of the parties concerned. It is, however, the obligation of the Committee to suggest means whereby any such agreement to vary the conditions can be facilitated if the circumstances make the change a just one. For this purpose, starting from the two basic points of the maintenance of the intention of the 1947 Resolution, and the establishment of a Jewish State in accordance therewith, our suggestion would be, in respect of further provisions which might be included in an eventual resolution, the establishment by the Assembly of a Commission of Conciliation for Palestine, with something like the following functions:

First of all, to assist and encourage the parties directly interested to enter at once into direct negotiations to replace the existing truce, or an armistice, by a permanent settlement. This settlement should be in conformity with the principles of the recommendation as regards boundaries contained in the Resolution of 1947, but would also take into account amended territorial suggestions, including those in the Mediator's Report.

Secondly, the Commission should operate on a long-term basis as an agency to help in the furtherance of good relations between Israel, the Arabs of Palestine, and the neighbouring Arab states.

Thirdly, at the proper time the Commission could appoint or act as a Boundaries Commission to draw up the final boundaries, in the technical sense, of the State of Israel in agreement with Israel and the neighbouring Arab peoples.

Fourthly, if there is no agreement as regards boundaries, or if the Commission should decide that justice in all the circumstances required it,

the Commission.....

the Commission should report to the next General Assembly with a view to final determination.

It might be thought desirable also to allocate certain other functions to the Commission, such as to assist in economic adjustments or to co-operate with other agencies and the Governments and peoples concerned in the long-term resettlement or repatriation of refugees in Palestine. In this connection, we have noted particularly the reference made the other day by Mr. Shertok to the intention of the Israeli Government to give careful consideration to the repatriation of Arab refugees displaced from their homes in Palestine.

More especially, it could be proper for such a Commission to direct itself, again in co-operation with the Governments concerned, and with other organs of the United Nations such as the Trusteeship Council, to the implementation of one of the most important parts of the General Assembly's Resolution of 1947, namely, that dealing with the status of Jerusalem and Bethlehem. The principles of the General Assembly's resolution last year in respect of Jerusalem and Bethlehem had the whole-hearted assent at that time of nearly every country, and the same is no doubt the case this year. Here is a clear obligation on the part of the General Assembly to proceed further with a measure which is of the deepest concern to religious conviction throughout the world.

This General Assembly is bound to recognize the 1947 Resolution as not only being in force, but also as being just in principle and, indeed, far more in keeping with the practical realities of the present situation in Palestine, including the military realities, than had been anticipated.

We consider that this General Assembly should not attempt to lay down at present any amended plan of boundaries in Palestine except by consent. If we tried to do this, many differences of detail would prolong our discussions indefinitely and these would all, in any event, have to be gone over again in the event of direct negotiations between the parties, which we hope the General Assembly will strongly enjoin on both sides.

We also propose, if I may recapitulate for a moment, that the interests of the United Nations will be most efficiently maintained, and the positive co-operation of both parties in Palestine most effectively promoted, by the setting up on the part of the General Assembly of a small Commission of the kind I have sketched, the terms of reference of which would be as

flexible as.....

flexible as possible but which would have regard to what is now, or should be, a matter of common sense: that is to say, that the Arab States now have a political entity in the State of Israel with which to negotiate. These suggestions derive from our opinion that there does exist room for conciliation and agreement between the parties concerned.

Although circumstances have made attainment of full economic union in Palestine, as contemplated in the earlier recommendations of the General Assembly, unlikely at least for the time being, we believe that the logic of events will inevitably force acceptance by both parties of the close economic co-operation essential to their mutual well-being. It is not our view that acceptance of the Bernadotte plan would either increase or reduce the economic interdependence of the various parts of Palestine and of the Near East generally or that the original partition plan is invalidated or made impracticable by deferment of the implementation of that part of the original plan dealing with economic union. It is obvious that the entire subtraction of the Negeb, for example, from the State of Israel would greatly impair the viability of that new State.

It is in the belief that the ultimate best interests of Palestine will be best served by adherence to the United Nations' decision arrived at last year that I would urge now that there should be no turning back in principle from that decision, and that this General Assembly should lay a clear injunction on both parties to abandon sterile antagonism and to pay heed to the force of judgment and opinion which the General Assembly's recommendation represents. In this respect, nothing is to be gained either by continued attitudes of defiance of the authority of the United Nations' decision on the part of the Arabs in Palestine or the Arab States themselves, or, on the other hand, by any disposition on the part of the new State of Israel, by selecting the most advantageous aspects of all proposals, to forget the immense debt it owes to the United Nations by virtue of last November's resolution which sanctioned the very existence of the State of Israel. The Jews have expected and have received justice at the hands of the General Assembly of the United Nations. They must also do justice.

The November 1947 resolution of the General Assembly won almost world-wide acceptance, largely because of the constructive solution of the special problem of Jerusalem and the Holy Places. Support for the General Assembly resolution reflected the deepest feelings of the centres of religious devotion in the world. In this respect, the plan for Jerusalem and the Holy Places was

and remains a cardinal feature of the General Assembly's recommendation.

Therefore, in its application to Jerusalem and Bethlehem and the Holy Places of Palestine, the November Resolution must also be maintained in fundamental principle. These places cannot be said to be the exclusive property of Jews or Arabs, Christians or non-Christians. Last year, the delegations of Australia and France particularly, to name only two, not only drew specific attention to the international nature of this problem, but put forward positive proposals relating to the safeguarding, inter alia, of the Christian churches - proposals which were accepted - and we do not intend to abandon the principle then expressly stated and supported by us. Jerusalem and the Holy Places engage not only the sentiments, but the sacred interests, of the great mass of mankind. This concept has been eloquently expressed in a recent encyclical letter of His Holiness the Pope, as follows:

"....It would be expedient, as a better guarantee for the safety of the sanctuaries under the present circumstances, to give an international character to Jerusalem and its vicinity, where so many and so precious reminders of the life and death of our Saviour are to be found. It is also necessary to ensure with international guarantees both the rights of free access to the Holy Places scattered throughout Palestine and the freedom of religion and the respect for customs and religious traditions."

In conclusion, it must be clear to the parties concerned in this problem that the members of this Committee are activated by goodwill in their efforts to reach a just settlement of the Palestine problem. My Government has made it abundantly clear that it is prepared to do all it can to contribute to the welfare of the peoples of the area by its immediate response to the suggestions of the Mediator that urgent relief was required by large numbers of Arab women and children. We shall continue to give the most earnest consideration to contributing to the settlement of the problems that may arise from the solution of this question.

In the settlement for Palestine there should be recognition not only of the international concern for the protection of what, for many hundreds of millions of people, are sacred interests, but also of the ultimate welfare of both peoples in the whole territory concerned. This can be served in the long-term view only by the co-operation of both, as was contemplated in part in the General Assembly resolution of last year, in all matters affecting

their social.....

their social, cultural and economic interests. If the two parties can find their way to such co-operation, beginning possibly with direct negotiations under the auspices of the United Nations, even here in Paris, they may be sure that they will have behind them the wholehearted goodwill of all countries represented in this Committee.

My delegation has submitted a draft resolution which comprises the main points and ideas which I have attempted to outline in my statement. I ask that it be distributed to the members of the Committee as soon as convenient.

United Nations

GENERAL
ASSEMBLY

Nations Unies

ASSEMBLEE
GENERALE

UNRESTRICTED

A/C.1/403

27 November 1948

ORIGINAL: ENGLISH

Dual Distribution

Third session

FIRST COMMITTEE

PROGRESS REPORT OF THE UNITED NATIONS MEDIATOR ON PALESTINE

Consolidated tabulation of resolutions and amendments prepared
by the Working Group of the First Committee

1. The First Committee, at its 214th meeting on 26 November, entrusted the task of preparing a consolidated tabulation of the various draft resolutions and amendments to a Working Group, composed of the authors of these various resolutions and amendments, under the Chairmanship of the Rapporteur of the First Committee, Mr. Selim Sarper.

2. The draft resolutions and amendments which had been submitted to the First Committee were as follows:

United Kingdom revised draft resolution:	A/C.1/394/Rev.1
United States amendments to the revised draft resolution:	A/C.1/397/Rev.1
Guatemalan amendments to the United States amendments:	A/C.1/398/Rev.1
Australian draft resolution:	A/C.1/396 and /Add.1
Colombian draft resolution:	A/C.1/399
Polish draft resolution:	A/C.1/400 and /Corr.1
USSR draft resolution:	A/C.1/401
Syrian draft resolution:	A/C.1/402

3. At its first meeting the Working Group adopted a classification whereby the subject matter contained in the draft resolutions and amendments was divided into 14 categories or headings, under which the relevant parts of the various texts would be set beside one another for purposes of easy comparison.

4. At its second meeting the Working Group approved the presentation of the consolidated tabulation as set forth below, for the consideration of the First Committee:

/I. Preamble

I. Preamble

United Kingdom and Colombia

HAVING ADOPTED on 29 November 1947 a resolution (A/516) regarding the future government of Palestine and providing a plan of partition with economic union;

Australia

HAVING IN MIND the resolution of the General Assembly on the future government of Palestine of 29 November 1947;

Poland

HAVING ADOPTED on 29 November 1947 a resolution on the future government of Palestine providing a plan for the establishment of a Jewish and an Arab State in Palestine, for the economic union of these two States and for the status of the City of Jerusalem;

United Kingdom and Colombia

HAVING ADOPTED on 14 May 1948 resolution 186 (S-II) empowering a United Nations Mediator in Palestine to exercise certain functions including the use of his good offices to promote a peaceful adjustment of the future situation of Palestine;

Australia

TAKING NOTE also of resolution 186 (S-II) of 14 May 1948 providing for the appointment of the United Nations Mediator in Palestine and of the resolution of the Security Council of 16 November 1948 calling for the negotiation of an armistice in Palestine;

Poland

TAKING NOTE of the resolution of the Security Council of 16 November 1948 calling for negotiations of an armistice in Palestine;

United Kingdom and Colombia

HAVING TAKEN NOTE of the resolutions of the Security Council concerning the truce in Palestine and of the resolution of 16 November 1948 concerning the establishment of an armistice by means of negotiations conducted either directly or through the Acting Mediator on Palestine;

United Kingdom and Colombia

HAVING RECEIVED AND EXAMINED the Progress Report of the United Nations Mediator on Palestine (A/648) submitted by the late Counte Folke Bernadotte;

Australia

HAVING CONSIDERED the Progress Report of the United Nations Mediator of 16 September 1948 (A/648, Part I);

/Poland

Poland
HAVING CONSIDERED
16 September 1948;
Syria

NOTING that the
was not accepted by the
and gave birth to the

NOTING that the
of the Progress Report
Jews - proposal which
detrimental to the

NOTING that the
imperative and compul

NOTING that the
essentially of force
to appropriate a part
against the wishes of

Poland

RECOMMENDS the
from the territory
Union of Soviet Soc

CONSIDERING the
the establishment
in Palestine, as well
the creation of an

RECOMMENDS the
and Arab States in
General Assembly of
foreign military

REQUESTS the
debaring a renewal

Poland

HAVING CONSIDERED the Progress Report of the United Nations Mediator of 16 September 1948;

Syria

NOTING that the resolution of the General Assembly of 29 November 1947 was not accepted by the Arabs of Palestine and the neighbouring Arab States and gave birth to the disastrous situation in the Holy Land;

NOTING that the recommendations proposed by the Mediator in his Part I of the Progress Report are based on partitioning Palestine between Arabs and Jews - proposal which has been flatly rejected by the Arabs and proved detrimental to the interests of both Arabs and Jews;

NOTING that the General Assembly is not empowered by the Charter to make imperative and compulsory recommendations for splitting countries;

NOTING that the Jewish Community now found in Palestine is composed essentially of foreign immigrants and refugees who have no legitimate rights to appropriate a part of the country and establish their sovereignty on it against the wishes of the lawful majority of the people of Palestine;

II. Withdrawal of Troops

Poland

RECOMMENDS that all foreign troops and military personnel be withdrawn from the territory of Palestine;

Union of Soviet Socialist Republics

CONSIDERING that the presence of foreign troops in Palestine prevents the establishment of peaceful relations between the Arab and Jewish populations in Palestine, as well as the normal development of the State of Israel and the creation of an Arab State in Palestine;

RECOMMENDS the immediate removal from the territories of the Jewish and Arab States in Palestine, the creation of which was provided for by the General Assembly Resolution of 29 November 1947, of all foreign troops and foreign military personnel; and

REQUESTS the Security Council to adopt appropriate measures for debarring a renewal of military activity in Palestine.

/III. General Principles

III. General Principles

United Kingdom

2. NOTES with satisfaction Part I of the Progress Report of the United Nations Mediator and ENDORSES the specific conclusions contained in Part I of that report as providing a practical means of giving effect to the principles contained in the resolution of 29 November 1947 and as a basis for a peaceful settlement of the Palestine question;

United States and Guatemala

DELETE numbered paragraph two of the United Kingdom resolution.

Australia and Columbia

BEING OF OPINION that the Assembly's resolution of 29 November 1947 is the basic starting point of settlement by the Assembly of the Palestine question;

Poland

AFFIRMS that the resolution of 29 November 1947 is the basis for the final settlement of the Palestine question by the General Assembly;

Australia and Poland

NOTES the establishment since 15 May 1948 of civil and military authority, under the Provisional Government of Israel, over substantially the area which, under the resolution of 29 November 1947 was recognized as delimiting the Jewish State in Palestine envisaged in that resolution;

United States and Columbia

2. CALLS UPON the governments and authorities concerned to extend the scope of the negotiations provided for in the Security Council's resolution of 16 November 1948, and to seek agreement by negotiations conducted either directly or through the Conciliation Commission with a view to a final settlement of all questions outstanding between them.

Syria

DECIDES to constitute a Commission composed of five Member States with functions:

To study on the spot and to prepare proposals for the establishment of a single State of the whole of Palestine on cantonization or federal basis in which all sections of population in Palestine will participate in rights and duties as loyal citizens of a democratic State with wide autonomous privileges in cantons or areas to be assigned to each of them.

/IV. Conciliation Commission

A. COMPOSE

United Kingdom

3. ESTABLISHES
Members of the United

Guatemala

3. ESTABLISHES
five) personalities and
and the Secretary-General

have the following functions:

Australia

ESTABLISHES a Commission
not more than five members

Columbia

3. ESTABLISHES
known personalities and

following functions:

Poland

ESTABLISHES a Commission
representatives of ..

Syria

DECIDES to constitute
with functions:

United Kingdom and Columbia

3(a) To assume the role of
Palestine by the resolution

3(b) To carry out the provisions
this resolution and as provided
given to it by the General Assembly

3(c) To enter into negotiations
concerned with a view to a
outstanding between them

IV. Conciliation Commission

A. Composition and appointment of Commission

United Kingdom

3. ESTABLISHES a Conciliation Commission consisting of (three States Members of the United Nations) which shall have the following functions:

Guatemala

3. ESTABLISHES a Conciliation Commission composed of three (or five) personalities appointed by the President of the General Assembly and the Secretary-General of the United Nations. The Commission shall have the following functions:

Australia

ESTABLISHES a Commission of Conciliation for Palestine composed of not more than five members, with the following functions:

Colombia

3. ESTABLISHES a Conciliation Commission consisting of three world known personalities appointed by the General Assembly which shall have the following functions:

Poland

ESTABLISHES a Commission of Conciliation for Palestine composed of representatives of ... (five states), with the following functions:

Syria

DECIDES to constitute a Commission composed of five Member States with functions:

B. Terms of Reference

United Kingdom and Colombia

- 3(a) To assume the functions given to the United Nations Mediator on Palestine by the resolution of the General Assembly of 14 May 1948;
- 3(b) To carry out the specific functions and directives given to it by this resolution and such additional functions and directives as may be given to it by the General Assembly or by the Security Council;
- 3(c) To enter into consultations with the Governments and authorities concerned with a view to achievement of a final settlement of all questions outstanding between them, including in particular the questions dealt with in

/the

the General Assembly resolution of 29 November 1947 and in Part I, section VIII, paragraph 4 of the Progress Report of the United Nations Mediator on Palestine;

3(d) To undertake, upon the request of the Security Council, any of the functions now assigned to the United Nations Mediator on Palestine or to the United Nations Truce Commission by resolutions of the Security Council; upon such request to the Conciliation Commission by the Security Council with respect to all the remaining functions of the United Nations Mediator on Palestine under Security Council resolutions, the office of the Mediator shall be terminated;

Guatemala

REPLACE paragraph 3(c) of the United Kingdom draft resolution by the following:

3(c) To use its good offices with the Governments and authorities concerned with a view to achievement of a final settlement of all questions outstanding between them.

Australia

(1) To assist the interested parties to enter immediately into direct negotiations to reach a permanent settlement, which shall include final designation of the boundaries of the State of Israel and in relation to the rest of the area of Palestine shall take into account the wishes of the people therein;

(2) To promote good relations between the State of Israel, the Arabs of Palestine and the neighbouring Arab States;

(3) To appoint under its supervision a boundaries commission which shall draw up the final boundaries of the State of Israel in conformity with any agreement arrived at between that State, the neighbouring States concerned and the people interested, reporting, in the event of failure to secure agreement between the parties on boundaries and related matters, its recommendations to the General Assembly with a view to final determination by the Assembly of the question;

(4) To consult with all governments and parties concerned, and with the Trusteeship Council, in order to protect and preserve the spiritual and religious interests involved, with a view to the carrying out of the plan for the future government of Jerusalem and Bethlehem in conformity with the principles of the resolution of 29 November 1947;

(5) To call into consultation all those organs and agencies of the United Nations which may assist in working out plans both for the resettlement of Palestinian refugees and displaced persons and for their repatriation where feasible in the areas from which they have come;

/Poland

Poland

(1) To assist the interested parties to enter immediately into direct negotiations to reach a permanent settlement, which shall include final designation of the boundaries of the State of Israel and in relation to the rest of the area of Palestine shall take into account the wishes of the people therein;

(2) To appoint, under its supervision, a boundaries commission which shall draw up the final boundaries of the State of Israel in conformity with any agreement arrived at between that State, the neighbouring States concerned and the people interested, reporting, in the event of failure to secure agreement between the parties on boundaries and related matters, its recommendations to the General Assembly with a view to final determination by the Assembly of the question;

(3) To establish a commission to study the situation in the State of Israel and in the surrounding areas with a view to final determination of the boundaries of the State of Israel and in relation to the rest of the area of Palestine;

(4) To call into consultation all those organs and agencies of the United Nations which may assist in working out plans both for the resettlement of Palestinian refugees and displaced persons and for their repatriation where feasible in the areas from which they have come;

United Kingdom

4. INSTRUCTS the Mediator to enter into direct negotiations with the interested parties concerned with a view to achievement of a final settlement, taking into account the wishes of the people therein, without excluding any parties;

(a) That there be a commission to study the situation in the State of Israel and in the surrounding areas with a view to final determination of the boundaries of the State of Israel and in relation to the rest of the area of Palestine;

(b) That the Mediator shall draw up the final boundaries of the State of Israel in conformity with any agreement arrived at between that State, the neighbouring States concerned and the people interested, reporting, in the event of failure to secure agreement between the parties on boundaries and related matters, its recommendations to the General Assembly with a view to final determination by the Assembly of the question;

(c) That the Mediator shall call into consultation all those organs and agencies of the United Nations which may assist in working out plans both for the resettlement of Palestinian refugees and displaced persons and for their repatriation where feasible in the areas from which they have come;

(d) That the Mediator shall use its good offices with the Governments and authorities concerned with a view to achievement of a final settlement of all questions outstanding between them.

United States

4. INSTRUCTS the Mediator to enter into direct negotiations with the interested parties concerned with a view to achievement of a final settlement, taking into account the wishes of the people therein, without excluding any parties;

Poland

(1) To assist the interested parties to enter immediately into direct negotiations to reach on the basis of the resolution of 29 November 1947 a permanent settlement which shall include the final designation of the boundaries of the State of Israel and the establishment of an independent Arab State over the rest of the area of Palestine;

(2) To appoint, under its supervision, a boundaries commission which shall draw up the final boundaries of the State of Israel and of the Arab State in Palestine, reporting in the event of failure to the General Assembly with a view to final determination by the Assembly;

(3) To establish the economic union and promote good relations between the State of Israel and the Arab State of Palestine;

(4) To call into consultation all those organs and agencies of the United Nations which may assist in working out plans both for the resettlement of Palestinian refugees and displaced persons and for their repatriation where feasible in the areas from which they have come;

V. BoundariesUnited Kingdom

4. INSTRUCTS the Conciliation Commission in pursuance of paragraph 3(c) above to enter into consultations with the Governments and authorities concerned with a view to delimiting the frontiers in Palestine as part of a final settlement, taking into account the following general considerations, without excluding any territorial settlement mutually acceptable to the parties;

(a) That there are important elements common to both the resolution of the General Assembly of 29 November 1947 and the Progress Report of the United Nations Mediator on Palestine;

(b) That the delimitation of frontiers in areas not covered by (a) above should be carried out in the light of the general equilibrium envisaged in the resolution of 29 November, the Mediator's comments thereon in paragraph 3(d) of Part I, Section VIII of his report, and his specific conclusions in paragraph 4(b) of the same section, with a view to contributing to the peaceful adjustment of differences between the parties;

United States

4. INSTRUCTS the Conciliation Commission in pursuance of paragraphs 2 and 3(c) above to enter into consultations with the Governments and authorities

/concerned

concerned with a view to delimiting the frontiers in Palestine as part of a final settlement, taking into account the following general considerations, without excluding any territorial settlement mutually acceptable to the parties;

(a) That there are important elements common to both the resolution of the General Assembly of 29 November 1947 and the Progress Report of the United Nations Mediator on Palestine;

(b) That certain modifications in the territorial arrangements of the General Assembly resolution of 29 November 1947 should be considered taking into account Part I, Section VIII, Paragraph 4(b) of the Progress Report of the United Nations Mediator in so far as it may contribute to a peaceful adjustment of differences between the parties;

Colombia

(Same as the United States except for the United States amendment adding the reference to paragraph 2 in the phrase "in pursuance of paragraphs 2 and 3(c) above".)

Guatemala

INSTRUCTS the Conciliation Commission to assist the governments and authorities concerned with a view to delimiting the frontiers in Palestine, taking into account the actual situation in Palestine, and in conformity with the principles of the resolution of 29 November 1947, without excluding any territorial settlement mutually acceptable to the parties. In the event of failure to secure agreement on the boundaries and related matters, the Commission shall report to the General Assembly for the purpose of final determination of the question by the Assembly;

Australia and Colombia

BEING FURTHER OF OPINION that the final settlement in Palestine as regards boundaries should be in conformity with the principles of the recommendation contained in the Assembly resolution of 29 November 1947 but should also take into account subsequent proposals, including those in the Mediator's Report;

Australia (repeated from terms of reference of Conciliation Commission as set out above)

(3) To appoint under its supervision a boundaries commission which shall draw up the final boundaries of the State of Israel in conformity with any agreement arrived at between that State, the neighbouring States

/concerned

concerned and the people
secure agreement between
its recommendations to t
by the Assembly of the
Poland (repeated from
out above)

(2) To appoint,
shall draw up the final
State in Palestine, re
with a view to final d

United Kingdom and Co

5. ENDORSES th
Mediator's conclusion
Palestine not include
City of Jerusalem, an
consultation with the
of the Arab States c
in accordance with t
Guatemala

The Commission
Palestine in decidin
the said territory.
without the consent
Australia (repeated
out above)

(1) ... in rela
account the wishes o
Poland (repeated fro
out above)

(1) ... and the
rest of the area of

concerned and the people interested, reporting, in the event of failure to secure agreement between the parties on boundaries and related matters, its recommendations to the General Assembly with a view to final determination by the Assembly of the question;

Poland (repeated from terms of reference of Conciliation Commission as set out above)

(2) To appoint, under its supervision, a boundaries commission which shall draw up the final boundaries of the State of Israel and of the Arab State in Palestine, reporting in the event of failure to the General Assembly with a view to final determination by the Assembly;

VI. Future of Arab Palestine

United Kingdom and Columbia

5. ENDORSES the recommendation contained in paragraph 4(c) of the Mediator's conclusions concerning the disposition of the territory of Palestine not included within the boundaries of the Jewish State or the City of Jerusalem, and INSTRUCTS the Conciliation Commission, in full consultation with the inhabitants of Arab Palestine, to assist the Governments of the Arab States concerned to arrange for the disposition of this territory in accordance with the aforesaid recommendation;

Guatemala

The Commission shall assist the inhabitants of the Arab territory of Palestine in deciding upon the political organization they wish to give to the said territory. No annexation to a neighbouring State shall be decreed without the consent of the people, freely and legally expressed;

Australia (repeated from terms of reference of Conciliation Commission as set out above)

(1) ... in relation to the rest of the area of Palestine shall take into account the wishes of the people therein;

Poland (repeated from terms of reference of Conciliation Commission as set out above)

(1) ... and the establishment of an independent Arab State over the rest of the area of Palestine;

VII. Jerusalem

VII. Jerusalem

United Kingdom

7. RESOLVES that in view of its association with three world religions, the Jerusalem area, as defined in the General Assembly resolution of 29 November 1947, should be accorded special and separate treatment from the rest of Palestine and should be placed under effective United Nations control with the maximum feasible local autonomy for the Arab and Jewish communities; INVITES the Security Council to take further steps to secure the demilitarization of Jerusalem with the least possible delay; and INSTRUCTS the Conciliation Commission:

- (a) To take all feasible steps to facilitate the effective administration of the area, co-ordinating to the fullest extent possible the organs of self-government and administration of the Arab and Jewish communities of the Jerusalem area,
- (b) To report to the Security Council for appropriate action any attempt to interfere with its functions with respect to Jerusalem, and
- (c) To present to the fourth regular session of the General Assembly detailed proposals for a permanent international regime for the Jerusalem area.

To assist it in carrying out these functions, the Conciliation Commission is authorized to appoint a United Nations Commissioner for Jerusalem who shall be responsible to the Commission;

8. RESOLVES that, pending agreement on more detailed arrangements among the Governments and authorities concerned, unimpeded access to Jerusalem by road, rail, or air should be accorded to all inhabitants of Palestine; and INSTRUCTS the Conciliation Commission to report immediately to the Security Council for appropriate action by that organ any attempt by any party to impede such access;

Australia (repeated from terms of reference of Conciliation Commission as set out above)

(4) To consult with all governments and parties concerned, and with the Trusteeship Council, in order to protect and preserve the spiritual and religious interests involved, with a view to the carrying out of the plan for the future government of Jerusalem and Bethlehem in conformity with the principles of the resolution of 29 November 1947;

/Colombia

Colombia

6. ... The City under a special international status. The Trust responsibilities of the United Nations;

The City of Jerusalem plus the area shall be Abu Dis; (including also the area as indicated on the map)

7. INSTRUCTS the Conciliation Commission to hold regular meeting of the Conciliation Commission for Jerusalem which shall be held in Chapter C, Part III of the Charter of the United Nations.

8. RESOLVES that the Conciliation Commission should be accorded full powers and authorities concerning the City of Jerusalem immediately to the extent necessary to attempt by any party to impede such access; Poland

REQUESTS the Conciliation Commission to report to the Security Council the State of Israel and the State of Jordan of Jerusalem accorded

United Kingdom

6. RESOLVES that Palestine should be placed under a special international status with existing rights and responsibilities should be under effective international Conciliation Commission

Colombia

6. ... The City of Jerusalem shall be established as a corpus separatum under a special international regime and shall be administered by the United Nations. The Trusteeship Council shall be designated to discharge the responsibilities of the Administering Authority on behalf of the United Nations;

The City of Jerusalem shall include the present municipality of Jerusalem plus the surrounding villages and towns, the most eastern of which shall be Abu Dis; the most southern, Bethlehem; the most western, Ein Karim (including also the built-up area of Motza); and the most northern Shu'fat, as indicated on the attached sketch-map (annex B to resolution 181);

7. INSTRUCTS the Conciliation Commission to bring before the next regular meeting of the General Assembly a detailed statute of the City of Jerusalem which shall contain inter alia the substance of the provisions of Chapter C, Part III, of the resolution 181 of the General Assembly;

8. RESOLVES that unimpeded access to Jerusalem by road, rail, or air should be accorded to all inhabitants of Palestine by the Governments and authorities concerned and INSTRUCTS the Conciliation Commission to report immediately to the Security Council for appropriate action by that organ any attempt by any party to impair such access;

Poland

REQUESTS the Trusteeship Council to work out, in consultation with the Commission of Conciliation for Palestine, and with the governments of the State of Israel and of the Arab State in Palestine, the statute of the City of Jerusalem according to the provisions of the resolution of 29 November 1947;

VIII Holy Places

United Kingdom

6. RESOLVES that the Holy Places, religious buildings and sites in Palestine should be protected and free access to them assured, in accordance with existing rights and historical practice; that arrangements to this end should be under effective United Nations supervision; that the United Nations Conciliation Commission in presenting to the fourth regular session of the

/General Assembly

General Assembly its detailed proposals for a permanent international regime for the territory of Jerusalem should include recommendations concerning the Holy Places in that territory; that with regard to the Holy Places in the rest of Palestine the Commission should call upon the political authorities of the areas concerned to give appropriate formal guarantees as to the protection of the Holy Places and access to them; and that these undertakings should be presented to the General Assembly for approval.

Colombia

(Same as United Kingdom except for expression "with a view to securing appropriate formal guarantees" in place of expression "give appropriate formal guarantees".)

Poland

DRAWs THE ATTENTION of the Trusteeship Council that the statute of the City of Jerusalem should provide for the preservation, protection and freedom of access to sites, buildings and institutions of religious and spiritual interest.

IX. Economic Union

Poland

(repeated from terms of reference of Conciliation Commission as set out above).

(3) To establish the economic union and promote good relations between the State of Israel and the Arab State in Palestine;

X. Refugees

United Kingdom

10. ENDORSES the principle stated in Part I, section V, paragraph 7 of the Mediator's report and RESOLVES that the Arab refugees should be permitted to return to their homes at the earliest possible date and that adequate compensation should be paid for the property of those choosing not to return and for property which has been lost as a result of pillage, confiscation or of destruction; and INSTRUCTS the Conciliation Commission to facilitate the repatriation, resettlement, and economic and social rehabilitation of the Arab refugees and the payment of compensation, and to enter into contact with the Director of United Nations Relief for Palestine Refugees;

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10. RESOLVES that the Arab refugees wishing to return to their homes and live at peace with their neighbours should be permitted to do so at the earliest possible date and that adequate compensation should be paid for the property of those choosing not to return; and INSTRUCTS the Conciliation Commission to facilitate the repatriation, resettlement, and economic and social rehabilitation of the Arab refugees and the payment of compensation;

Guatemala

10. RESOLVES that the Arab refugees wishing to return to their homes and live at peace with their neighbours should be permitted to do so at the earliest possible date after the proclamation of peace between the contending parties in Palestine, including the Arab States, and that adequate compensation should be paid for the property of those choosing not to return; and INSTRUCTS the Conciliation Commission to use its good offices to facilitate the repatriation, resettlement, and economic and social rehabilitation of the Arab refugees and the payment of compensation;

Australia (repeated from terms of reference of Conciliation Commission as set out above)

(5) To call into consultation all those organs and agencies of the United Nations which may assist in working out plans both for the resettlement of Palestinian refugees and displaced persons and for their repatriation where feasible in the areas from which they have come;

Poland (repeated from terms of reference of Conciliation Commission as set out above)

(4) To call into consultation all those organs and agencies of the United Nations which may assist in working out plans both for the resettlement of Palestinian refugees and displaced persons and for their repatriation where feasible in the areas from which they have come;

XI Admission of Israel to UN Membership

Australia:

NOTING FURTHER that the establishment of the Provisional Government of Israel and the exercise by it of autonomous defence and administrative functions is in conformity with the spirit and intention of the resolution of 29 November 1947, and that this Government has been described by the Mediator as "a living, solidly entrenched and vigorous reality";

/Guatemala and Australia

Guatemala and Australia

REQUESTS the Security Council to give sympathetic consideration to an application for the admission of the State of Israel to the United Nations if and when such application will be submitted;

Poland

HOPES that the Security Council will give sympathetic consideration to an application of the admission of the State of Israel to the United Nations if and when such application will be submitted;

XII Requests to Security Council

United Kingdom

9. RECOMMENDS to the Security Council that after the frontiers have been established in accordance with this resolution the Security Council consider, in conformity with the Charter, any attempt to alter these frontiers by force as a threat to the peace, breach of the peace, or act of aggression;

Colombia

(Same as United Kingdom except for omission of phrase "... in conformity with the Charter,...".)

XIII Administration

United Kingdom and Colombia

11. AUTHORIZES the Conciliation Commission to appoint such subsidiary bodies and to employ such technical experts, acting under its authority, as it may find necessary to the effective discharge of its functions and responsibilities under this resolution;

14. REQUESTS the Secretary-General to provide the necessary staff and facilities and to make appropriate arrangements to provide the necessary funds required in carrying out the terms of this resolution.

Australia

AUTHORIZES the Secretary-General to put at the disposal of the Commission such administrative and advisory staff and other facilities as may be required.

Poland

AUTHORIZES the Secretary-General to provide the necessary staff and facilities as may be required;

/United Kingdom and Colombia

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United Kingdom and Colombia

12. INSTRUCTS the Conciliation Commission to render progress reports periodically to the Secretary-General for transmission to the Security Council and to Members of the United Nations;

Poland

REQUIRES the Commission to present a report to the next General Assembly;

XIV. Other Items

United Kingdom and Colombia

1. EXPRESSES its deep appreciation of the progress achieved through the good offices of the late United Nations Mediator in promoting a peaceful adjustment of the future situation of Palestine for which cause he sacrificed his life; and EXTENDS its thanks to the Acting Mediator and his staff for their continued efforts and devotion to duty in Palestine;

13. CALLS UPON all Governments and authorities concerned to co-operate with the Conciliation Commission and to take all possible steps to assist in the implementation of this resolution;

Australia

CALLS ON the Parties concerned to co-operate with the Commission in the discharge of its functions and of the purposes of this resolution;

Poland

CALLS upon the Parties concerned to co-operate with the Commission and to assist it in the implementation of its task;

Australia and Poland

REQUESTS the Commission to begin its functions at once, with a view to the establishment of contact between the Parties themselves and the Commission at the earliest possible date;

Mr. HOOD (Australia): The amendments contained in document A/789 which is now before the plenary meeting, and which I take to be the immediate aspect of this question under discussion, are amendments to the resolution adopted a week ago by the First Committee of the General Assembly, which resolution has just been read by the Rapporteur of the First Committee. These amendments stand in the name of seven delegations.

I take the opportunity afforded by the fact that Australia happens to be the first name in this list, of expressing, very shortly, to the Assembly our own conception of what these amendments mean and our own general attitude towards the next stage of the Assembly's deliberations in this vital and important question. No doubt, other sponsors of this resolution will wish to express their own points of view and their own conceptions, and it may be that one or another will desire to place varying emphasis on particular points. Nonetheless, I feel no doubt whatsoever that one and all of these sponsors will be in accord in stating what is to the seven members who have taken part in these discussions, the main and outstanding purpose of the amendments.

The essential purpose of the amendments is to specify, make more clear and more specific, and more practical, the intention expressed in the resolution adopted by the First Committee. That resolution, although it is by no means a short one, does, in its essence, express the general will of all delegations that were represented in the First Committee, namely, a desire to see the stage of conciliation in Palestine approached in a practical and realistic fashion.

These amendments are designed to bring out still further the essential position. Furthermore, it is true to say that in the adoption of that resolution the First Committee had also before it as a cardinal and guiding point in these matters the recommendation of the General Assembly of the United Nations, under which controlling guidance all nations should give practical help to bring about the settlement which was so ardently sought for by all of us. The purpose of the amendments is intended to bring about the collective

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responsibility of the United Nations, and to ensure that a realistic policy shall be followed. Those are the two main points which Australia takes, and that is the reason for these amendments.

In explaining how these six amendments have come to be before the Assembly, allow me to recall the position which appeared to be reached at the end of the debates of the Committee just a week ago. It is a matter of common knowledge that the debates were prolonged, and that there was considerable heated debate with respect to the resolution. In the event the resolution was adopted by a vote of the members by, I think, twenty-five for and twenty-one against. In accordance with the terms of our procedure that was a decision that led many of us to feel apprehension regarding the ultimate result of the recommendation of the resolution to this Assembly.

Therefore, in an honest effort to find whether there was a possibility of reaching some common ground, and of working out a text which would meet the wishes of the minorities before this General Plenary Assembly, my delegation has during the last week conducted informal discussions with those interested, and these amendments are the result of those talks. Our object was, quite frankly, to change and modify the resolution without destroying the essential purpose underneath it, so as to specify more clearly what its intention was, to delete from it polemical references, to concentrate on the intention of the First Committee, and to put forward an expression of the intention of the First Committee as wholly and as completely as possible. In considering the amendments we were guided by that wish, and we have therefore proposed these amendments to the resolution, which we hope will be acceptable to the General Assembly.

Looking at the matter more broadly, we consider that the next stage in the process of obtaining a settlement in Palestine must be based on a realistic appreciation of what is actually the position at present in Palestine. The amendments proposed, as the delegates

/ will

will observe, and as will be discussed in this General Assembly, contain the implicit question of the recognition of two outstanding facts in the situation, and it would be unreasonable for this Assembly to go forward to a further stage in this process without paying attention to these two aspects of the matter.

I refer to the actual existence in fact of a State of Israel, of a Government of Israel, and of an entity, both political and economic, which exists as an entity and is the State of Israel. That is no new consideration. It was noted in very glaring terms in the report which was before the General Assembly last year. In that respect, my country finds that irrespective of administrative functions the State of Israel does exist for self-defence, as has been demonstrated, and events here which we all are aware of show that a Jewish State existed a year ago, or at least it was envisaged, and now it has come into existence, and it has come to stay. No purpose is to be gained by omitting to take into the fullest possible consideration that fact. It is true that the resolution still contains no explicit reference to that fact; but let me make it clear that the Australian delegation considers that to be a basic element on which we must base any further consideration of the matter.

The other aspect which is also a necessary part of the process for our further efforts in this matter is the economic interest, which consideration has been amended as from the original resolution of the Assembly a year ago. I refer to the partition of Palestine. It would not be partition pure and simple, but it would be a constitutional setting-up of two politically independent States, subject to certain economic and political amendments. That has not come about. Nonetheless, it would be wrong to disregard the possibility, and indeed the necessity of the eventual establishment of a method which, if not in form, at any rate in practice and in fact, will meet the requirements which were made quite clear to the Assembly when it passed its vital resolution of last year. I hope that the resolution, with the amendments which we have put up, will forward the eventual development of the whole of Palestine, and that that will be taken in mind in any efforts which may be made at conciliation.

/ The situation

The situation as it at present exists in Palestine is not covered by the resolution in its original form, and it is necessary for the Assembly to take notice of the facts of the present situation. It would be wrong for the Assembly to do anything which might keep Palestine entirely outside the influence and entirely outside the political authority of the United Nations. That is the intention of the resolution. My delegation thinks that if any committee of conciliation is set up, it should be under the Assembly, and its purposes must be closely concerned with the vital aspects of the matter. Any commission which is set up must be in fact a conciliation commission in the true sense of the word, and it must recognize the basic facts of the situation with which the commission has to deal.

That position, and some other reactions which we have heard here, too, are, let me say quite frankly, understandable. It is in no sense the intention of this resolution to impose any settlement. The settlement which the resolution envisages is one of conciliation. It may be that all parties concerned will find it, on reflection, to be in their own best interests to co-operate wholeheartedly with the Commission in its efforts to bring them together on the basis of such conciliation.

I am not, of course, discussing the resolution as a whole, and I shall try to confine myself at the moment to some of the specific amendments.

It will be noted that a considerable condensation of the preamble has been proposed, thereby omitting phrases which, by implication or by direct meaning, might be held to be prejudicial to the intention of setting up a real conciliation commission, with a general directive of bringing the parties together. Therefore, we suggest that we merely say, "The General Assembly, having considered further the situation in Palestine, etc.," and then come to the operative clauses.

Similar considerations apply to the proposed deletion of paragraph 2(c), and also to the deletion of certain words in paragraphs 10 and 11.

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A most important proposed amendment is the deletion from the resolution of the paragraph relating to the means of appointment of the commission. Representatives know that that proposal led, in the Committee, to some difficult debate, and there is by no means any general consensus of opinion. Our proposition now is to delete that specific proposal for the appointment of the members of the commission. The Assembly will eventually decide how many there should be -- whether three or four or five -- but it would seem right to us that, in this matter where the commission is the agent and servant of the Assembly, it should itself be chosen by the Assembly in the normal and democratic manner, and that is the object of the amendment.

Finally, my delegation thinks that the resolution offers by far the best prospect of carrying us toward a real further stage in the solution of this problem. The text is by no means a perfect text. The work devoted to it in the First Committee was intense, and there was not always time to find the best means of expression of intention in the particular passages. However, broadly speaking, we would contend that the resolution, as it is proposed to be amended, meets every requirement which the situation calls for at the moment. The object was not to produce a perfect and fully agreed draft resolution, but, taking into account the amendments which are now proposed, to express the undoubted and emphatic general will of the Assembly and of its First Committee that the time has now come for the two parties mainly concerned on the spot in Palestine to come together in negotiation -- either directly, or through, or in association with the Commission -- to attempt to achieve a final settlement, on a basis which will be just and lasting. I have no doubt that the other sponsors of the amendment who will follow me will be in accord in expressing the most sincere and earnest hope that the parties will, as indeed is expressly enjoined on them in the resolution, co-operate with the Commission to enable it to discharge its functions and to enable this Assembly to discharge adequately its high responsibility in this matter.

PALESTINE: PROGRESS REPORT OF THE UNITED NATIONS MEDIATOR

Resolution adopted by the General Assembly at its
hundred and eighty-sixth plenary meeting,
11 December 1948

THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY,

HAVING CONSIDERED FURTHER the situation in Palestine,

1. EXPRESSES its deep appreciation of the progress achieved through the good offices of the late United Nations Mediator in promoting a peaceful adjustment of the future situation of Palestine, for which cause he sacrificed his life; and

EXTENDS its thanks to the Acting Mediator and his staff for their continued efforts and devotion to duty in Palestine;

2. ESTABLISHES a Conciliation Commission consisting of three States Members of the United Nations which shall have the following functions:

(a) To assume, insofar as it considers necessary in existing circumstances, the functions given to the United Nations Mediator on Palestine by the resolution of the General Assembly of 14 May 1948;

(b) To carry out the specific functions and directives given to it by the present resolution and such additional functions and directives as may be given to it by the General Assembly or by the Security Council;

(c) To undertake, upon the request of the Security Council, any of the functions now assigned to the United Nations Mediator on Palestine or to the United Nations Truce Commission by resolutions of the Security Council; upon such request to the Conciliation Commission by the Security Council with respect to all the remaining functions of the United Nations Mediator on Palestine under Security Council resolutions, the office of the Mediator shall be terminated;

3. DECIDES that a Committee of the Assembly, consisting of China, France, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, the United Kingdom and the United States of America, shall present, before the end of the first

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part of the present session of the General Assembly, for the approval of the Assembly, a proposal concerning the names of the three States which will constitute the Conciliation Commission;

4. REQUESTS the Commission to begin its functions at once, with a view to the establishment of contact between the parties themselves and the Commission at the earliest possible date;

5. CALLS UPON the Governments and authorities concerned to extend the scope of the negotiations provided for in the Security Council's resolution of 16 November 1948 and to seek agreement by negotiations conducted either with the Conciliation Commission or directly with a view to the final settlement of all questions outstanding between them;

6. INSTRUCTS the Conciliation Commission to take steps to assist the Governments and authorities concerned to achieve a final settlement of all questions outstanding between them;

7. RESOLVES that the Holy Places - including Nazareth -, religious buildings and sites in Palestine should be protected and free access to them assured, in accordance with existing rights and historical practice; that arrangements to this end should be under effective United Nations supervision; that the United Nations Conciliation Commission, in presenting to the fourth regular session of the General Assembly its detailed proposal for a permanent international regime for the territory of Jerusalem, should include recommendations concerning the Holy Places in that territory; that with regard to the Holy Places in the rest of Palestine the Commission should call upon the political authorities of the areas concerned to give appropriate formal guarantees as to the protection of the Holy Places and access to them; and that these undertakings should be presented to the General Assembly for approval; -

8. RESOLVES that, in view of its association with three world religions, the Jerusalem area, including the present municipality of Jerusalem plus the surrounding villages and towns, the most Eastern of which shall be Abu Dis; the most Southern, Bethlehem; the most Western, Ein Karim (including also the built-up area of Motza); and the most Northern, Shufat, should be accorded special and separate treatment from the rest of Palestine and should be placed under effective United Nations control;

REQUESTS the Security Council to take further steps to ensure the demilitarization of Jerusalem at the earliest possible date;

INSTRUCTS the Conciliation Commission to present to the fourth regular
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international regime
maximum local autonomy
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The Conciliation Commission
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9. RESOLVES that
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session of the General Assembly detailed proposals for a permanent international regime for the Jerusalem area which will provide for the maximum local autonomy for distinctive groups consistent with the special international status of the Jerusalem area;

The Conciliation Commission is authorized to appoint a United Nations representative who shall co-operate with the local authorities with respect to the interim administration of the Jerusalem area;

9. RESOLVES that, pending agreement on more detailed arrangements among the Governments and authorities concerned, the freest possible access to Jerusalem by road, rail or air should be accorded to all inhabitants of Palestine;

INSTRUCTS the Conciliation Commission to report immediately to the Security Council, for appropriate action by that organ, any attempt by any party to impede such access;

10. INSTRUCTS the Conciliation Commission to seek arrangements among the Governments and authorities concerned which will facilitate the economic development of the area, including arrangements for access to ports and airfields and the use of transportation and communication facilities;

11. RESOLVES that the refugees wishing to return to their homes and live at peace with their neighbours should be permitted to do so at the earliest practicable date, and that compensation should be paid for the property of those choosing not to return and for loss of or damage to property which, under principles of international law or in equity, should be made good by the Governments or authorities responsible;

INSTRUCTS the Conciliation Commission to facilitate the repatriation, resettlement and economic and social rehabilitation of the refugees and the payment of compensation, and to maintain close relations with the Director of the United Nations Relief for Palestine Refugees and, through him, with the appropriate organs and agencies of the United Nations;

12. AUTHORIZES the Conciliation Commission to appoint such subsidiary bodies and to employ such technical experts, acting under its authority, as it may find necessary for the effective discharge of its functions and responsibilities under the present resolution;

The Conciliation Commission will have its official headquarters at Jerusalem. The authorities responsible for maintaining order in Jerusalem will be responsible for taking all measures necessary to ensure the security of the Commission. The Secretary-General will provide a limited number of guards for the protection of the staff and premises of the Commission;

/13. INSTRUCTS

13. INSTRUCTS the Conciliation Commission to render progress reports periodically to the Secretary-General for transmission to the Security Council and to the Members of the United Nations;
 14. CALLS UPON all Governments and authorities concerned to co-operate with the Conciliation Commission and to take all possible steps to assist in the implementation of the present resolution;
 15. REQUESTS the Secretary-General to provide the necessary staff and facilities and to make appropriate arrangements to provide the necessary funds required in carrying out the terms of the present resolution.
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United Nations

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ASSEMBLEE
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A/C.1/394/Rev.2
30 November 1948

ORIGINAL: ENGLISH

Dual Distribution

Third session
FIRST COMMITTEE

PROGRESS REPORT OF THE UNITED NATIONS MEDIATOR ON PALESTINE

United Kingdom: Second Revised Draft Resolution

THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY,

Having adopted on 29 November 1947 resolution 181 (II) regarding the future government of Palestine and providing a plan for partition with economic union;

Having adopted on 14 May 1948 resolution 100 (S-2) empowering a United Nations Mediator in Palestine to exercise certain functions including the use of his good offices to promote a peaceful adjustment of the future situation of Palestine;

Having received and examined the Progress Report of the United Nations Mediator on Palestine (A/348) submitted by the late Count Folke Bernadotte;

Having taken note of the resolutions of the Security Council concerning the truce in Palestine and of the resolution of 10 November 1948 concerning the establishment of an armistice by means of negotiations conducted either directly or through the Acting Mediator on Palestine;

1. EXPRESSES its deep appreciation of the progress achieved through the good offices of the late United Nations Mediator in promoting a peaceful adjustment of the future situation of Palestine for which cause he sacrificed his life; and EXTENDS its thanks to the Acting Mediator and his staff for their continued efforts and devotion to duty in Palestine;

2. ESTABLISHES a Conciliation Commission consisting of (three States Members of the United Nations) which shall have the following functions:

- (a) To assume the functions given to the United Nations Mediator on Palestine by the resolution of the General Assembly of 14 May 1948;
- (b) To carry out the specific functions and directives given to it by this resolution and such additional functions and directives as may be given to it by the General Assembly or by the Security Council;
- (c) To enter into consultations with the Governments and authorities concerned with a view to achievement of a final settlement of all

questions

questions outstanding between them, including in particular the questions dealt with in the General Assembly resolution of 29 November 1947 and in Part I, section VIII, paragraph 4 of the Progress Report of the United Nations Mediator on Palestine;

(d) To undertake, upon the request of the Security Council, any of the functions now assigned to the United Nations Mediator on Palestine or to the United Nations Truce Commission by resolutions of the Security Council; upon such request to the Conciliation Commission by the Security Council with respect to all the remaining functions of the United Nations Mediator on Palestine under Security Council resolutions, the office of the Mediator shall be terminated;

3. CALLS upon the Governments and authorities concerned to extend the scope of the negotiations provided for in the Security Council's Resolution of 16 November 1948 and to seek agreement by negotiations conducted either through the Conciliation Commission or directly with a view to a final settlement of all questions outstanding between them;

4. INSTRUCTS the Conciliation Commission in pursuance of paragraph 2 (c) above to enter into consultations with the Governments and authorities concerned with a view to delimiting the frontiers in Palestine taking into account the following general considerations, without excluding any territorial settlement mutually acceptable to the parties;

(a) That there are important elements common to both the resolution of the General Assembly of 29 November 1947 and the Progress Report of the United Nations Mediator on Palestine;

(b) That certain modifications in the territorial arrangements of the General Assembly Resolution of 29 November 1947 should be considered taking into account Part I, section VIII, paragraph 4 (b) of the Progress Report of the United Nations Mediator as a contribution to a peaceful adjustment, based on reciprocity and mutual interest of differences between the parties;

5. ENDORSES the recommendation contained in paragraph 4 (c) of the Mediator's conclusions concerning the disposition of the territory of Palestine not included within the boundaries of the Jewish State or the City of Jerusalem, and INSTRUCTS the Conciliation Commission, in full consultation with the inhabitants of Arab Palestine, to assist the Governments of the Arab States concerned to arrange for the disposition of this territory in accordance with the aforesaid recommendation;

6. RESOLVES that the Holy Places, religious buildings and sites in Palestine should be protected and free access to them assured, in accordance with

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existing rights and historical practice; that arrangements to this end should be under effective United Nations supervision; that the United Nations Conciliation Commission in presenting to the fourth regular session of the General Assembly its detailed proposals for a permanent international regime for the territory of Jerusalem should include recommendations concerning the Holy Places in that territory; that with regard to the Holy Places in the rest of Palestine the Commission should call upon the political authorities of the areas concerned to give appropriate formal guarantees as to the protection of the Holy Places and access to them; and that these undertakings should be presented to the General Assembly for approval;

7. RESOLVES that in view of its association with three world religions, the Jerusalem area, as defined in the General Assembly resolution of 29 November 1947, should be accorded special and separate treatment from the rest of Palestine and should be placed under effective United Nations control with the maximum feasible local autonomy for the Arab and Jewish communities; INVITES the Security Council to take further steps to secure the demilitarisation of Jerusalem with the least possible delay; and INSTRUCTS the Conciliation Commission:

- (a) to take all feasible steps to facilitate the effective administration of the area, co-ordinating to the fullest extent possible the organs of self-government and administration of the Arab and Jewish communities of the Jerusalem area,
- (b) to report to the Security Council for appropriate action any attempt to interfere with its functions with respect to Jerusalem, and
- (c) to present to the fourth regular session of the General Assembly detailed proposals for a permanent international regime for the Jerusalem area;

To assist it in carrying out these functions, the Conciliation Commission is authorised to appoint a United Nations Commissioner for Jerusalem who shall be responsible to the Commission;

8. RESOLVES that, pending agreement on more detailed arrangements among the Governments and authorities concerned, unimpeded access to Jerusalem by road, rail, or air should be accorded to all inhabitants of Palestine; and INSTRUCTS the Conciliation Commission to report immediately to the Security Council for appropriate action by that organ any attempt by any party to impede such access;

9. INSTRUCTS the Conciliation Commission to seek arrangements among the governments and authorities concerned which will facilitate the economic
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development of the area, including arrangements for access to ports and airfields and the use of transportation and communication facilities; in this connection, the conclusions contained in Part I, Section VIII, Paragraph 4 (e) and (f) of the Progress Report of the United Nations Mediator should be taken into account;

10. RECOMMENDS to the Security Council that after the frontiers have been established in accordance with this resolution the Security Council consider, in conformity with the Charter, any attempt to alter these frontiers by force as a threat to the peace, breach of the peace, or act of aggression;

11. ENDORSES the conclusions stated in Part I, Section VIII, paragraph 4 (1) of the Progress Report of the United Nations Mediator in Palestine, and

RESOLVES that the refugees wishing to return to their homes and live at peace with their neighbours should be permitted to do so at the earliest possible date, and that compensation should be paid for the property of those choosing not to return and for loss of or damage to property which under principles of international law or in equity should be made good by the governments or authorities responsible; and

INSTRUCTS the Conciliation Commission to facilitate the repatriation, resettlement and economic and social rehabilitation of the refugees and the payment of compensation and to maintain close relations with the Director of the United Nations Relief for Palestine Refugees;

12. AUTHORISES the Conciliation Commission to appoint such subsidiary bodies and to employ such technical experts, acting under its authority, as it may find necessary to the effective discharge of its functions and responsibilities under this resolution;

13. INSTRUCTS the Conciliation Commission to render progress reports periodically to the Secretary-General for transmission to the Security Council and to Members of the United Nations;

14. CALLS UPON all Governments and authorities concerned to co-operate with the Conciliation Commission and to take all possible steps to assist in the implementation of this resolution;

15. REQUESTS the Secretary-General to provide the necessary staff and facilities and to make appropriate arrangements to provide the necessary funds required in carrying out the terms of this resolution.

A1838

PT3

FILE No.:
191/2/1 A Part III

CABLEGRAM.

AMENDED COPY

ECM/jo

DECYPHER FROM

AUSTRALIAN EMBASSY
WASHINGTON

1.13772

1157

Rec'd September 19, 1949
0845

838. RESTRICTED.

My 869. Israel.

New York Times reports that Sharet stated yesterday that the Israeli Delegation at the Assembly would do its utmost to show the injustice and impracticability of the Commission's plan re Jerusalem.

Sharet made the following points:

1. Jewish Jerusalem in all respects an integral part of Israel.
2. Impossible to break this connection without jeopardizing its existence.
3. Projected stoppage of immigration into Jerusalem unenforceable.
4. Formal equality of demilitarization a sham as Jewish Jerusalem surrounded on three sides by Arab territory.

* amendment

MIN AND DEPT E.A.
September 19, 1949

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CABLEGRAM.

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WASHINGTON

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MIN AND DEPT E.A.
September 19, 1949

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191/2/1

EXTRACT FROM : *"Sept. Inf. Shortwave Bulletin"*, Melb.

DATE:- 15/9/49

FILE NO.:- 191/2/1

UNITED NATIONS RADIO. 14/9/49 - 1.30 p.m. NEWS IN ENGLISH.

PALESTINE PLAN. A plan for the establishment of an international regime for Jerusalem has been made public. It was prepared by the Palestine Conciliation Commission at the request of the General Assembly. The Assembly itself will consider the plan in detail and will take final action when it reconvenes this month at Flushing Meadows. The plan divides the Holy City into Arab and Jewish Zones to be administered in municipal affairs by the local authorities. A Commissioner would head the over-all administration of the area, having as his principal functions the protection and free access to holy places. He will be aided by a 14-member Council which will coordinate and operate civil services such as public health, communications and public security. The plan also provides for the establishment of two tribunals in Jerusalem, - (1) an international tribunal which would decide claims made by the parties against rulings of the Commissioner, and (2) a mixed tribunal which would hear civil and criminal cases involving residents of both areas. All the expenses incurred in the international administration of the Holy City would be paid by the U.N. The plan stressed the fact that Jerusalem would be permanently demilitarised and neutralised. It asks the two parties to make declarations before the General Assembly guaranteeing this. It provides that any violation of such declaration would be brought before the appropriate organ of the U.N.

EXTRACT FROM :-

"Apt. Inf. Shortwave Bulletin"
Mellouane

DATE:-

14/9/49.

FILE NO.:-

191/2/1

THE U.N. PALESTINE CONCILIATION COMMISSION at Lausanne has issued a plan for the permanent internationalisation of Jerusalem. This would give control of the holy places in the area, including Bethlehem, to a U.N. Commissioner. He would share (his) responsibilities with a Council of 15 members, including both Arabs and Jews. It proposes that Jerusalem itself should be divided into a Jewish and Arab zone with the present armistice line as a provisional demarcation between the two. According to these proposals it would be the duty of the Commissioner to supervise the permanent demilitarisation of the area, to protect minority rights, to (control) the holy places and to ensure that visitors and pilgrims are able to move freely throughout the area. The duty of theCouncil would be the keeping of public order, the control of public services in the two zones, and the direction of town planning and economic development in Jerusalem. The plan also proposes a special International Court to be appointed by the U.N. General Assembly which would settle any dispute between the Commissioner and the authorities of the two zones.

The report of the Conciliation Commission, containing these proposals, will be submitted to the forthcoming session of the General Assembly at Lake Success. The Commission thought that its plans should not be interpreted as prejudging the final settlement of the Palestine territorial question.

An Israel Foreign Office spokesman said tonight that at first sight the plan seems impracticable. He said it ignores the fundamental problem of sovereignty and contains some proposals which Israel could not accept.

CABLEGRAM.

W.R.:JSH

I.13682

ENCIPHER FROM:

Dated: 16th September, 1949
1647The Australian Embassy,
WASHINGTON.Recd: 16th September, 1949
1045 hours.869. RESTRICTED.

Palestine.

New York Times reports from Tel Aviv state that press and other criticism of the recommendation of the United Nations Commission concerning Jerusalem indicated that Israel would resist even to the point of armed force any attempt to sever Jerusalem from the rest of Israel. American Zionist Council also have strongly attacked Commission's proposal.

MIN. & DEP'T. OF E.A.

16th September, 1949.

R.H.

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CABLEGRAM.

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Sent: 9th September, 1949
1610.

ENCYRHER TO

Australian Delegation to
The United Nations,
NEW YORK.431. RESTRICTED.

Palestine Conciliation Commission.

Please ascertain and report on likely lines of
Commission's report dealing with Jerusalem, Holy Places,
Refugees and territorial questions.

MIN & DEPT E.A.

12th September, 1949

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CONFIDENTIAL

No. 809.

20th August 1949.

Memorandum to:

The Secretary,
Department of External Affairs,
Canberra.

PALESTINE - United Kingdom Views.

With reference to my telegram No. 3425 of 19th August, the United Kingdom has been considering closely the discussions received from the Palestine Commission at Lausanne and unless very rapid progress is made, thinks that it may informally suggest to the Arab Governments and to Israel certain principles which might provide for a solution by the Commission. These have been discussed with United States officials and though the United States would not wish to put them through the diplomatic channels to the Arab Governments and the Israeli Government, the United Kingdom, if it decides to take this action, will hope that the United States member of the Commission will in general advocate the same principles.

In this memorandum I shall deal with the principles that I have summarised in telegram No. 3425, point by point.

REFUGEES.

2. "Acceptance of refugees by both sides in proportions to be determined."

The position regarding refugees is more hopeful now than earlier, in part because of the Israeli Government's offer to take a certain number of refugees back. The United Kingdom sees some hope in the idea which has been growing that the Conciliation Commission should form a survey group which should visit the Middle East to assess the capacity of various development projects to absorb refugees. By and large the contributions to the Fund for relief have come in fairly well but are likely to run out by October and the question of Palestine refugees, of course, is to be discussed at the Fourth Session of the General Assembly.

The neighbouring countries have done well in the last twelve months and the forthcoming attitude of the Israeli Government gives some hope of success.

GAZA STRIP.

3. "Israel's proposal to incorporate the Gaza Strip with the refugees at present in it could form part of the general settlement."

Several conditions would have to be attached to the adoption of this proposal in the view of the United Kingdom. First of all, it would have to be made clear that there was no

question of a mere deal between territory and the acceptance of responsibility for refugees. Territorial compensation for the Gaza Strip would have to be found elsewhere by Israel for the Arabs, if the latter demanded such compensation. This is dealt with below under "Territorial Compensation". Secondly, it would be necessary to devise some safeguards for the future treatment of the Gaza refugees in Israel, that is, they should be permitted to return to any part of Israel where they had property or special interests and they should be able to earn a livelihood and presumably have full rights of citizenship.

4. It is conceivable of course that the Israeli Government will reply that its offer to take 100,000 refugees has superseded its suggestion regarding the incorporation of the Gaza Strip, but the United Kingdom feels that the Israeli Government's attitude on the question is not rigid.

POLITICAL COMPENSATION.

5. "Territorial compensation for the Gaza area (if ceded) and for other areas held by Israel but not allotted to her under the 1947 Plan should be provided if the Arabs demand it."

The following areas appear to the United Kingdom authorities politically and geographically suitable for this purpose, i.e. contiguous to other Arab areas:-

- (a) a land-bridge in the southern Negev between Egypt and Jordan.
- (b) An area in the Negev north of Beersheba connecting with Arab central Palestine.
- (c) An area along the Egyptian frontier south of El Auja.
- (d) The restoration of part or all of Western Galilee.
- (e) The Ramleh-Lyddah area.

6. The United Kingdom authorities see no reason to insist that any one of these areas should form the exclusive field for compensation. They could, if necessary, be combined in various proportions. This would certainly provide greater flexibility for the discussions. But the shape of the eventual territorial compensation should in any case be governed by the requirements of either side in regard to communications and outlets to the sea.

COMMUNICATIONS AND OUTLETS.

7. "Communications and outlets to be arranged so that Israel has access to the Red Sea and Arab States to the Mediterranean".

The view of United Kingdom Officials is that if the territorial compensation to the Arabs were to be in the form of the award to Jordan, or to Jordan and Egypt, of part or whole of the Southern Negev, thus providing a land bridge between Egypt and Jordan, Israel should have guaranteed freedom of

access and communication to the Red Sea. Equally the Arab States should have guaranteed freedom of communication and access to the Mediterranean. If another solution were adopted for the Southern Negev, there should nonetheless be guaranteed freedom of communication and access across it between Egypt and Jordan and between Israel and the Red Sea. An alternative method of providing for freedom of communication and access might be by a neutral zone or zones.

HAIFA.

8. The United Kingdom authorities feel that it is axiomatic that a free port, or at least a free zone for all Arab States, should be established at Haifa with an arrangement by which Iraqi crude oil could be freely exported in return for the provision by Iraq of normal supplies for the Haifa Refinery. They point out that this has been insisted on constantly by the United Nations.

JERUSALEM.

9. The United Kingdom is still committed to the internationalisation of the whole of Jerusalem and some Governments, notably the French Government, are very firm in their adherence to this principle. The United Kingdom feel that if this is not practical, there might be a partition of Jerusalem for administrative purposes with international supervision, particularly of the Holy Places. They are anxious to secure free access to Jerusalem for all nationalities and creeds and point out that the reference in the resolution passed at the Third Session of the Assembly in Paris to "autonomy for distinctive groups" is consistent with their present idea of an alternative to internationalisation.

CENTRAL ARAB PALESTINE.

10. The original partition resolution contemplated that Arab Palestine would be an independent State and in the earliest stages no doubt the Government of Israel would have preferred this, but in view of the fact that relations of Israel with Jordan are now relatively better than her relations with other States, the United Kingdom authorities feel that as part of the general settlement the Government of Israel might be prepared to agree to the incorporation of Central Arab Jerusalem in Jordan.

WATER RIGHTS.

11. "Israel and the Arab States concerned should agree to share for their mutual benefit the waters of the Jordan and Yarmuk."

This appears to United Kingdom officials to be essential to the economic welfare of both Israel and Jordan and to be a point on which there should be no disagreement.

PALESTINE AT THE ASSEMBLY.

12. The question of Palestine generally is not down for discussion at the Assembly. The Commission is obliged to present a report on Jerusalem, though not on other subjects. The Commission, however, may decide to submit a report which will, in effect, involve reference of its problems to the Assembly, though the United Kingdom authorities have no information yet that this is likely. Their feeling is that in the present state of relations between Israel and the neighbouring States, it is on the whole unlikely that any of them will wish to raise the whole problem of the future of Palestine at the forthcoming Session of the Assembly.

13. I am sending a copy of this memorandum to the Australian Mission to the United Nations, New York.

External Affairs Officer.

CABLEGRAM.

JSH/jc

DECYPHER FROM

HIGH COMMISSIONER'S OFFICE
LONDON

I.12317

2053

Rec'd August 20, 1949
(990)

3425. CONFIDENTIAL

From External.

An sending memorandum explaining points which United Kingdom contemplate circulating to Arab countries and Israel as possible basis of solution by the Palestine Commission in following main principles which are worked out in some detail.

- (i) Acceptance of refugees by both sides in proportions to be determined,
- (ii) Israel's proposal to incorporate the Gaza states with refugees at present in it could form part of a general settlement,
- (iii) territorial compensation for the Gaza area (if ceded) and for other areas held by Israel but not allotted to her under 1947 plan should be provided if Arabs demand it,
- (iv) Communications and outlets to be arranged so that Israel has access to the Red Sea and Arab States to the Mediterranean,
- (v) A free port at Haifa,
- (vi) Internationalisation of whole of Jerusalem state of Israel but if impossible partition of Jerusalem for administration purposes with international supervision particularly of Holy places,
- (vii) Central Arab Palestine should be incorporated in Jordan,
- (viii) Israel and Arab states concerned should agree to share for their mutual benefit waters of Jordan and Yarmuk.

MIN AND DEPT E.A.
August 20, 1949

P.A

The ALL PALESTINE GOVERNMENT

Ministry of Foreign Affairs

Ref. No. 3 / 49

RECEIVED
Date 19. 3. 1949
RECEIVED
No. 27 MAY 1949
File No. 851/54

The Minister for Foreign
Affairs of the All Palestine Government
presents his compliments to the Minister
for Foreign Affairs of the *Australia*
Government and has the honour to transmit,
for information, a copy of a note he has
today addressed to the General Secretary
of the United Nations Organization on the
subject of the atrocities committed by
the Jews in the town of Falouja.



UN → ME.

191/2/1

PA.

The **ALL PALESTINE GOVERNMENT**

Ministry of Foreign Affairs

Ref. No. 3 / 49
Date 19. 3. 1949

The Minister for Foreign Affairs of the All Palestine Government presents his compliments to the General Secretary of the United Nations Organization and would desire to invite attention to the atrocities committed by the Jewish Forces in the town of Falouja which has been evacuated by the Egyptian Army in accordance with the Armistice concluded between Egypt and the Jews, the terms of which provided for the respect of the life and property of the inhabitants.

Men, Women and Children have been murdered in Falouja by the Jews and the buildings and dwelling houses have been wantonly destroyed. Nor was this clandestinely done for the people all around have witnessed with horror the barbarism of Jewish behaviour on this occasion.

The All Palestine Government believes that the Jews flocked to Palestine from all parts of the world to perpetrate their crimes on the Holy Land and on its rightful owners; and recognition of their Government has been accorded in spite of their disregard of the decisions taken by the United Nations and the Security Council.

Therefore, the All Palestine Government, in registering this protest, requests that an immediate enquiry be made in order to reveal to the world the true facts of the case which go to indicate the aims pursued by the Zionist Policy as well as the Jewish inability to assume the responsibilities that properly belong to a Government worthy of recognition. It further declares that as long as these Jewish bands remain within its boundaries, the Holy Land, Land of Peace, shall continue to be the scene of strife and bloodshed; and it calls once again on the United Nations and the Security Council to desist, in the additional light these events shed on the Palestine case, from the course so far pursued, and recognize the natural rights of the Arabs to self-determination in their own Country.



191/2/1

Prospects in Palestine

By VISCOUNT SAMUEL

IN the long, diversified and often illustrious history of Palestine, a chapter is now closing. The episode of the British Mandate is over, and a new chapter is opening. At the turn of the page we wonder what it will be. The situation is still too unsettled to allow confident predictions of any kind, but the main features are already set and the details are shaping.

It is now a year since the State of Israel was proclaimed. A government was established; elections have been held; a Parliament is functioning. The State has successfully defended itself against armed attack. It has been recognised by all the principal Powers and admitted as a member of United Nations. All this has been done, and cannot be undone. Important questions of boundaries remain to be decided, and may perhaps take some time yet; but the outline of the map of Israel is appearing.

There is little doubt also that the more distinctively Arab districts west of the Jordan will be joined to Transjordan. No other destiny for them seems practicable. Already, in anticipation, King Abdullah has changed the name of his State to "The Kingdom of Jordan," and has brought into his Cabinet members of well-known Palestinian Arab families.

The question of Jerusalem remains. In 1947 the United Nations Assembly contemplated that Jerusalem, and the surrounding area should form, between the proposed Arab and Jewish States, an independent enclave under direct international rule. This, with the other proposals, the Arabs refused to accept. They took up arms; a four-weeks' truce was agreed, but they refused to continue it, and renewed the attack. The result was the reverse of their anticipations; and the new lines of military occupation, under the armistice now in operation, have left the Old City of Jerusalem, with the principal Holy Places, in Arab hands, while the New City, with a Jewish population of 100,000, is occupied and administered by the Israelis.

An International Enclave?

A closer examination of the plan for an international enclave has raised new doubts in many quarters. It is no longer a question of diplomats sitting at a table drawing a circle on a map. It is the practical question of setting up a government, maintaining law and order, ensuring supplies, stopping contraband, providing communications for a living population—active and highly political, often inflammable, and divided into two communities, which have been mutually antagonistic, and may easily become so again.

A permanent armed force would be indispensable if authority is to be maintained. Is the United Nations prepared to establish one as the immediate first step? The Government to be efficient must be harmonious. Is it to be a Council representative of the principal Powers? If so, is it likely to be any more unanimous than in Berlin? Or is it to be a Council of the minor Powers? But could the great ones remain aloof? Or is authority to be vested in a single Governor? In that case, would there be any better prospect of agreement who the Governor should be than at Trieste?

Nor is there any assurance that the plan would now be acceptable to either of the States in military possession. King Abdullah, installed in the Old City, might need much persuasion before he would disappoint Moslem opinion all over the world by voluntarily marching out again. The Israeli Government would find it a hard task to persuade its Parliament and its electorate to accept the amputation of its historic capital. All hearts are set on it, with a fervour even greater than that, a hundred years ago, of the Italians for Rome.

On the other hand, the question of the Holy Places, whether in Jerusalem or

elsewhere in Palestine, does not appear to present any difficulty at all. The Israeli Government made, on May 5, a formal statement to the United Nations that it "advocates and supports" the establishment by U.N. of "an international régime" for the control and protection of all the Holy Places, with guaranteed free access for the members of the Faiths to which they belong. There is no reason to suppose that King Abdullah would refuse to accede. And this more restricted obligation, involving no duties of territorial government, is one that the United Nations need not be unwilling to accept.

The chapter about to open will have to recount how the difficulties still facing the State of Israel—military, political and international—will have been met, and whether overcome or not. At the moment it is on the economic side that the dangers are greatest.

Here is a country with, at best, a very restricted territory; without coal or oil, and with hardly any raw materials; its commerce on a small scale, with imports several times as great as exports; its present cost of living higher, probably, than that of any other country in the world; and its Jewish population of 600,000 being increased, by their own voluntary act, at the rate of 50 per cent. in two years, with more immigrants, in hundreds of thousands, to follow after. How are all these people to live?

Plans for the Future

In a short space I can give only a condensed summary of the plans that are in hand, as I was told about them during my month's stay recently in the country. First, a concentrated effort has been set on foot to lower the excessive level of prices. It is obvious that this is the first condition for economic stability. A series of measures are now being taken, closely following the Cripps policy, to bring this about. It is realised there—as it is in Britain—that increased production at home and trade abroad is the most important of all the means to lower prices.

The Zionist movement, from the beginning, has laid stress on the revival of Jewish agriculture in Palestine. This is now emphasised more than ever. It may be expected that before long the well-watered or irrigable parts of the country will be cultivated as intensively as Belgium or Holland. Small, and sometimes large, industries have been established in recent years in an astonishing variety, and the advent of numbers of experienced industrialists and skilled workmen from Europe will help a further development. The supply of electric power, mostly from oil-fuel stations, which has trebled in the last three years, needs at once to be doubled again. A merchant marine is being created; 12 ships have been acquired as a beginning; a nautical school has been established, and proposes to train 5,000 sailors in the next few years; the ports of Haifa and Jaffa-Tel-Aviv are to be modernised and greatly enlarged.

There are in the country considerable reserves of capital, supplemented already by a dollar loan from America of 100 millions, with a prospect of more to follow. In addition, voluntary contributions, mainly for social purposes but also for land purchase and development, are flowing in, at the rate of many millions a year, both of pounds and dollars, from all over the world.

Will all this suffice to feed the population, provide housing, increase exports, lower the cost of living and prevent unemployment? Only the future writer of that next chapter will be able to say. But if energy and enthusiasm, intelligence and self-sacrifice can bring this about, then there is ground to hope that achieved it will be.

DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS.

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JSH:MW

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I. 9157

DECYPHER FROM:

Dated 15th June, 1949.
 2330

Rec'd 16th June, 1949.
 1430

SECRETARY OF STATE
 FOR COMMONWEALTH RELATIONS,
LONDON.

Confidential. H. No. 280. Palestine.

The following are main developments in regard to Palestine during the past month.

(1) Syrian-Israeli Armistice talks broke down on May 17th and are still suspended. Syrians have refused Israeli suggestion of separate negotiations.

(2) Lausanne talks are understood to have reached an impasse neither side being willing to make concessions and the Commission is now likely to go into recess until August 15th. The main points of difference are thought to be -

(1) Boundaries.

(2) Future status of Jerusalem.

(3) Readmission of Arab refugees to Israel for which the Arabs are apparently still pressing.

(3) The U.S. Government sent what is understood to have been a stiff note to the Israeli Government on May 31st on the question of boundaries and Arab refugees. According to one report it called on the Israeli Government to give up southern Negev and to admit up to 300,000 refugees. The Israeli Government are believed to have resisted both suggestions and to have made it clear that they are not prepared to make any concessions on frontiers though the possibility of "minor" concessions over refugees is not excluded.

(4) Conditions in Arab Palestine are deteriorating, largely because of economic difficulties and because delay in annexing it to Transjordan is creating uncertainty which is being exploited by self-seeking or anti-Abdullah elements, e.g., Husseins (followers of ex Mufti of Jerusalem). The Transjordan Government are convinced that prompt annexation is essential but the United States Government are opposed to King Abdullah taking this course unless and until Lausanne negotiations definitely break down on the grounds that such unilateral action would give the Israelis the pretext for counter-action. We are considering our attitude on this point.

(5) Meanwhile the Israelis have more than once suggested unofficially to King Abdullah (as they did to the Syrians) the possibility of direct negotiations. We and the U.S. Government have advised against this and Abdullah has so far declined. He might conceivably be brought to agree if the Israelis show aggressive intentions in view of his conviction that neither the U.N. nor anybody else would in the event restrain them.

(6) Israeli on June 6th occupied 2 buildings in the demilitarised area of Jerusalem but the U.N. Commission has persuaded both sides to withdraw their troops from this area. Some reports suggest that the Israelis are building up forces in this area with a view to further acquisition, confident in the military weakness of

* amendment.

191/2/1

DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS.

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I. 9157.

the Transjordan and practical ineffectiveness of the U.N.
It is true that the Israelis internal economic situation in view of
the problems created by the constant influx of new immigrants and
the decline in remittances from the U.S. is so serious as to
suggest that they are not in a position to indulge in any
adventures for the present. But front-line incidents between
them and Transjordan forces have certainly increased of late and
the possibility of further forward move on their part cannot in
our view be excluded.

MIN. & DEPT. E.A.
MIN. & DEPT. DEFENCE.

16th June, 1949

DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS

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191/2/1

DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS.

This is an unclassified version of a
Cyber Message. It is not to be distrib-
uted outside the Department of External
Affairs without paraphrasing. It is
never to be downgraded below 'Secret'.

CABLEGRAM.

2

I. 9157.

~~Transjordan~~ and practical ineffectiveness of the U.N.
It is true that the Israeli internal economic situation in view of
the problems created by the constant influx of new immigrants and
the decline in remittances from the U.S. is so serious as to
suggest that they are not in a position to indulge in any
adventures for the present. But front-line incidents between
them and Transjordan forces have certainly increased of late and
the possibility of further forward move on their part cannot in
our view be excluded.

MIN. & DEPT. E.A.

MIN. & DEPT. DEFENCE.

16th June, 1949

DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS.

HP:HP

CABLEGRAM. I. 6445

DECRYPTED FROM:

Dated: 25th April, 1949.

1323

Rec'd: 26th April, 1949.

9.30 a.m.

AUSTRIAN DELEGATION,
UNITED NATIONS ASSEMBLY,
NEW YORK.

UN.270. Restricted.

Please see second report of Palestine Commission (A/836) for up to date account of negotiations between Israel and Arab States. This was despatched air bag last week.

A/G. Min. & Dept. of External Affairs.

26th April, 1949.

HA B wing
9 N 191/2/1
pic

ORIGINAL COPY

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49/1/26
BCH/JJ

TEMPLE BAS 611.
TEMPLE 617.

In reply quote No.



28 MAR 1949

55-4/44

COMMONWEALTH OF AUSTRALIA,
DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS,
AUSTRALIA HOUSE,
STRAND,
LONDON, W.C.2.

No. 276.

15th March, 1949.

MEMORANDUM FOR:

The Secretary,
Department of External Affairs,
CANBERRA, A.C.T.

Your attention is drawn to the following extracts from
Hansard, House of Commons:

10th March, 1949

Question and Answer on whether Dominions Governments
were notified of the British decision to land a force
at Akaba.

Question by Mr. Churchill and reply by the Prime Minister
on the European Consultative Assembly.

11th March, 1949.

Question and Answer (by Mr. McNeil) on Israeli troop
movements around Transjordan.

Seen 4/3.

Transjordan

External Affairs Officer.

RI

→ EA + ME
Seen 8/4/49

191/2/11

TRANSJORDAN (ISRAELI TROOP
MOVEMENTS).

1603

Transjordan (Israel)

11 MARCH 1949

Troop Movements)

1604

HOUSE OF COMMONS

Friday, 11th March, 1949

The House met at Eleven o'Clock

PRAYERS

The Clerk, at the Table, informed the House of the unavoidable absence, through indisposition, of Mr. SPEAKER from this day's Sitting:

Whereupon Major MILNER, The CHAIRMAN OF WAYS AND MEANS, proceeded to the Table and took the Chair as DEPUTY-SPEAKER, pursuant to the Standing Order.

TRANSJORDAN (ISRAELI TROOP
MOVEMENTS)

11.6 a.m.

Mr. Oliver Stanley (*by Private Notice*) asked the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs whether he has any statement to make on the reported movement of Israeli troops towards Aqaba.

The Minister of State (Mr. McNeil): Reports have been received from the Transjordan authorities of the movement of a considerable force of Israeli troops southwards towards the Gulf of Aqaba, which they are now reported to have reached. The Transjordan Government also report that at one point the Israeli forces entered Transjordan territory to a distance of some miles and attacked a police post. They subsequently withdrew. The situation has been urgently reported to the Acting Mediator by the Transjordan Government. It is not yet known what reports United Nations observers have made on these events. No British forces have been involved in any action. My right hon. Friend would prefer not to make any further statement until reports by United Nations observers are available.

Mr. Stanley: While not wishing in any way to press the right hon. Gentleman at this moment, there are two questions I would like to ask him. First, in view

of the possible special responsibility that we may have in the adjacent area, will his right hon. Friend impress upon the mediator the urgent necessity for getting these reports from the observers as soon as possible and for their immediate communication to us as well as to other member nations? Secondly, is it not a fact that talks are now proceeding between the Israeli Government and the Government of Transjordan with regard to an armistice, and are not military operations of this kind in the middle of such talks calculated to prevent the success of the armistice which we all desire?

Mr. McNeil: Certainly my right hon. Friend will be glad to impress still further upon the Acting Mediator the necessity for speedy reporting. I am not clear that we can ask for a copy of the reports except as members of the Security Council. As to the second part of the question, it is true that truce talks have been going on at Rhodes between the two parties, and it is very difficult to relate these two events, if these reports which have been made to us are unfortunately found to be true.

Viscount Hinchinbrooke: In view of newspaper reports stating that the Israeli forces are now only three miles from Aqaba, and in the unfortunate event of a direct threat arising to our own Forces at Aqaba, can the right hon. Gentleman assure the House that the commander of our garrison at Aqaba has the fullest facilities to call upon air support from Headquarters, Middle East?

Mr. McNeil: Our Forces at Aqaba have every support available. I should think that it would not be anticipated that a call would be made upon such support except in the event of a direct threat to our Forces which, of course, we all hope will not occur.

Mr. Emrys Hughes: In the event of this air support being given, will steps be taken to safeguard the civilian non-combatant population?

Mr. McNeil: I should think that the civilian non-combatant population in this area is very sparse indeed.

CABLEGRAM.

ACTION
COPY

I.5295

DECIPHER FROM:

Dated 1st April, 1949
1905

THE SECRETARY OF STATE

Recd. 2nd April, 1949
1125

FOR COMMONWEALTH RELATIONS,

L O N D O N.

H No. 167. Confidential.

My telegram 24th March H No. 152. Palestine.

We understand that agreement has been reached between Israeli and Transjordan Representatives at Amman under which Transjordan Government will cede all but a small part of the belt of territory claimed by the Israelis but will recover a small portion of territory elsewhere. The ceded area will remain as a No-mans-land until eventual peace settlement. This agreement will be incorporated into general armistice agreement which is expected to be signed at Rhodes next week.

2. Transjordan Prime Minister is understood to have felt obliged to make this concession because the appeal which King Abdullah had previously addressed to President Truman received a non-committal reply and the Prime Minister formed the impression that United States influence would not be exercised to restrain Jews from resorting to force if their demands were resisted.

A/MIN. AND DEPT. OF E.A.
MIN. AND DEPT. OF DEFENCE

4th April, 1949

NA 9
191/2/1

Copies re:
Secretary ☒
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SAY ☒
SUN ☒

DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS.

RECEIVED
1949
CABLEGRAM
The Department of External Affairs is not to be considered a British Government Department of Government without paraphrasing the word 'never to be downgraded below'.

ACTION
COPY

FF/FF

I.4760
Dated 23rd March 1949
2035
Recd. 24th March 1949
1050

DECYPHER FROM:

The Secretary of State for
Commonwealth Relations,
LONDON.

H.149. CONFIDENTIAL.

PALESTINE, ARMISTICE NEGOTIATIONS.

In addition to the armistice which is reported to have been arranged between the Israeli and Lebanese Authorities we learn that the Syrian Government have now decided to open armistice negotiations with the Israeli Authorities in order to conform with the Security Council resolution. It is not yet known where these negotiations will take place.

2. Transjordan and Iraqi Governments recently came to an agreement by which Transjordan forces would take over that section of the front hitherto held by Iraqi forces. Transjordan Authorities have purposely delayed in implementing this agreement because of circumstantial reports that the Israelis were concentrating forces opposite this front and might be intending to commit a further act of aggression as soon as the Transjordan forces, which would necessarily be much fewer in numbers, relieved the Iraqis. We learn that the United States Government, having also received reports of this concentration, made immediate representations in Tel a Viv warning the Israeli Government against committing any further aggression. In the meantime the Iraqi Government have authorised the Transjordan Government to negotiate, in their own name, the armistice in Rhodes with the Israeli Authorities to cover the Iraqi section of the front and in reply to a query from the Acting Mediator have informed him that their intention is to withdraw from their forward positions in Palestine and to hand these over to Transjordan which will constitute concrete proof of their acceptance of the Armistice. They have added that it is their intention eventually to withdraw from Palestine.

A. Min & Dept of E.A.
Min & Dept of Defence

24th March 1949.

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191/2/11

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DECYPHER FROM

AUSTRALIAN DELEGATION
 UNITED NATIONS ORGANISATION
 NEW YORK.

I.4620
 1652
 Rec'd March 22, 1949
 1575

UN.206. RESTRICTED.

Palestine.

First progress report of Conciliation Commission to
 Secretary General has been circulated here and is being
 forwarded by bag. Report is in general terms, the main features
 being -

- (1) the commission believes that it should for the
 present concentrate on efforts to bring about
 rapprochement of the parties,
- (2) present negotiations at Rhodes should be left in
 the hands of the acting Mediator,
- (3) the commission has set up a sub-committee on
 Jerusalem and Holy places to undertake preparatory
 work necessary for ultimate recommendations to the
 Assembly,
- (4) The commission has conferred with the Director
 of United Nations Relief for Palestine Refugees and
 has taken steps to secure the services of an expert
 both to maintain liaison with the Director and if
 necessary to assume direction of the repatriation and
 resettlement arrangements for which the Commission is
 responsible,
- (5) The commission has made a series of official visits
 to the Governments concerned and has found "an attitude
 of mind definitely favourable to peace". However,
 the realization of this will not be an easy matter. In
 particular the refugee question is acutely printed in
 the minds of the Arab Governments. The Commission has
 now decided to invite the Arab states to hold meetings
 for the purpose of exchanging views on the refugee
 question with the Commission and a meeting has accord-
 ingly been proposed in Beirut on 21st March.

2. Refugees.

With reference to your telegram 124 of 3rd March, the
 United States House of Representatives has approved an immediate
 8 million dollars advance towards total United States contribu-
 tion but Secretary General stated last week that even with
 this and taking account of the supplementary programme of

WA 1949
 pc 19/2/11
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DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS.

2. **CABLEGRAM.**

I.4620

P.R. has insufficient funds to dispose of
at the minimum level recommended by the General Assembly.
Secretary General estimated that including 8 million dollars
advances from the United States, total of 14,300,000 dollars
has now been received in various form from 19 governments.
Principal of these apart from the United States are United
Kingdom 3,600,000 dollars, Canada 726,000 dollars, Belgium
432,000 dollars, Sweden 270,000 dollars, France 233,000
dollars, Egypt 166,000 dollars, Australia 160,000 dollars,
Denmark 130,000 dollars.

ACTING MIN AND DEPT E.A.
March 23, 1949

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I. 4593

Dated : 21st March, 1949.
1715Recd. : 22nd March, 1949.
0945

DECYPHERED FROM :

HIGH COMMISSIONER'S OFFICE,
LONDON.ACTION
COPY

1150. RESTRICTED.

From External.

My telegram 1056 Palestine.

Change over has been delayed.

(1) by fear of Arabs that Israeli force may
attack on this part of the line.(11) by refusal of Israel to negotiate armistice
with Transjordan in respect of this area before latter's
troops replace Iraqis.

-----000-----

A/Min. & Dept. E.A.

ND

22nd March, 1949.

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JH
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DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS.

CABLEGRAM.

**ACTION
COPY**

JH:HP

1.4339

DECRYPT FROM:

Dated: 15th March, 1949.
1535

HIGH COMMISSIONER'S OFFICE,
L O N D O N.

Rec'd: 16th March, 1949.
8.30 a.m.

1056. From External. Confidential.

My telegram 806 - Palestine.

Transjordan has agreed to take over Iraqi
front line positions and when changeover has been completed,
no Iraqi troops will be in direct contact with Jewish
Forces though some will remain in reserve to Transjordan
Forces.

A/G. Min. & Dept. of External Affairs.

16th March, 1949.

Copies re:

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DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS

I.4197

CABLEGRAM.

Dated: 14th March, 1949.
1506
Rec'd: 15th March, 1949.
1000

JO:RP

DECRYPTED FROM:

AUSTRALIAN DELEGATION,
UNITED NATIONS ASSEMBLY,
NEW YORK.

UN.190. My telegram 161. Restricted.

Palestine.

Acting Mediator reports that Israeli and Transjordan Delegations at Rhodes signed on 11th March, a General Cease Fire Agreement applying to all sections in which respective forces are opposed. The agreement is to be without prejudice to the claims and positions of both parties in relation to the Armistice negotiations now also in progress.

A/G. Min. & Dept. of External Affairs.

15th March, 1949.

NA

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9/191/21

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DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS.

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ECM/NEB.

ECYPHER FROM:

AUSTRALIAN DELEGATION
UNITED NATIONS ORGANISATION
NEW YORK.

Dated: 3rd, March, 1949.
1629.
Rec'd: 4th, March, 1949
2100.

RESTRICTED. U.N. 151. Palestine.

Acting Mediator reports that in pursuance of resolution of Security Council of the 16th November 1948, Armistice Negotiations under the chairmanship of United Nations between representatives of Israel and Transjordan, and Israel and Lebanon are being held simultaneously at Rhodes and Raebun Nakoura on the Lebanese Palestine boarder respectively. In both of these negotiations, delegation carry credentials from their respective Governments authorising them to negotiate and conclude an armistice agreement. Both negotiatives began 1st March.

A/G Min & Dept of External Affairs. 5th, March, 1949.

ND B
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191/2/1

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DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS.

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Affairs. It is not to be retransmitted, it is
not to be downgraded below "Secret".

CABLEGRAM.

ECM/EMW

I.5416

DECYPHER FROM

Dated: 1st March, 1949
1845

AUSTRALIAN HIGH COMMISSIONER'S OFFICE
LONDON.

Rec'd: 2nd March, 1949
1240

CONFIDENTIAL.

829. From External.

Palestine my telegram 806 para 1

United Kingdom favours return of Arab refugees but
thinks that in light of United Nations decisions,
support for idea of Jerusalem becoming an Arab city is
impossible.

2. United Kingdom authorities believe that the best
way of obviating danger of an attack by Israelis
on the Iraqifront is a conclusion of the Armistice.

5. Armistice talks between Lebanese and Israelis
were to begin on 28th February at Lebanon-Palestine
border.

ND

A/G MIN & DEPT E.A.

2nd March, 1949.

B

Ks

Rec'd 191/2/1

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1533

1010

NEW YORK.

Palestine.


- MIN AND DEPT E.A.
MIN AND DEPT DEFENCE
February 25, 1945

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COMMONWEALTH OF AUSTRALIA

OFFICE OF THE
AUSTRALIAN GOVERNMENT COMMISSIONER
IN EGYPT



A. BENNETT ABOU SEBA
(OFF. H. CHERIF PASHA)
CAIRO

TELEGRAPHIC ADDRESS
AUSTRADE

TELEPHONE 44996

P. O. BOX 273

16th February, 1949.

REF. NO. 43

The Secretary,
Department of External Affairs,
CANBERRA, A.C.T.

MEMORANDUM:

Palestine.

The attached documents were left in an envelope this morning at
this Commission by the Secretary of the All Palestine Government Represent-
ative in Egypt.

I have made no acknowledgement in any way of the receipt of same.

For your information I understand that a similar document was
delivered to the British Embassy this morning. I am told it is expected
that it will be forwarded on to the Foreign Office without any acknowle-
gement of its receipt being given to the All Palestine Government Represent-
ative in Cairo.

D.J. Ahern
Actg. Australian Government
Commissioner in Egypt

/et

E.

PA

حكومة فلسطين
 رئاسة مجلس الوزراء

حكومة فلسطين
 رئاسة مجلس الوزراء

The All Palestine Government presents
 its compliments to the Embassy of, Australia
 Cairo, and has the honour to enclose a third
 person note on the subject of the de facto
 recognition of Israel by the Government of
 Australia with the request for its
 transmission to the Minister for Foreign affairs.

It takes this opportunity of expressing
 to the Embassy its highest regard.



compliments
 with reference
 Israel,
 the Palestine
 ed Nations
 ition at this
 decision, and
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to oppose any
 tting up therein
 ing the country
 nd. It affirms
 of the problem
 hose principles
 ed itself.

the right of
 not accord
 Nations

Organization has been made to rest. moreover, such recognition, far
 from being conducive to peace, will place the arab countries in a
 deplorable state of unrest.

THE ALL PALESTINE GOVERNMENT lodges this protest firm
 In its belief that justice will prevail.



THE ALL PALESTINE GOVERNMENT presents its compliments to the Minister for Foreign Affairs of Australia and with reference to the de facto recognition Australia has accorded to Israel, expresses its regrets that such a step was taken while the Palestine Problem is and remains under consideration by the United Nations Organization. It desires to point out that the recognition at this stage is of a nature that might influence the ultimate decision, and it is furthermore a negation of the natural right of the arabs to their independence in their country.

THE ALL PALESTINE GOVERNMENT shall continue to oppose any solution based on partition of their country and on setting up therein a jewish state and it shall direct its efforts to ridding the country of the jewish armed bands that have invaded the Holy Land. It affirms again that, to restore peace to the land, the solution of the problem must rest on the principles of justice and democracy, those principles with which the United Nations Organization has identified itself.

The recognition accorded to Israel disregards the right of the Arabs - the rightful owners of the land - and does not accord with the principles on which the authority of the United Nations Organization has been made to rest. moreover, such recognition, far from being conducive to peace, will place the arab countries in a deplorable state of unrest.

THE ALL PALESTINE GOVERNMENT lodges this protest firm in its belief that justice will prevail.





K:JC

TOP SECRET.

Ref. 2/149.

OFFICE OF THE HIGH COMMISSIONER
FOR THE UNITED KINGDOM
CANBERRA

14th February, 1949.

My dear Prime Minister,

At the request of my Government, I am
sending you the enclosed information about the course
of the negotiations at Rhodes between the Egyptian and
Israeli Governments.

Yours sincerely,

E. Williams

The Right Honourable J.B. Chifley, M.P.,

Prime Minister of the Commonwealth of Australia,

CANBERRA.

A. C. T.

191/2/1
N. J. [unclear]
PA

the Rhodes talks. At a meeting of the Arab representatives in Cairo on the 6th February, the Egyptians are understood to have advised the other Arab Governments not to conform to this suggestion, pending the outcome of their own discussions with the Jews, apparently because they thought that if the other Arab Governments delayed in complying with Dr. Bunche's suggestion, the Jews might be impelled to come more quickly to agreement with the Egyptians. The Transjordan Government have, however, since agreed to send representatives to the talks, but have suggested that the venue of these might be changed to Jerusalem.

United Kingdom High Commissioner's Office,

CANBERRA. A.C.T.

14th February, 1949.

TOP SECRET.

MESSAGE FROM THE UNITED KINGDOM GOVERNMENT.

PALESTINE - NEGOTIATIONS IN RHODES.

While we have no official information as to the progress of the Rhodes talks, the Egyptian Government have informed us that the Acting Mediator has put forward various proposals for the armistice line in The Negeb, which the Egyptians in general were prepared to accept, but which the Jews rejected, subsequently making an unacceptable counterproposal of their own. The Egyptian Government had brought these facts to the notice of the United States Government.

2. In the light of this information, we approached the United States Government on the 5th February, pointing out that we had used our influence with the Arab Governments in favour of reaching agreement on an armistice and then on a final settlement, and suggesting that it was now for the United States Government to persuade the Israelis to accept Dr. Bunche's proposals.

3. We were subsequently informed by the United States Government that they had in fact taken strong action in this sense both in Tel Aviv and with the Israeli representative in Washington on the 5th February. They had expressed the earnest hope that the Israeli Government would make a special effort at accommodation in order to accept Dr. Bunche's draft as a possible basis of agreement, particularly in view of its acceptance by the Egyptian Government. The Israelis were also told that the United States Government were deeply concerned at the possibility of a breakdown of the Rhodes talks, that they believed that this was the psychological moment when the armistice could be achieved if only the Israeli Government would manifest a spirit of conciliation, and that if the negotiations failed and the matter was reported to the Security Council, Israel's position would be prejudiced. A formal reply has not yet been received from the Israeli Government, though Shertok's initial reactions seem to have been that the Israelis, having originally been attacked by the Egyptians, were not anxious to retire from an area from which the Egyptians could launch further attacks.

4. Meanwhile, the Acting Mediator has suggested to the other Arab Governments that they should send representatives to participate in the Rhodes talks. At a meeting of the Arab representatives in Cairo on the 6th February, the Egyptians are understood to have advised the other Arab Governments not to conform to this suggestion, pending the outcome of their own discussions with the Jews, apparently because they thought that if the other Arab Governments delayed in complying with Dr. Bunche's suggestion, the Jews might be impelled to come more quickly to agreement with the Egyptians. The Transjordan Government have, however, since agreed to send representatives to the talks, but have suggested that the venue of these might be changed to Jerusalem.

United Kingdom High Commissioner's Office,

CANBERRA. A.C.T.

14th February, 1949.

DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS.

CABLEGRAM.

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**ACTION
COPY**

NR:MD

I.1816.

DECRYPTER FROM:

Dated: 2nd February, 1949.

THE AUSTRALIAN DELEGATION,
UNITED NATIONS ASSEMBLY,
NEW YORK.

Rec'd: 3rd February, 1949.
1222.

UN.80. Restricted.

Palestine.

My UN.37.

Israeli sources here say that issue between them and Egyptians at Rhodes Conference is no longer demarcation lines but disposition of forces. They had proposed reduction and withdrawal of troops but Egyptians have not agreed. Israel interprets Egyptian attitude to British undertakings to assist in any renewed fighting in accordance with 1936 treaty. British attitude is said to be related to renunciation of the treaty. Bunche is said to be preparing compromise proposal which is likely to be accepted.

2. Israel is opposed to other states, e.g., Transjordan, joining in present talks, and is supported by United States in this. It is claimed that problems of various Arab countries vis-a-vis Israel are different. For instance Transjordan has territorial claims, while Syria has not. However, it is reported here today that Bunche has now proposed Armistice talks between Israel and all Arab states at war with her.

3. Iraq has so far given no indication of willingness to negotiate, and has not even acknowledged to Security Council November cease-fire order. Latter fact regarded as serious by Israel.

4. General tone of Israeli comment is confident. Formal incorporation of new city of Jerusalem in state of Israel reported today is taken by press here as indicating that Israel feels assured of return to normal relations with neighbouring states, particularly Transjordan.

MIN. & DEPT. EXTERNAL AFFAIRS.
" " DEFENCE.

3rd February, 1949.

Copies to:

Secretariat

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COMMONWEALTH OF AUSTRALIA

FASTEST AIR MAIL

11 9

Australia House,
Strand,
LONDON, W.C.2.
DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS
27th January, 1949.

Rec'd - 9 FEB 1949

191/2/11

MEMORANDUM for -The Secretary,
Prime Minister's Department,
CANBERRA A.C.T.

I forward herewith the following -

House of Commons Hansard of 26th January, 1949,
containing debate on Palestine, together with
newspaper comment thereon.Report of the Tribunal appointed to inquire into
Allegations reflecting on the Official Conduct
of Ministers of the Crown and other Public
Servants.(Sgd.) R. Maxwell
for Deputy High Commissioner......
The Secretary,
Department of External Affairs.-----
*Referred. Original enclosures re Palestine are
attached.**J. McKenna*
Acting Secretary
Prime Minister's Department.

8 FEB 1949

M NA

At back of file PA

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To: 1489

MC:MC

DECYPHER FROM:

AUSTRALIAN MISSION
TO UNITED NATIONS,
NEW YORK.

Dated 27th January, 1949.

1411.

Rec'd 28th January, 1949.

10.40.

Restricted. UN.65. Palestine.

Bunche reports cease/fire agreement extended
indefinitely but severe divergencies in view point of negotiating
parties encountered during past few days.

Min. & Dept. E.A.

28th January, 1949

ND

191/2/11

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CABLEGRAM.

HP/RM

DECYPHER FROM

AUSTRALIAN DELEGATION
TO THE UNITED NATIONS.
NEW YORK.

I-1311

Dated: 24th January 1949

Rec'd: 25th January 1949
1545.RESTRICTED.

UN 50. Your 43.

We are preparing only section on Palestine which will
be forwarded at end of week.

MIN & DEPT E.A. (ATTN.)

25th January 1949

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DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS.

CABLEGRAM.

PF:BP

DECRYPTER FROM:

AUSTRALIAN DELEGATION,
UNITED NATIONS ASSEMBLY,
NEW YORK.

I.1073

Dated: 20th January, 1949.
2347

Rec'd: 21st January, 1949.
8.30 a.m.

UN.37. Restricted.

Palatine.

Press reports from Jerusalem state that Transjordan
armistice talks have passed from Army to Foreign Office
level. It is believed both Parties are eager to arrive
at a workable formula before the Conciliation Commission
reaches Tel Aviv. The talks are reported to be of broad
scope and go well beyond consideration of Jerusalem lines.
Israel remains opposed to inter-nationalisation of
Jerusalem, the plan Commission members are reported to
favour. It appears both countries prefer separate peace
on the spot rather than complicating matters by taking
the issue to Rhodes or reference to the Commission.

2. From Rhodes it is reported that Arab countries,
except Lebanon and perhaps Transjordan, will probably refuse
to negotiate an armistice at this stage.

3. Your 404. United Nations would appreciate an early
indication of your attitude to request by Griffs for wheat
for refugees.

Min. & Dept. of External Affairs.
" " " Defence.

21st January, 1949.

**ACTION
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DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS.

CABLEGRAM.

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I. 1041.

Dated 19th January, 1949

1534
Rec'd 20th January, 1949
10.55.

JSH:MO

DECYPHER FROM:

AUSTRALIAN DELEGATION
TO UNITED NATIONS,
NEW YORK.

Restricted. UN.36. Palestine. Your 24.

Bancho, on 17th January, cabled Secretary-General suggesting
that functions of Mediator be taken over by conciliation Commission
as soon as possible. Cable has been referred to Security Council
for action.

Min. & Dept. E.A.

20th January, 1949.

NA B *W*
W *S* *J*
10 *19/1/49*

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DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS.

CABLEGRAM.

FF/RMW

I.983

DECRYPTER FROM

Dated: 18th January, 1949
1928.

AUSTRALIAN DELEGATION
TO THE UNITED NATIONS
NEW YORK.

Rec'd: 19th January 1949
1435.

**ACTION
COPY**

RESTRICTED.

UN. 34 Palestine. The conciliation commission has selected Jerusalem as its headquarters and elected Huseyin Cahid Yalchin of Turkey as its chairman. The headquarters will open twenty fourth.

MIN & DEPT E.A.

20th January, 1949

Handwritten: NA 101
#C-38
191/2/1

CABLEGRAM.

JEO:NER

DECYPHER FROM:

THE SECRETARY OF STATE
FOR COMMONWEALTH RELATIONS,
LONDON.

H No. 23. CONFIDENTIAL.

PALESTINE.

Dated 19th January, 1949

Recd. 20th January, 1949

0830

IMPORTANT.

In view of the wide misrepresentation of the United Kingdom Government's attitude and policy in regard to Palestine and the extent to which these misrepresentations have obtained credence in various parts of the world, we think it desirable to place on record the real policy we have been pursuing and the considerations on which it is based.

2. Our primary aim is to secure and maintain the peace and stability of the Middle East and the preservation of our own and general Commonwealth interests in that area. We are equally concerned to uphold the authority and prestige of the United Nations and to carry out our obligations as a member of that Organisation. We do not consider that these aims are incompatible, and all our actions are directed towards the attainment of both.

3. Since we handed over the Mandate of Palestine to the United Nations we have endeavoured, first, to ensure that the United Nations are properly informed of the fundamental facts of the Palestine situation (for which purpose we are obviously better equipped than anyone else in view of the long period for which we held sole responsibility for Palestine); secondly, to advise the United Nations in the sense of adopting measures which we considered in the light of our experience to be the most realistic and the most likely to secure a permanent settlement; and thirdly, whilst ourselves scrupulously carrying out all decisions made by the United Nations to attempt to secure that the latter themselves showed sufficient firmness in obtaining implementation of these decisions by the parties concerned.

4. In pursuance of this policy, we have from first to last observed the terms of the successive truces imposed by the Security Council and in particular have refrained from supplying any war material to Arab States, even though we were bound under the terms of our treaties of alliances with three of those States to supply them with certain war material and had entered into specific contracts with them for this purpose. One result of this action had been that while the Arabs lacking any appreciable alternative source of supply have suffered a substantial depreciation of their war potential, the Jews have been able greatly to increase theirs because of the stream of material which has been supplied to them by certain Satellite States, no doubt with the full consent (to put it no higher) of the Soviet Government. When the United Nations Mediator, as a result of his survey of the situation in Palestine, produced his report we immediately gave it our full support, not because we considered it satisfactory in all ways, but because we felt that its adoption represented the only practicable means of securing a settlement which could be imposed on both the Arabs and the Jews with United Nations authority. United States Government at that time made similar declaration of support.

5. As Commonwealth Governments will be aware, we had hoped that

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2.

1.985/6/7/8.

the Assembly would have endorsed the Bernadotte plan and when that plan was discarded that the Conciliation Commission would have been empowered to enforce a settlement in which the Jews and Arabs might have been expected to acquiesce. We nevertheless voted for the final resolution and are prepared to do everything in our power to assist Conciliation Commission in this task. To that end we have constantly urged on the Arab States the necessity of co-operating with the Commission, and have endeavoured to expedite the departure of the latter for Palestine.

6. Meanwhile, during the past three months, the situation in Palestine itself has given us cause for great and increasing anxiety. Report of the Acting Mediator leave no room for doubt as to the aggressiveness of the Jews, who since October have launched three military operations in violation of the truce: in the Negeb, beginning on October 15th, in Northern Galilee late in October and in the Negeb again beginning on December 22nd. They have failed to comply with Security Council resolutions of November 4th (to withdraw to lines held by them before October 14th) and of December 29th, both of which the Arabs accepted. They have also made an incursion into Egyptian territory and are still occupying Lebanese territory. Our information had enabled us to anticipate that these attacks would take place, as in fact they did, and leads us to believe that further Jewish aggression either against Transjordan or in Jerusalem may well be in prospect. Meanwhile the Security Council, by failing to secure the effective implementation of its own resolutions, has allowed its authority to be dangerously undermined with consequent temptation to the Jews to utilise their increased military strength still further to improve their position.

7. It is, of course, wholly untrue to suggest that the United Kingdom Government are animated by any feelings of hostility towards Israel still less that we are pursuing "a blindly pro Arab policy". We wish to see the State of Israel established within properly defined frontiers in conditions which would allow it to create and maintain peaceful relations with their Arab neighbours. But we cannot feel that the temper of the Jews as displayed by their recent actions is likely to contribute to this solution above all unless and until the authority of the United Nations can be re-established in the area.

8. Nor must the vital importance of our relations with the Arab States and of the stability of those States themselves be overlooked. Reference has already been made above to our treaty obligations to three of those States. These treaties were devised before the present conflict between the Arabs and Jews had developed and were prompted by the necessity of maintaining Commonwealth communications through the Suez Canal. As a result of the treaties with Egypt and Iraq, the British forces were in Egypt in 1939 and enabled the Allied bridgehead to be maintained in North Africa, as a result of which elimination of axis forces from North Africa and the subsequent liberation of Sicily and Italy were made possible not to mention the continued access to Middle Eastern oil supplies. The position in this respect is unchanged today and it remains of paramount importance not only to our security but to that of Western Powers, and indeed of all Democratic States that the Middle East should be preserved from threat of aggression and from the internal strife which unchecked aggression would be almost certain to cause.

.....3/9. Thus

CABLEGRAM.

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1.985/6/7/8.

9. Thus if either Egypt or Transjordan were directly attacked by Jews and invoked our assistance under terms of our treaties of alliance with them we could not avoid complying. The Egyptians did in fact ask us for help when the Jews invaded their territory, but were unwilling formally to invoke the 1936 treaty. The Transjordanians, however, fearing (as we did) that the Jews would next attack them, did invoke the treaty; and in hopes of preventing this further Jewish aggression, and also in order to be in a position both to protect our own installations in the Transjordan and to implement our obligations to Transjordan, we felt compelled to send forces to Arabia as we had the full right to do. Such other measures as we have taken are purely precautionary and the Jews have no cause to feel endangered by our actions, unless they harbour further aggressive designs.

10. The air reconnaissance which resulted in our aircraft being attacked without provocation by Jewish aircraft over Egyptian territory and in five of them being shot down was undertaken because of the importance of ascertaining whether, in fact, Jewish forces had invaded Egyptian territory. The United Nations Observers had been excluded by the Jews from the area. The responsibility for the decision to send reconnaissance flights was ours, but in conversations with the United States State Department it was clear to both sides that further precise information was required. We alone were in a position to supply this evidence and took steps open to us to do so. We do not intend to exaggerate the importance of this deplorable incident for which the Jews are wholly to blame in order not to prejudice the main issue of negotiations which the Conciliation Commission are to promote.

11. Throughout the period under review, we have made every attempt to align our Palestine policy with that of the United States, in view not only of the overriding importance which we attach to co-operation with them in all fields, but also of the influence which they are in a position to exert especially on the Jews. This has not been easy in view of the constant shifts of United States policy (notably their withdrawal from original support of the Belfrage plan) and we have been forced on many occasions to accept what we regard as unsatisfactory compromises. We are continuing to pursue this aim in so far as we can do so without renouncing the objectives described in paragraph 2 above, which we maintain are, and will continue to be, vital for us and for the Commonwealth as a whole.

12. The first reports of the Egyptian Jewish meetings at Rhodes are comparatively satisfactory. There are also reports of discussions between the Lebanese Government and the Jews and the Transjordan Jewish discussions are continuing intermittently. We regard the prospects of these various talks as having been considerably improved as a result of the action which we have taken and we shall now wait to see their results in the hope that no further trouble will break out meanwhile.

MIN. AND DEPT. OF E.A.
MIN. AND DEPT. OF DEFENCE

20th January, 1949

CABLEGRAM.

MINER

DECRYPTER FROM:

THE HIGH COMMISSIONER'S OFFICE,
L O N D O N.

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I.872

Date: 17th January, 1949

1440

Rece: 18th January, 1949

0830

181.

Important. Confidential. From External.

Criticism of Foreign Secretary.

My memo 1322 22nd December, 1948. Despite a burst of favourable publicity on the occasion of Schuman's visit, criticism of Bevin's handling of Foreign Policy has developed sharply in the past week. Conservative criticism has grown gradually over the past year while back bench Labour Opposition, which was vigorous in 1946 and 1947, was less apparent in 1948. The effect of the former can still be discounted somewhat as having at least a partisan element and partly because it tends to be a general protest against the "muddle" particularly in the Middle East. The latter loses some of its effect because Crossman, its chief spokesman, is regarded as having too close relations with the Israeli Government. Nevertheless the Press articles over the weekend are a reasonably accurate reflection of public opinion.

2. The main criticism arises over Palestine, though some within the Labour Party concerns Indonesia. The R.A.F. reconnaissances over the Egyptian-Palestine border has aroused considerable criticism among groups usually favourable to the Foreign Secretary, and it may be said that the reaction to the deaths of the airmen in this reconnaissance is precisely the opposite of that in the case of the sergeants in 1947. In other words, these deaths are laid at the door of the Government.

3. This week there will be many parliamentary questions on Palestine, the Labour Party will discuss Palestine and Bevin will probably make a long statement in the House. The Cabinet is reviewing Palestine policy today, 17th January, and I understand that Commonwealth Relations Office, which had intended telegraphing you a statement of policy over the weekend, has delayed pending the results of the Cabinet meeting.

MIN. AND DEPT. OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS

18th January, 1949

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Teleprinted to Melbourne for Minister

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DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS.

CABLEGRAM.

TWTF/11 L.

0.586.
Sent: 14th January, 1949.
1655.

DIXON 20:

AUSTRALIAN MISSION TO THE UNITED NATIONS.

NEW YORK.

24.

UNCLASSIFIED.

Please advise when Palestine
Conciliation Commission will meet and whether you
are aware of any move to relieve Acting Mediator of his
functions under Security Council Resolution.

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External Affairs.

17th January, 1949.

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DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS.

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JO MW

I.746

DECYPHER FROM

Dated; 14th January 1949

AUSTRALIAN DELEGATION
TO THE UNITED NATIONS ORGANISATION
NEW YORK.

Rec'd: 15th January, 1949
0900

RESTRICTED.

UN. 22.

Palestine.

The Egyptian Delegation headed by Colonel Mohamed Ibrahim Seif El Dineoud, the Israeli Delegation headed by Dr. Eytan commenced negotiations in Rhodes yesterday. Both Delegations are empowered to "Negotiate, conclude and initial" an armistice agreement subject to ratification. Bunche considers as encouraging preliminary meetings at which both delegations have expressed desire for an early peace and undertaken to work persistently in the spirit of conciliation to the end. Separate meetings will take place between the mediator and each of the parties before joint formal meetings of the two delegations are held.

2. Bunche reports that he has been advised by Tel Aviv that all Israeli troops have now been evacuated from Egyptian Territory. He states that United Nations observers have confirmed this fact.

E.A.

15th January, 1949.

DEFENCE

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DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS.

CABLEGRAM.

MD

0.547/8.

DECODE TO:

Dated 14th January, 1949.

HIGH COMMISSIONER'S OFFICE,
L O N D O N.

14.

AUSTRALIAN DELEGATION
TO THE UNITED NATIONS,
NEW YORK.

21.

Unclassified.

We would appreciate regular reports of developments
in Palestine situation.

EXTERNAL AFFAIRS.

14th January, 1949.

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DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS.

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RMW

I.746

DECYPHER FROM

Dated; 14th January 1949

AUSTRALIAN DELEGATION
TO THE UNITED NATIONS ORGANISATION
NEW YORK.

Rec'd: 15th January, 1949
0900

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E.A.

15th January, 1949.

DEFENCE

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DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS

CABLEGRAM

SECRET.

JSH:MC

I. 775.

DECYPHER FROM:

Dated 14th January, 1949.

AUSTRALIAN EMBASSY
WASHINGTON.1496.
Rec'd 14th January, 1949.
2.00.Secret. 41.Palestine. Following ascertained mainly from British
Embassy sources.

1. Egyptian Minister of War approached British Commander in Egypt and informed him that Israeli troops had crossed border into Egypt. He indicated that his approach was personal and that he was not invoking Anglo-Egyptian treaty but would nevertheless appreciate any action which United Kingdom could take in this regard.

2. British Commander consulted Ambassador, and, resulting from this, instructions were sent to British Ambassador, Washington, to request United States Government to take strong line with Israel in connection with entry into Egyptian territory. Franks suggested to U.K. Government that Egyptian statement should also be verified, hence R.A.F. planes sent on reconnaissance which resulted in the shooting down. (It appears from Foreign Office and State Department that Franks had previously discussed with Lovett, need for first hand information).

3. British troop movement to Agaba had been arranged before R.A.F. incident and was not intended as show of force.

4. British Ambassador's interviews with Lovett and Truman procedure following United States reaction.

(a). As against British emphasis on recent breaches of Security Council's resolutions, the earlier resolutions, and particularly, the Assembly resolution of 1947, were emphasised as a basis to a settlement.

(b). It should not be forgotten that the Arabs were originally responsible for the disruption of peace.

(c). United States emphasised that the vital qualities of the State of Israel rendered it important to ensure that it looked to the West.

(d). It favoured the early meeting of the Commission.

4. It appreciated that vital interests of United States and Britain were involved but considered that an agreed solution, rather than one imposed upon the parties by U.S. and Britain, was desirable.

5. In press interview after discussion with British Ambassador, Trumans stated that U.S. policy would be found in statement of Jessup in Paris on 20th November. He denied that Anglo-American relations more strained and denied that R.A.F. planes recently shot down were on reconnaissance at request of United States Government.

6. With regard to De June recognition of Israel by United States, British Embassy, considered that U.S. may extend recognition after elections in Israel.

E.A.

NA
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191/2/1
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CABLEGRAM.

Sent: 14th January, 1949.
0.586.
1.555.

NEW YORK.

24.



UNCLASSIFIED.

Please advise when Palestine Conciliation Commission will meet and whether you are aware of any move to relieve Acting Mediator of his functions under Security Council Resolution.

$$1000 \times 100 = 100,000$$

External Affairs.

17th January, 1949.

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NP:MD

1.20379

DECIPHER FROM:

Dated: 24th December, 1948.

1917.

THE SECRETARY OF STATE
FOR COMMONWEALTH RELATIONS,
LONDON.

Rec'd: 25th December, 1948.

1630.

H.513.

Confidential.

My telegram 11th December H.495.

PALESTINE.

King Ferouk lost no time in expressing his strong opposition to resolution passed by Jericho Conference and conveyed a message to Heads of Arab Diplomatic Missions in Cairo (with exception of Transjordan Minister) in which he deplored resolution as a grave threat to Arab Unity and claimed that Conference had no mandate to express views of Palestine Arabs. Egyptian press took uniformly hostile attitude towards both Government of Transjordan and Jericho Conference.

2. These attacks seem merely to have served to produce considerable anger both in Palestine and Transjordan and to increase their determination to bring about union of Arab Palestine with Transjordan despite Egyptian objection. Transjordan Parliament has unanimously confirmed decisions of Council of Ministers on Jericho resolution namely to carry out unification of the two countries provided this was done by constitutional methods in accordance with principle of self-determination. Present position is that after a sharp exchange of notes between Egyptian and Transjordan Prime Minister's former has hinted at desirability of holding discussions on the matter.

3. Other Arab League countries have been using their influence to prevent King Abdullah from taking any further step and Secretary General of Arab League has sent notes to the Transjordan Legation in Cairo and to Secretary General of United Nations pointing out that the Arab League maintains a position which was previously endorsed by Transjordan that there should be no minority Jewish state in Palestine and that the Palestinians themselves should decide their own future.

4. Political Committee of Arab League is to meet within next few days to discuss their attitude towards conciliation Commission appointed by General Assembly and towards King Abdullah's actions in Palestine. Meanwhile it was announced in Amman on 20th December that King Abdullah had appointed a new Mufti of Jerusalem. New Mufti, Sheikh Hissaruddin Jarallah formerly Chief Justice of Muslim Religious Courts in Palestine is an old political opponent of the ex-Mufti Hajj Amin.

A/G. MIN. & DEPT. EXTERNAL AFFAIRS.
" " DEFENCE.

27th December, 1948.

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CABLEGRAM.

JREC/MW

O.17917

ENCODED TO

Sent: 21st December, 1948
1045.AUSTRALIAN MISSION
TO THE UNITED NATIONS
NEW YORKUNCLASSIFIED.

400. It is noted that the election of Economic Board for Palestine appears as item 11 on the Agenda for the 8th Session of the Economic and Social Council (E/1073).

Whereas that as the Palestine Commission has been relieved of its functions it follows that the proposal for an Economic Board will have lapsed. Please advise.

E.A.

21st December, 1948

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I.30021

Dated 19th December, 1948

1955

Rec'd. 19th December, 1948

0900 hours.

HQ:JSH

CYPRER FROM:

THE AUSTRALIAN HIGH COMMISSIONER'S OFFICE,
LONDON.

190. SECRET. From Beasley.

At High Commissioners meeting yesterday,
 Hector McNeil spoke on Berlin, Palestine and European unity.
 Main points were:

1. Berlin.

Although United Kingdom are most anxious to discover some formula which will enable them to reach measure of agreement with Soviet authorities regarding the currency question they are not optimistic, and as precaution to another breakdown, intend to proceed in conjunction with the United States and French Governments the formulation of plans for linking the Western mark with their Sector in Berlin. McNeil emphasised danger of inflation always present in German economy and stressed importance of being prepared to link Berlin currency to that of Western zones. Soviet mark has deteriorated to extent of 8 to 1 against Western mark.

2. PALESTINE.

191/2/1
 In face of criticism from High Commissioners, McNeil said that new Three Power Commission on Palestine was certainly not perfect, but difficulty had been finding three countries with which both Jews and Arabs would consent to deal. High Commissioner for Ceylon said that he thought United Kingdom were giving in too readily to American pressure over Palestine question and suggested further that a stronger line should have to be taken by United Kingdom over settlement of Italian Colonies question. I took the opportunity of expressing my displeasure at much of manoeuvring on these subjects that went on in Paris of which Dr. Evatt strongly disapproved.

3. On subject of Paris committee on European Unity which is expected to report mid January, McNeil said United Kingdom was strongly opposed to any form of nominated independent Assembly, and favoured instead regular meetings of council of responsible Ministers.

4. I thus raised questions of Commonwealth consultation arising out of Prime Minister's meeting and received general support for a special meeting of High Commissioners in new year to consider practical measures for increased consultation here. McNeil supported this and said that meanwhile Foreign Office would be issuing shortly a circular setting out procedures for increased consultation with Foreign Office at all levels.

A/G. MIN. & DEP'T OF E.A.
 MIN. & DEP'T OF DEFENCE.

20th December, 1948.

LB/JO

DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS

European

DECRYPTED FROM

CABLEGRAM, 25 **SECRET.**

THE SECRETARY OF STATE
FOR COMMONWEALTH RELATIONS
LOND

Rec'd December 12, 1948
0900

E. No. 495. CONFIDENTIAL.

Palestine.

A conference of Palestine Arabs held at Jericho on 4th December passed resolution proclaiming Union of Palestine and Trans-Jordan and acknowledging King Abdullah as King of the united country. Resolution further pressed for Arab states to complete their task of liberating Palestine.

2. Trans-Jordan Council of Ministers after discussing situation created by this proclamation passed resolution welcoming these decisions as promoting unity of Arab world so much desired by all Arabs and promising to take the necessary constitutional and international measures to secure their implementation as soon as circumstances permitted. This resolution has been agreed with by Abdullah and has been placed before Trans-Jordan Parliament where it seems likely to be confirmed.

MIN AND DEPT L.A.
MIN AND DEPT DEFENCE
December 12, 1948

ND

207/1²

CABLEGRAM.

MAL:ND

I.19740.

DECOMPHER FROM:

Dated: 13th December, 1948,
2035.THE AUSTRALIAN DELEGATION,
TO THE UNITED NATIONS,
P A R I S.Rec'd: 14th December, 1948.
0930.

Austdel 365.

Restricted.

Palestine.

1. General Assembly on Saturday evening passed resolution by 35 votes to 15 with 8 abstentions. This resolution is as in our 334 as amended by seven power amendments as in our 357 with following exceptions -

- (a) Nazareth is included in definition of Holy Places,
- (b) Area of Jerusalem is fully described instead of reference to 29th November resolution, and
- (c) Further French amendment to paragraph 3 of original resolution giving to permanent members of Security Council right to nominate membership of Commission for Assembly approval.

2. Five powers met during plenary meeting Saturday night and chose United States, France and Turkey despite objections of U.S.S.R. which desired inclusion of Poland and a five power Commission.

3. Negative vote consisted of Arab and Slav blocs plus Cuba, Pakistan and Afghanistan. In view of small margin for two thirds vote decision to support resolution as amended even though text was unsatisfactory in some respects was undoubtedly right alternative being complete failure of Assembly to take any positive step on Palestine at all. As regards composition of Commission final selection was in line with what United Kingdom had desired. During previous three or four days a certain amount of support for inclusion of Australia instead of Turkey had been apparent but majority of permanent members of Committee evidently accepted in the end United Kingdom contention that wishes of Arab states concerning composition of the Commission must be given weight. Commission as recommended by the Committee was agreed to with 40 affirmative votes including Australia. Israel would rather have seen some other country included than Turkey preferably ourselves but they are not too displeased with final result. Judging from comment after the vote there is a reasonable hope that the Commission will be able to achieve something.

A/G. MIN. & DEPT. EXTERNAL AFFAIRS.
" " " DEFENCE.

14th December, 1948.

B MS

JS

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CABLEGRAM.

JO:MC

I. 19599

DECRYPTED FROM:

Dated 10th December, 1948.
1425.AUSTRALIAN DELEGATION
TO UNITED NATIONS,
PARIS.Rec'd 11th December, 1948.
8.30.

Restricted. Ausdel. 387. Palestine.

As the result of many private discussions over the past few days amendments to Palestine resolution will be submitted in plenary today jointly by Australia, Brazil, Canada, China, Colombia, France and New Zealand.

Purpose of securing two thirds majority appears assured. Eventual membership of the Commission as yet unpredictable.

Following is text of amendments.

"1. Delete the first, second third and fourth paras of the preamble and substitute therefore the following "The general assembly having considered further the situation in Palestine".

2. Delete para. 2(c).

3. Delete para. 5.

4. Substitute the word "with" for "through" in para. 5 so that the paragraph will read

"calls upon the Governments and authorities concerned to extend the scope of the negotiations provided for in the Security Council's resolution of 16th November, 1948 and to seek agreement by negotiations conducted either with the conciliation Commission or directly with a view to the final settlement of all questions outstanding between them".

5. Delete in para. 10 the following words "in this connexion of conclusions contained in part 1 section VIII 4(e) and (f) of the report of the United Nations Mediator should be taken into account".

6. Delete in para 11 the following words "endorses the conclusions stated in part 1 section VIII para 4 (1) of the progress report of the United Nations Mediator in Palestine.

A/G. Min. & Dept. E.A.
Min. & Dept. Defence.

11th December, 1948

Copies received

Secretary	/
AS (P)	/
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ME	/
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Adm	/
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Exec	/

CABLEGRAM.

"Z"

JSH/RMW

I.19596/7

DECYPHER FROM

Dated: 10th December, 1948
1425.

AUSTRALIAN DELEGATION

TO THE UNITED NATIONS ORGANISATION Rec'd: 11th December, 1948
PARIS. 0900RESTRICTED.

Austdel 856.

Your UNP 115.

Restricted.

Palestine. Following is verbatim record
of statement referred to :

" The proposal introduced by the representative of Canada raises most important considerations both in respect of principle and proper procedure and of practice. I regret to say that in both respects my delegation cannot find that this is any real justification for the proposed method of selecting the members of the commission. It is not merely that there is no ultimate justification but that such a procedure could lead to undesirable results and therefore be positively objectionable in itself from a procedural aspect because this commission will be a body of the general assembly. Its setting up cannot be considered on the same footing as the proposal for the appointment of a mediator in Palestine which was carried by the previous special assembly. This body will derive its real authority and functions, so far as we have been able to express them, from the General Assembly but in the case of the mediator as is well known a large part of his directives and of his functions conferred upon him were the concern of the Security Council and not of the Assembly alone. Therefore, it is no real analogy to compare the case of the selection of the mediator with the matter now before us. We feel very strongly that the only straight forward and proper procedure and the only procedure which it is right for the political committee of the General Assembly to recommend is that the Assembly itself should by methods properly laid down select the members of this commission.

The reasons given by the representative of Canada for making this particular proposal are, as I understand it, mainly of a practical nature. We implied that there might be difficulty in the selection of this body of three member states in the General Assembly and he indicated also that the ultimate selection would carry more weight and authority if it had been made by a committee consisting of those particular states named in the resolution. But let us consider what is most likely in fact to happen. This is not any committee of five states, it is a proposed committee of the permanent members of the Security Council in fact. Is there anything at all in the experience of the past two years to warrant an expectation that such a

E./committee

CABLEGRAM.

- 2 -

I.19596/7

committee, I am not in any sense casting any reflection on the five powers, would reach a real agreement carrying the common opinion of all the five powers even if the committee operates as a committee of the assembly. I think the representative of El Salvador expressed very clearly the apprehensions which could legitimately be felt in this respect and they are real apprehensions. It is not really sufficient to say "very well, this committee operating under the rules of the Assembly can reach decisions by a simple majority". That is not what we want. For the sake of this commission and its capacity to carry out its work, we want something more than the backing of the simple majority of the permanent members of the Security Council. We want the backing of the whole Assembly.

I note from the terms of the resolution that this proposed committee will not merely recommend the three members of the Commission but will in fact choose them. In other words the whole process from selection to actual appointment will lie with this committee. It is conceivable that the committee as committees do, and as this particular kind of committee unfortunately very frequently does, will not reach agreement. A selection will be made by a majority but it might be a majority of four or it might even conceivably be a majority of three. What sort of satisfaction would the assembly feel in a selection of three member states for this highly important and responsible task in such a contin

We submit that the only straightforward and ultimately the most satisfactory method which will reflect the real will of this committee and the assembly is to resort to the established procedure of election in the plenary meeting of the General Assembly.

Therefore, my delegation is emphatically of the opinion that this committee should reject the proposal put forward by ^{of} of Canada and have recourse only to the established method and most satisfactory and straightforward method of election in the General Assembly.

E.A.

11th December 1948

A group omitted.

Copies received	
Secretary	✓
AS (P)	✓
MP	✓
A	✓
IA	✓
RI	✓
TA	✓
ANT	✓
ON	✓ a
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Adm	
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CABLEGRAM.

18.

DECYPHER FROM

THE SECRETARY OF
FOR COMMONWEALTH
LONDON

This is an unprocessed version of
the message. It is not to be
used for any purpose other than
Government. It is not to be
reproduced or used in any way
without the consent of the
Department of External Affairs.

I.19660

1525

December 12, 1948

0900

H. No. 495. CONFIDENTIAL.

Palestine.

A conference of Palestine Arabs held at Jericho on 4th December passed resolution proclaiming Union of Palestine and Trans-Jordan and acknowledging King Abdullah as King of the united country. Resolution further pressed for Arab states to complete their task of liberating Palestine.

2. Trans-Jordan Council of Ministers after discussing situation created by this proclamation passed resolution welcoming these decisions as promoting unity of Arab world so much desired by all Arabs and promising to take the necessary constitutional and international measures to secure their implementation as soon as circumstances permitted. This resolution has been agreed with by Abdullah and has been placed before Trans-Jordan Parliament where it seems likely to be confirmed.

MIN AND DEPT E.A.
MIN AND DEPT DEFENCE
December 12, 1948

ND 6
JG

191/2/1
[Signature]

191/2/1
[List of names and initials]



COMMONWEALTH OF AUSTRALIA



TELEPHONE:
MU 9287 (4 LINES)

TELEGRAMS:
"TRANSDIP"

P.O. Box 2258U.
IN YOUR REPLY PLEASE QUOTE:

DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORT,
14 McKILLOP STREET,
MELBOURNE, C.I.

DCE. 5/2. P766

8th December, 1948.

MEMORANDUM TO:

The Secretary,
Department of External Affairs,
CANBERRA. A.C.T.

Communications between Departments and
Overseas Missions.

... In accordance with the Prime Minister's
request of the 17th November, 1948, addressed to the
Minister for Transport (The Hon. E. J. Ward, M.P.),
copies of correspondence that has passed between this
Department and the Office of the High Commissioner
for India in Australia are attached.

A. W. Paul
(A. W. Paul)
Secretary.

169/4/7

PA

Pacific
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C O P Y

By Air Mail.

No. 214 P. & D.

From

Shri P.L. Verma, M.B.E.,
Chief Engineer, (Dv.) East Punjab,
P.W.D., Buildings & Roads, Branch.

To

The High Commissioner for India,
Canberra, Australia.

Dated Simla - 29th October, 1948.

Subject : Soil Burning Machine.

Sir,

I have the honour to state that this department has a heavy programme of construction of roads. The road/crust usually consists of soling coat of bricks which acts as foundation over which a wearing coat of stone metal treated with tar is laid. Bricks have to be burnt in kilns which are approximately 6 miles apart and have to be carted to the road site by motor trucks requiring large quantity of petrol for cartage.

I understand that Highway Engineers in Australia have invented a machine which burns and bakes the soil in situ into a hard crust. This machine travels along the road at very small speed and throws flames at very high temperature which burns the soil below into a hard crust. Details of this machine may be available from Chief Engineer of P.W.D. in Australia.

It will be appreciated if you will kindly take steps to get details of this machine with specifications from the Highway Department. Kindly also enquire about the name of manufacturer and its approximate cost. This Department would be interested to know what fuel is used and whether the machine could be adapted to burn wood as well.

Yours faithfully,

Sgd. G. Chand.

Executive Engineer (Designs)
for Chief Engineer, (Dev.) East Punjab,
P.W.D. Buildings and Roads Branch.

C O P Y

Office of the
High Commissioner for India in
CANBERRA, A.C.T. Australia,

Ref. No. M(3)HCI

The Secretary,
Department of Road & Transport,
CANBERRA, A.C.T.

Sir,

I have the honour to forward a copy of a self-explanatory letter dated 29th October, 1948, from the Government of East Punjab, India, regarding soil burning machine used for construction of roads.

It is requested that if there be no objection, the information asked for may kindly be forwarded to this office for the Government of East Punjab.

Thanking you,

Yours faithfully,

Official Secretary.

Encl:

C O P Y



TELEPHONE:
NO. (4 LINES)

TELEGRAMS:
"TRANSPER."

COMMONWEALTH OF AUSTRALIA.

P.O. Box 2258U
IN YOUR REPLY PLEASE QUOTE:

DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORT,
14 McKillop STREET,
MELBOURNE, C.I.

DCE.

30th November, 1948.

Dear Sir,

I am in receipt of your letter of the 16th November, enclosing a letter from the Government of East Punjab, India, regarding a soil burning machine used for the construction of roads.

I would like to confirm the fact that such a machine was invented in Australia and has been used for road construction in the State of Queensland. The inventor of this machine was Mr. L.R.H. Irvine, M.E., whose present address is as follows:

Divisional Engineer,
Department of Main Roads,
Goulburn,
New South Wales,
AUSTRALIA.

I am sure that if an approach were made to Mr. Irvine directly, he would be willing to supply any information concerning this machine.

Details of the construction of the machine and its methods of operation are available in the following articles - "Road Making by Heat Treatment of Soils", Part I and II, by L.R.H. Irvine, M.E., Journal of the Institution of Engineers, Australia, Vol. 2, No. 11, November, 1930, and Vol. 6, No. 4, April, 1934.

I believe that the Main Roads Commission, Brisbane, Queensland, have a machine available that they would be willing to dispose of at the present time, and it is suggested that should the Government of East Punjab consider purchasing this machine, they should communicate directly with Mr. D.A. Crawford, Chief Engineer, Main Roads Commission, Brisbane, Queensland.

Yours faithfully,

(Sgd.) A.W. Paul.
S e c r e t a r y

The Official Secretary,
Office of the High Commissioner for India
in Australia,
CANBERRA. A.C.T.

DOM/PMB

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SECRET.

MER:NER

I.19350

DECYPHER FROM:

Dated 8th December, 1948

0100

Recd. 8th December, 1948

0625

THE AUSTRALIAN DELEGATION
TO THE UNITED NATIONS,
P A R I S.

IMMEDIATE:

Austdel 335. Personal for Burton.

COMMITTEE 1 PALESTINE.

Committee 1 consideration of Palestine ended December 4th. Final vote on United Kingdom resolution as amended was 25 - 21 with 9 abstentions, minority was composed mainly of Arab and Soviet bloc. This is clearly insufficient for two thirds majority and modifications designed to * Arab abstention and attraction of some Latin Americans (who mainly abstained) appears necessary.

Main modifications secured to original resolution namely:-

- (A) Dropping of mediators report as a basis, and
- (B) Recognition of principle of direct negotiations at earliest possible date, made it logical for us to support resolution as a whole. Our position would probably have led to defeat of resolution outright, the resultant position being presumably the indefinite continuation of the office of mediator with terms of reference laid down by the Special Assembly which are unsatisfactory as regard achieving a final settlement. It is certainly recognised by the United States and United Kingdom firstly that the nature of final resolution was largely due to us and secondly that steam rolling methods are not always successful. With more United States United Kingdom frankness both prior to and during the debate, it is possible that a resolution might have been devised which would have commanded a two thirds majority in the Committee.

The United Kingdom and the United States have regarded the preservation of a common front on this question as more important than the resolution itself. It was for this reason that the United States made amendments to the United Kingdom resolution and not to ours which was much closer to their view. The result was confusing to the Committee although United States United Kingdom motives are from their point of view understandable.

The position we have reached has following features and anomalies:-

1. By supporting in the vote a group (Australia, New Zealand, Guatemala, Venezuela and Uruguay) which consistently fought the United Kingdom concept of the place of the Bernadette Plan the Arabs have achieved a resolution far worse from their point of view than the original United Kingdom resolution;
2. Slow opposition was insistant as they demanded the complete re-establishment of all features of the 1947 resolution;
3. It is recognised on all sides that way out is likely to be a simple resolution setting up a Commission with wide and loosely

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drawn terms of reference and providing briefly for Jerusalem and the Holy Places and refugees, consideration by the Plenary Assembly of the First Committee report will provide the occasion for the re-opening of the matter and the few days between then and now is likely to be filled with pretty intensive private talks in which we hope to play some part.

The position of the United Kingdom is an extremely awkward one. As sponsors of the resolution they have accepted the amendments of United States, Australia (some) and other countries. In addition the action of the Committee in eliminating altogether paragraphs 4 and 5 of their second revised resolution produced something totally different from their intentions. Their acceptance of the original United States amendments was made, we are privately informed, only with the greatest reluctance and although they voted for the final resolution Beeby made it clear that their final attitude in the Plenary would have to be carefully considered by his Government. As there is now no possibility that anyone will attempt to use Bernadotte as the basis of any Commissions work it would seem to be in the best interest of everybody and for United Nations prestige if we collaborated in a co-operative and earnest attempt to achieve a resolution acceptable to two thirds in the Plenary. The Ministers direction has been to this effect.

It is possible that Slav support would come if a clear statement were made in the resolution as to the supremacy of the 1947 resolution. While this may in fact be the case in the practical working of the Commission, as Neger seems certain to remain in Israeli Hands and Jerusalem provisions have been confined in principle, it is unlikely that the United Kingdom (and therefore Western Union generally) would be prepared to make this gesture. (Our attitude in debate has led to some marked disagreement with the United Kingdom but if the United Kingdom had shown the same co-operative support to us before the debate as they have shown throughout to the United States and to us latterly, this need never have happened. The basis of our actions has been support for the justice of last years resolution and for consistency in the work of the United Nations whereby its prestige may be maintained.

Apart from the unfortunate history of the matter prior to the debate the determination of the United Kingdom (and United States) not to accept or repeated suggestions for a Drafting Committee was in our view largely to blame for the inconclusive vote yesterday. Their reason against such a Sub Committee was dictated by fear that the United States would again switch their policy and the United Kingdom would thereby loose all support for their approach. As things turned out those parts of their resolution to which we objected were deleted and United Kingdom possibly lost much more by insisting on consideration in the full Committee. Last year there were sufficient abstentions to make the eventual success of the resolution quite feasible. On this occasion either the Arab or the Slav Bloc will have to be persuaded to change their votes. We were informed last night that both United States and France are working hard to this end.

Also at yesterdays meeting (the 13th and 14th of a very heavy weeks work) the Committee rejected the Soviet proposal on the withdrawal of troops (Australia and New Zealand abstaining) and two Syrian resolutions the first supporting the principle of a Federal State and the second referring the question of the powers

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I.19350

of the United Nations to partition Palestine to the International Court. We opposed both. The latter was only defeated by a tie vote of 20 - 20.

The text of the final resolution in immediately following telegram.

* word mutilated

DR. BURTON

7th December, 1948

CABLEGRAM.

I.19347/344

Dated 6th December, 1948

01.00

Recd. 6th December, 1948

1740

Restricted. Austdel 334. PALESTINE - TEXT OF FINAL

RESOLUTION.

The General Assembly having adopted on 29th November, 1947, resolution 181(II) regarding the future Government of Palestine and providing a plan for partition with economic union, having adopted on 14th May, 1948, resolution 186(S-2) empowering a United Nations Mediator in Palestine to exercise certain functions including the use of his Good Offices to promote a peaceful adjustment of the future situation in Palestine, having received and examined the progress report of the United Nations Mediator on Palestine (A/648) submitted by the Late Count Folke Bernadotte having taken note of the resolutions of the Security Council concerning the truce in Palestine and of the resolution of 16th November, 1948, concerning the establishment of an armistice by means of negotiations conducted either directly or through the Acting Mediator on Palestine.

1. Expresses its deep appreciation of the progress achieved through the Good Offices of the late United Nations Mediator in promoting a peaceful adjustment of the future situation of Palestine for which cause he sacrificed his life and sends its thanks to the Acting Mediator and his staff for their continued efforts and devotion to duty in Palestine;

2. Establishes a Conciliation Commission consisting of three states members of the United Nations which shall have the following functions -

(A) To assume in so far as it considers necessary in existing circumstances the functions given to the United Nations Mediator on Palestine by the resolution of the General Assembly of 14th May, 1948;

(B) Carry out the specific functions and directives given to it by this resolution and such additional functions and directives as may be given to it by the General Assembly or by the Security Council:

(C) To promote good relations between the State of Israel, the Arabs of Palestine and neighbouring Arab States;

(D) To undertake upon the request of the Security Council any of the functions now assigned to the United Nations Mediator on Palestine or to the United Nations truce commission by resolutions of the Security Council; upon such request to the Conciliation Commission by the Security Council with respect to all the remaining functions of the United Nations Mediator on Palestine under Security Council resolutions the Office of the Mediator shall be terminated:

3. Canada's amendment to second revised draft resolution of the United Kingdom (A/C1/394(REV2) adds the following final paragraph to the resolution:-

"Decides that the three members of the Conciliation Commission shall be chosen by a Committee of the Assembly consisting of the2/Representatives

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CABLEGRAM.

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I.19347/344

Representatives of China, France, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, United Kingdom and United States of America."

4. Requests the Commission to begin its functions at once with a view to the establishment of contact between the parties themselves and the Commission at the earliest possible date.

5. Calls upon the Governments and Authorities concerned to extend the scope of the negotiations provided for in the Security Council's resolution of 18th November, 1948, and to seek agreement by negotiations conducted either through the Conciliation Commission or directly with a view to a final settlement of all questions outstanding between them.

6. Instructs the Conciliation Commission to take steps to assist the Governments and Authorities concerned to achieve a final settlement of all questions outstanding between them.

7. Resolves that the Holy Places, religious buildings and sites in Palestine should be protected and free access to them assured in accordance with existing rights and historical practice, that arrangements to this end should be under effective United Nations supervision, that the United Nations Conciliation Commission in presenting to the fourth regular session of the General Assembly its detailed proposal for a permanent international regime for the territory of Jerusalem should include recommendations concerning the Holy Places in the territory, that with regard to the Holy Places in the rest of Palestine the Commission should call upon the Political Authorities of the area concerned to give appropriate formal guarantees as to the protection of the Holy Places and access to them and that these undertakings should be presented to the General Assembly for approval.

8. Resolves that in view of its association with three world religions the Jerusalem area, as defined in the General Assembly resolution of 29th November, 1947, should be accorded special and separate treatment from the rest of Palestine and should be placed under effective United Nations control, requests the Security Council to take further steps to ensure the demilitarisation of Jerusalem at the earliest possible date, instructs the Conciliation Commission to present to the fourth regular session of the General Assembly detailed proposals for a permanent International Regime for the Jerusalem area which will provide for the maximum local autonomy for distinctive groups consistent with the special international status of the Jerusalem area, the Conciliation Commission is authorised to appoint a United Nations Representative who shall co-operate with the local authorities with respect to the interim administration of the Jerusalem area.

9. Resolves that pending agreement on more detailed arrangements among the Governments and authorities concerned the fairest possible access to Jerusalem by road, rail or air should be accorded to all inhabitants of Palestine and instructs the Conciliation Commission to report immediately to the Security Council for appropriate action by that organ, any attempt by any party to impede such access.

10. Instructs the Conciliation Commission to seek arrangements among the Governments and authorities concerned which will facilitate the economic development of the area including arrangements for access to ports and airfields and the

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I.19347/344.

use of transportation and communication facilities. In this connection the conclusions contained in part I Section VIII paragraph 4 (E) and (F) of the progress report of the United Nations Mediator should be taken into account.

11. Endorses the conclusions stated in part I Section VIII paragraph 4 (I) of the progress report of the United Nations Mediator in Palestine and resolves that the refugees wishing to return to their homes and live at peace with their neighbours should be permitted to do so at the earliest practicable date and that compensation should be paid for the property of those choosing not to return and for loss of, or damage to, property which under principles of International law or in equity should be made good by the Governments or authorities responsible and instructs the Conciliation Commission to facilitate the repatriation, resettlement and economic and social rehabilitation of the refugees and the payment of compensation and to maintain close relations with the Director of the United Nations relief for Palestine refugees and through him with the appropriate organs and agencies of the United Nations.

12. Authorises the Conciliation Commission to appoint such subsidiary bodies and to employ such technical experts acting under its authority as it may find necessary to the effective discharge of its functions and responsibilities under this resolution. The Conciliation Commission will have its official headquarters at Jerusalem. The Authorities responsible for maintaining order in Jerusalem will be responsible for taking all measures necessary to ensure the security of the Commission. The Secretary General will provide a limited number of guards for the protection of the staff and premises of Commission.

13. Instructs the Conciliation Commission to render progress reports periodically to the Secretary General for transmission to the Security Council and to members of the United Nations.

14. Calls upon all Governments and authorities concerned to co-operate with the Conciliation Commission and to take all possible steps to assist in the implementation of this resolution.

15. Requests the Secretary General to provide the necessary staff and facilities and to make appropriate arrangements to provide the necessary funds required in carrying out the terms of this resolution.

A/MIN. AND DEPT. OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS

MIN. AND DEPT. OF DEFENCE

7th December, 1948

CABLEGRAM.

EF/ME

AMENDED COPY

I. 19234.

DECRYPTER FROM:

Dated: 3rd, December, 1948.

AUSTRALIAN DELEGATIONS TO THE
UNITED NATIONS
PARIS.1720.
Rec'd: 4th, December, 1948.
9.00 a.m.RESTRICTED.

Amstel 319. Security Council 2nd December.

1. Security Council considered Israel's application for membership of United Nations. Shepstone's letter to the Secretary-General dated 29th November stated that the Independence of Israel was proclaimed on the 14th May 1948 by the National Council of Jewish people in Palestine "by virtue of the natural and historic right of the Jewish people to independence in their own sovereign state and in pursuance of the General Assembly resolution of 29th November 1947". Claimed Israel had been consolidated administratively and had successfully defended itself against the aggression of neighbouring states. Pointed to recognition of 19 powers and in view of "special nature" of application requested that consideration should proceed without regard to deadlines fixed by rule 60 paragraphs 1 to 4 but in conformity with rule 60 paragraph 5 of the Security Council's provisional rules of procedure.

2. United States strongly supported Israel's application and hoped for admission during the present session. Claimed Israel fulfilled all requirements under article 4 and asked that the Security Council's special membership Committee should report back later than 6th December.

3. The United Kingdom considered the application 'premature and rather doubtful'. Questioned need for haste particularly as other older established countries had been awaiting membership for two years. Stated that Israel was engaged in hostilities, there had been no elections, frontiers were not yet fixed, and it would be much better to await the resolution of the first Committee. Warned that the United Kingdom would move for deferment of application to special committee.

5. Soviet supported Israel's application claiming that Soviet attitude had consistently been based on decision of 29th November 1947 when Israel's territorial status clearly defined whereas other had departed from decision and suggested trusteeship and conciliation.

6. France and Canada supported normal method through special committee and said their attitude would be governed by resolution of first committee and Israel's reaction to it.

7. Syria bitterly attacked application.

8. Security Council referred application to special committee and decided to resume debate when committee's report received.

A/G Min & Dept of External Affairs.

6th, December, 1948.

" " " " " Defence.

paragraph 2 apparently omitted.

1912/1

CABLEGRAM.

JO/MB

I.19208

Dated 3rd December, 1948

0205

Recd. 3rd December, 1948

1245

DECRYPTER FROM -

The Australian Delegation
United Nations Organisation,
PARIS.

MOST IMMEDIATE.

Austdel. 316. For Burton.

RESTRICTED.Palestine.

The First Committee in the past two days has completed the debate on the working paper and begun voting on the substance.

2. At the conclusion of the debate yesterday we proposed Sub Committee to prepare single text with alternative paragraphs where necessary to form convenient basis in voting. This was rejected by 16 votes to 15. Canadian support which had been promised was not forthcoming.

3. As a result of this vote we proposed all substantial parts of the Australian resolution as amendment to the United Kingdom resolution. In the course of the debate we withdrew the provision regarding admission of Israel to the United Nations in consideration of objectives that vote on this which would in any case have been small affirmatively would prejudice favourable conclusion in Security Council to-day. As explained to-day, however, this was done without any surrender of principle and with the right to introduce separate proposal in this respect if Security Council discussion proved inconclusive.

4. Our amendments voted by paragraphs on roll call were rejected by votes averaging 12 in favour, 24 against, and 13 abstentions. New Zealand supported throughout with United States and Canada abstaining and United Kingdom and South Africa against.

5. As a result of the debate initiated largely by Australian amendments, voting to-day on operative parts of United Kingdom resolution led to unexpected results. All three clauses laying down directive for proposed Conciliation Commission as proposed by agreed United Kingdom-United States text were rejected, leaving nothing of substance in the United Kingdom resolution. United Kingdom have since approached us recognising they must make some advance towards our (and essentially United States) attitude with a view to the next step. This seems to us to be the appointment of Sub-Committee to establish powers of Commission in conformity with the principles of 1947 resolution and United Kingdom acquiescence in our view is to be impressed by them on United States to-night.

Dr. Burton

3rd December, 1948.

Handwritten notes: BAF, 9-14/12/48, JB

Mr. A.	
Mr. B.	
Mr. C.	
Mr. D.	
Mr. E.	
Mr. F.	
Mr. G.	
Mr. H.	
Mr. I.	
Mr. J.	
Mr. K.	
Mr. L.	
Mr. M.	
Mr. N.	
Mr. O.	
Mr. P.	
Mr. Q.	
Mr. R.	
Mr. S.	
Mr. T.	
Mr. U.	
Mr. V.	
Mr. W.	
Mr. X.	
Mr. Y.	
Mr. Z.	

CABLEGRAM. **SECRET.**

NER/BA

I.19135

Dated : 1st December, 1948.
2340Recd. : 2nd December, 1948.
1145

DECYPHERED FROM :

AUSTRALIAN DELEGATION
TO THE UNITED NATIONS,
PARIS.Austdel 309. SECRET.

Personal for Burton.

First Committee 30th November, 1948. Palestine.

Committee today made only fair progress in its discussion of the consolidated resolutions - covering the sections dealing with general principle and the conciliation committee. We spoke twice maintaining the position taken up in the resolution. United Kingdom called Commonwealth meeting at lunch time to indicate extent to which they were prepared to meet amendment of the United States. They have changed position almost completely and in effect accepted United States views on 29th November as basis for direct negotiations and compensation for Arab property with only minor verbal alterations. This is a complete somersault and flatly contradicts McNeill's assertion at the Commonwealth Meeting before the debate opened that United Kingdom would never change its position on Bernadotte report and regarded direct negotiations as wishful thinking. We had only a couple of hours warning of this fundamental switch which while bringing United Kingdom Resolution (United States amendments will now be withdrawn) so close to ours that differences are not important has left us in procedurally difficult position, specially in view of voting priority of United Kingdom Resolution. At the Minister's suggestion Mr. Beasley explained at the meeting our feelings as to tactics which had been employed. United Kingdom had not only misled us as to their intentions but had both privately and in the Committee misrepresented our approach. They then today proceeded to concur in virtually our approach without previously informing us. We were satisfactorily supported at the Meeting by New Zealand, Canada and South Africa will now support United Kingdom.

United Kingdom informed us tonight that they will probably press to have their resolution voted on first which will embarrass those delegations who prefer our approach. One chance both to establish our unambiguous wording and protect the position into which we have been put by the United Kingdom would be to get sub-committee to co-ordinate text.

A/Min. & Dept. E.A.

2nd December, 1948.

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191/2/11

Mr. E.A. Tamm	
Mr. Clegg	
Mr. Glavin	
Mr. Ladd	
Mr. Nichols	
Mr. Rosen	
Mr. Tracy	
Mr. Carson	
Mr. Egan	
Mr. Gurnea	
Mr. Hendon	
Mr. Pennington	
Mr. Quinn	
Mr. Nease	
Miss Gandy	

CABLEGRAM.

JO:HP

I.19015

DECYPTER FROM:

Dated: 29th November, 1948.
2230

THE AUSTRALIAN DELEGATION
TO THE UNITED NATIONS ASSEMBLY,
P.A.R.I.S.

Rec'd: 30th November, 1948.
12.45 p.m.

Austdel 298. Restricted.

First Committee 29th November.

Palestine.

Committee decided to take document produced by Working Group section by section without voting on proposals until procedure completed.

Section on withdrawal of troops completed with Eastern Group and Israel in favour and Arabs United Kingdom and United States opposed.

Section on general principles not completed. New Zealand(Fraser) made statement strongly supporting our approach.

Present progress marks conclusion of debate remote and we have been privately informed by United States that they may propose to prolong tomorrow night's meeting until debate is completed.

A/G. Min. & Dept. of External Affairs.
" " " " Defence.

30th November, 1948.

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JG:HP

I. 19389

SAVING FROM:

Dated: 26th November, 1948.

Saving

THE SECRETARY OF STATE
FOR COMMONWEALTH RELATIONS,
L O N D O N.Rec'd: 7th December, 1948.
11.5 a.m.

Secret.

Saving H. No. 306, Southern Rhodesia No. 203, Fire No. 81.

Purchase of Citrus Fruit from Palestine.

Question of United Kingdom purchases of citrus fruit from Palestine has been under urgent consideration here and contracts have just been signed with the Arabs for 220,000 to 255,000 boxes of citrus fruit and with the Jews for 3,125,000 to 3,825,000 boxes.

2. Last year we bought about 9 million cases of citrus fruit from Palestine, half from Jewish growers and half from Arab. In present circumstances some 85 per cent of fruit-growing areas are understood to be under Jewish control and only 15 per cent in Arab-held territory. Problem therefore arose as to how we should be able to ensure that our purchases from Jewish growers would not include large quantities of fruit from Arab-owned properties in Jewish hands, thereby appearing to condone improper acquisition of this fruit and, moreover, enabling Jews to profit from expulsion of Arab inhabitants. In transactions which have just been concluded every effort was made to safeguard Arab interests. We have bought maximum quantity Arabs could offer and are prepared to buy more, while we have also assisted them to obtain packing materials, indispensable to delivery of fruit. We have limited amount of fruit bought from Jews to less than known reduced capacity of Jewish groves (allowing for their small sales to certain European countries) and have expressly stipulated that contract is for fruit from Jewish-owned groves only. In addition to these safeguards Jews and Arabs have been kept fully informed of all moves and thus given ample opportunity to express their views.

3. Purchase of orange juice has been arranged with an Association of producers consisting of one Arab and nine Jewish firms. The Arab owner is voluntarily collaborating with Jews and Association is prepared to guarantee that no fruit from Arab-owned groves now in Jewish hands will be used.

4. (Dublin only). Please inform Fire authorities.

A/G. Min. & Dept. of External Affairs.
" " " " T. & C. (Canberra)
" " " " G. & A. (Canberra)
" " " " P.W.R.

Treasurer & Treasury.

7th December, 1948.

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Rec'd
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ML/jc

DECYPHER FROM

AUSTRALIAN DELEGATION
UNITED NATIONS ORGANISATION
PARIS.

I.18894
2325

Rec'd November 28, 1948
0900

AUSTDEL. 282.

Committee one 26th November Palestine.

The debate today was mainly procedural as to whether a sub-committee should be set up to consider the various proposals. Discussion was finally crystallised by Canadian suggestion that nations submitting resolutions or amendments should join in working group under chairmanship of rapporteur (Turkey) for purpose of setting out in one convenient document under main subject heading proposals which had been made.

Committee (Australia, Colombia, Guatemala, Poland, United States, United Kingdom, USSR, Syria) met this afternoon and will present consolidated text to full Committee tomorrow after further meeting in the morning. General discussion will then continue on rather more orderly basis. It is still likely that actual drafting sub-committee will be final answer.

ACTING MIN AND DEPT E.A.
MIN AND DEPT DEFENCE
November 29, 1948

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Mr. L.	
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Mr. H.	
Mr. I.	
Mr. J.	
Mr. K.	
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Mr. N.	
Mr. O.	
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Mr. Q.	
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Mr. W.	
Mr. X.	
Mr. Y.	
Mr. Z.	

CABLEGRAM.

MC 2' NB.

I. 18921.

DECYPHER FROM:

Dated : 27th. November, 1948.
1731.AUSTRALIAN DELEGATION
TO THE UNITED NATIONS
PARIS.Rec'd : 28th. November, 1948.
11.00. a.m.RESTRICTED.

Austdel 286 First Committee 27th November Palestine

Owing to prolonged meetings of Plenary on Four Power resolution on Greece First Committee did not meet today. Working group set up yesterday had further and final meeting to approve consolidation of resolutions. Document that has been produced will be most useful when full committee resumes work.

We took opportunity to hand to Secretariat small amendment to our resolution as follows - Insert in (3) of the terms of reference of the conciliation committee after the word "matters" the words "its recommendation".

This is destined to prevent a situation where Commission could not achieve negotiations and might then just report failure without indicating its views as to the proper course of action.

A/G Min & Dept of External Affairs
" " " " " Defence.

/ 29th. November, 1948.

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O. 16875.

Sent : 26th. November, 1948.
1705.

RESTRICTED

Your article of 26th part 2, Palestine.

Please advise whether you have any information on United Kingdom's intention.

29th November, 1948.

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I.18825
Dated 26th Nov. 1948
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Recd. 26th Nov. 1948
1400

DECYPHER FROM:

The Australian Delegation,
United Nations Assembly,
PARIS.

Austdel 276. Restricted.

First Committee. Palestine 24th-25th November.

Eighteen further speakers have taken part in general debate which is now closed. We have also had a rather confused statement from Eucche. Committee will now proceed to consideration of resolutions in detail.

Position is as follows. The United Kingdom have rejected the basic intention of the United States amendments to their resolution which laid greater stress on 29th November recommendations and direct negotiations. United Kingdom has submitted revised resolution incorporating some of the United States' amendments broadening the terms of reference of the proposed Commissions but omitting those on 1947 resolution and on compensation.

McNeil devoted some time to our resolution in his statement explaining revised United Kingdom text. Main burden of this criticism was not so much the fact that we used 1947 as basis but that we confined the Commission to a solution based on direct negotiation. He further suggested that our resolution was an attempt to allow the Committee to evade its proper responsibilities. If we made provision for the Assembly to consider the matter again and make final determination why do we seek to avoid this issue now? The same criticisms of course can be equally directed to United Kingdom proposals which envisage so far as we can see the working out of a plan by the Commission based on Bernadotte for presentation to the next Assembly.

It is not true to say that the functions of the Commission are restricted in our resolution. In the long run it is only by direct negotiation that any settlement will be lasting. The logic of events, the present position in Palestine and common sense, all point to the need for a real effort by the United Nations along these lines.

It is for this reason that developments both military and political point the way to negotiation rather than an imposed solution that it is our view that it is not practical for the Assembly to consider a final settlement now. It is not a matter of dodging responsibility but rather a matter of exhausting all reasonable means to reach a lasting and agreed settlement.

Other contributions have not been of much weight. Over the past two days the Committee has listened on 7 occasions to Representatives of the Arabs who have not broken any new ground except understandable argument that solving Jewish refugee problem by setting up of Israel is creating just as intractable an Arab refugee problem.

Identical fact will pointed to (1) Appearance of Germany in 1939
(2) Surrender in 1940
Would those have been right decisions?

CABLEGRAM.

2. I.16825

Actual future course of the debate is hard to predict but a Sub-Committee to consider the various propositions may come out of the confusion caused by the existence of formal resolutions from United Kingdom, United States, Australia, Guatemala, Colombia, Poland and U.S.S.R.

United States and United Kingdom are not unnaturally opposed to the setting up of a Sub-Committee, as to proceed now in the Committee itself to detailed consideration of the proposals made would give to the United Kingdom proposal the advantage of being taken first. As two thirds majority is not necessary here it might be possible for them to secure enough abstentions to prevent consideration of the proposals.

South Americans appear to favour our approach and Polish resolution is almost indistinguishable except that it incorporates proposal re withdrawal of forces, calls for setting up Arab State and re-introduces economic union.

After Bunche's statement we replied briefly to McNeill stressing positive aspects of the resolution.

This was followed by procedural debate as to the order in which proposals should be taken and latitude which speakers might have to refer to all proposals. Question of Sub Committee was mentioned but debate was adjourned without definite decision.

A. Min & Dept of E.A.
Min & Dept of Defence

27th November 1948.

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I. 18671.

TELEGRAM FROM:

Dated 23rd November, 1948.

AUSTRALIAN DELEGATION
TO UNITED NATIONS,
PARIS.1650
Rec'd 24th November, 1948.
9.00.

Immediate. Unclassified.

264. Following are extracts from statement on Palestine to be delivered this morning.

"What has happened in Palestine since the last regular session of the Assembly and particularly since the special session in April and May of this year gives the present Assembly an opportunity to take a definite step towards the ultimate settlement of this question. One thing that has become clear throughout the debates dealing with the Palestine question is that consistency in principle and resolution in maintaining the authority of general assembly decisions once they are arrived at offer the only chance of opening the way to a final and just settlement. Any departure from such ideas means uncertainty and strike a blow at the United Nations. The responsibility for the political settlement in Palestine is a matter for the exclusive determination of the Assembly which laid down the basis of such a settlement 12 months ago a basis which would have been accepted but by one party was not as the considered judgment of the United Nations derived from the report and recommendations of the Special Committee on Palestine on which very considerable energy was expended with a cost exceeding one million dollars. Moreover this Assembly is bound to recognise the outstanding fact which has emerged since the Assembly's recommendations in May of this year namely, the establishment of effective organisations of the Jewish State by every practicable test whether in respect of this capacity for self-defence its governmental organisation its control of all forms of administration within specified areas its voice before the Security Council and the Assembly itself the fact that the Government of Israel is a reality must by now be clearly apparent to all the world Count Bernadotte himself recognised this in the following terms.

"The Jewish State is a living solidly entrenched and vigorous reality. The provisional Government of Israel is today exercising without restrictions on its authority or power all the attributes of full sovereignty".

In the opinion of the general assembly the separation of Jewish territory from the rest of Palestine and its establishment as an independent state was an inescapable act of justice now that it has come into being even though some of the means used were not premeditated in this Assembly it cannot possibly be taken otherwise than as a development in full and strict conformity with the intention of the 1947 resolution which provided as follows:

"Independent Arab and Jewish states shall come into existence in Palestine two months after the evacuation of the armed forces of the Mandatory power has been completed but in any case not later than first October, 1948."

The proposals of this committee should therefore take into account the existence as an entirety of Israel by way of recommendation respecting its admission to the United Nations or in some other tangible manner this is also in strict accordance with the November resolution which said:

"When the independence of either the Arab or the Jewish state as envisaged in this plan has become effective sympathetic considerations should be given to its application for admission to Membership

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in the United Nations".

The 1947 plan was worked out in an atmosphere conducive to fair and reasonable conclusions. Should the whole issue now be re-opened afresh it would have to be dealt with in conditions distorted by military activities and warlike emotions on both sides and in the day-to-day fluidity of armed contest. The Committee has before it the report of the Mediator in Palestine. This is a sincere and valuable document and a tribute to the distinguished personal efforts of its originator it is however, quite erroneous to regard the mediators report as having been intended to supplement the 1947 resolution. We are satisfied that nothing was further from the Mediators intention. The Mediators work derived from the recommendations of the Special Assembly which itself was acting within the broad intentions of the 1947 resolution. There is nothing whatever in the Mediators report which was ever intended to or could result in setting aside the principles of the November resolution as the true reflection of the general will of the Assembly. On the contrary it recommended as a basis in strict conformity with the purpose of the 1947 resolution

(1). Political partition comprising a Jewish state and

(2). An international arrangement for the Government of Jerusalem.

All the Mediators suggestions deserve to be and will be taken account of through appropriate means but we should be entirely misled if we allowed them at this late stage and in the present disturbed conditions to displace the Assemblys original resolution which still stands unamended and of full binding significance.

Therefore we should not attempt now to make any recommendations especially as regards the boundaries of the Jewish state at variance with those contained in the 1947 resolution unless this is done with the agreement of the parties concerned it is however, the obligation of the committee to suggest means whereby any such agreement to vary the conditions can be facilitated if the circumstances make the changes a just one for this purpose starting from the two basic points of the maintenance of the intention of the 1947 resolution and the establishment of a Jewish state in accordance therewith our suggestion would be in respect of further provisions which might be included in an eventual resolution the establishment by the assembly of a commission of condiliation for Palestine with something like the following functions.

First of all, to assist and encourage the parties directly interested to enter at once into direct negotiations to replace the existing truce or an armistice by a permanent settlement. This settlement should be in conformity with the principles of the recommendation as regards boundaries contained in the resolution of 1947 but would also take into account amended territorial suggestions including those in the Mediators report.

Secondly, the Commission should operate on a long term basis as an agency to help in the furtherance of good relations between Israel the Arabs of Palestine and the neighbouring Arab states.

Thirdly, At the proper time the commission could appoint or act as a boundaries commission to draw up the final boundaries of the state of Israel in agreement with Israel and the neighbouring Arab peoples.

Fourthly, If there is no agreement as regards boundaries or if the commission should decide that justice in all the circumstances required if the commission should report at the next Assembly with a view to final determination.

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I. 18671.

It might be thought desirable to allot certain other functions to the commission as well such as to assist in economic adjustments, or to co-operate with other agencies and the Governments and peoples concerned in the long term re-settlement or repatriation of refugees from the Jewish held territory in this connection we have noted particularly the reference made by Mr. Shertok to the intention of the Israeli Government to give careful consideration to the repatriation of Arab refugees displaced from their homes in Palestine.

More especially it could be proper for such a commission to direct itself again in co-operation with the Governments concerned and with other organs of the United Nations such as the trusteeship council to the implementation of one of the most important parts of the assembly resolution of 1947 namely, that dealing with the status of Jerusalem and Bethlehem the principles of the assembly resolution last year in respect of Jerusalem and Bethlehem had the whole hearted assent then of nearly every country and the same is no doubt the case also this year. Here is a clear obligation on the part of the Assembly to proceed further with a measure which is of the deepest concern to religious conviction throughout the world.

This Assembly is bound to recognise the 1947 resolution as not only being in force but also as being just in principle and indeed far more in keeping with the practicable realities of the present situation in Palestine (including the military realities that had been anticipated.

Although circumstances have made attainment of full economic union in Palestine unlikely at least for the time being, we believe that the logic of events will inevitably force acceptance by both parties of the close economic collaboration essential to mutual well being it is not our view that acceptance of the Bernadotte plan would either increase or reduce the economic interdependence of the various parts of Palestine and of the Middle East generally or that the original partition plan is invalidated and made impracticable by deferment of the implementation of that part of the original partition plan dealing with economic union. It is obvious that the entire subtraction of the Negev from the state of Israel, would greatly impasse the availability of the new state.

It is in the belief that the ultimate best interests of Palestine will be best served by adherence to the United Nations decision arrived at last year that I should urge now that there should be no turning back in principle from that decision and that this Assembly should lay a clear injunction on both parties to abandon sterile antagonism and to pay heed to the force of judgment and opinion which the assembly recommendation represents in this respect no hint is to be aimed either by continued attitudes of defiance of the authorities of the United Nations decision on the part of the Arabs in Palestine and the Arab States themselves or by any disposition on the part of the new state of Israel by selecting the most advantageous aspects of all proposals to forget the immense debt they owe to the United Nations by virtue of last November's resolutions which sanctioned its very existence the Jews have expected and have received justice at the hands of the assembly of United Nations they must also do justice.

The November resolution of the assembly won almost world wide acceptance largely because of the constructive solution of the special problem of Jerusalem and the Holy places support for the Assembly resolution reflected the deepest feelings of the centres of religious devotion in the world in this respect the plan for Jerusalem and the Holy places was and remains a cardinal feature of the assembly recommendation.

In its application to Jerusalem and Bethlehem and the Holy places of Palestine the November resolution must also be maintained in

CABLEGRAM.

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I. 18671.

fundamental principle these places cannot be said to be the exclusive property of Jews or Arabs Christians or non Christians last year the delegations particularly of Australia and France not only drew specific attention to the International nature of this problem but put forward positive proposals relating to the safeguarding inter alia of the Christian churches which were accepted and we do not intend to abandon the principle then expressly stated and supported by us. Jerusalem and the Holy places engage not only the sentiments but the sacred interests of the great mass of mankind this concept has been eloquently expressed in a recent encyclical letter of His Holiness the Pope as follows:

"It would be expedient as a better guarantee for the safety of the Sanctuaries under the present circumstances to give an international character to Jerusalem and its vicinity where so many and so precious reminders of the Life and Death of Our Saviour are to be found it is also necessary to ensure with international guarantee both the rights of free access to the Holy places scattered throughout Palestine and the freedom of Religion and the respect for customs and religious traditions".

In the settlement for Palestine there should be recognition not only of the international concern for the protection of (§) for many hundreds of millions of people and sacred interests but also of the ultimate well being of both peoples in the whole territory concerned.

This can be served in the long term view ^{only} by the co-operation of both as was contemplated in part in the assembly resolution of last year in all matters affecting their social cultural and economic interests. If the two parties can find their way to such co-operation beginning possibly with direct negotiations under the auspices of the United Nations here in Paris they may be sure that they will have behind them the wholehearted goodwill of all countries represented in the committee.

A/G. Min. & Dept. E.A.

Min. & Dept. Defence.

24th November, 1948.

Why should the 1947 Resolution work any better during the coming 12 months than it has in the past 12 months?

CABLEGRAM.

JEM/L.

I.18635/37.

Dated: 23rd November, 1948

0045.

Rec'd: 23rd November, 1948.

1445.

D. CYRIL FROM:

AU THIRTEEN DELEGATION TO THE UNITED NATIONS.

P A R I S .RESTRICTED.

Austdel 261. First Committee. Palestine.

United States (Jeso) made preliminary statement reserving opportunity to speak again at later stage. Expressed United States desire to see peoples of Near East reconciled either through direct discussions or with help from United Nations. United States had supported November 1947 Resolution as fair and reasonable settlement but when inadequacy apparent supported appointment of mediator. Noted impartial and persistent efforts of Security Council to maintain truce and support of parties concerned in limiting extent of the fighting. Considered wise Bunche's statement of need for assurance that neither party will again resort to force and desire to have position of the United Nations on major issues clear while leaving to parties the burden of peaceful adjustment. Expressed support for general principles contained in 7 basic premises of report. Confident state of Israel will continue remarkable progress in firm establishment of Governmental institutions, growth of Economy and Resettlement of Immigrants. Hopes Security Council will soon recommend Israel for Membership. At moment considers further agreement required before attempts to settle boundaries. Conciliation Commission should do this but approves claims of Israel to Boundaries set out in November 1947 Resolution. Any proposed reductions should be fully acceptable to Israel. If Israel desires, additions would be necessary to negotiate appropriate exchange. Supports principle of geographical homogeneity. Believes mediator's report provides basis for renewed efforts for peaceful adjustment of differences. Refugees should be permitted to return to their homes and compensation given for property of those choosing not to do so. City of Jerusalem should be accorded special treatment. Careful consideration required regarding guarantees with respect to boundaries and human rights.

Giving careful consideration to United Kingdom Draft Resolution containing positive and constructive elements bringing solution substantially nearer. May not be able to accept on all particulars. Will try to present more specific suggestions without delay.

South Africa. Bernadote proposals unacceptable to both parties. Efforts of Assembly might be directed to getting Parties together. Will not take part in dispute, not make its de facto recognition de jure at this stage. Peace cannot be restored by the imposition of a settlement, genuine conciliation needed.

China. New solutions wanted partition plan predicated on Economic Union which at present not possible. Feit accompli not necessarily always to be accepted by Jewish claims cannot be overlooked. Not prepared at present to discuss specific proposals but will support Mediator's

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idea that Conciliation Commission should be established. Arab refugees should have right to return to homes and those not returning should receive compensation. Arrangements for Jewish immigration should be written into the Settlement. No solution possible if both parties unwilling to co-operate and if both prepared to resort to force.

Copy of United States will be forwarded by air.

U.S.S.R. made statement which indicates that they will give full support to November 29th Resolution. Canada's statement was not of a firm character but is likely to lend support to general line we are following. We are to speak first to-morrow morning 23rd November to the following resolution which will be put in simultaneously.

New Zealand tonight indicated would support Resolution which in main points is natural development of policy first laid down in 1947 Resolution. Principal features of Resolution seem likely to have support of United States as discussion develops. Present indications are general approach on broad basis of 1947 Resolution with provision for conciliation and negotiation between 2 parties direct appears to be in line with the view of substantial number of Delegations besides those mentioned. Presentation of Resolution should do much to assist Debate and help early conclusion.

--OC--

A/C Min and Dept E.A.
" " " Defence.

23rd November, 1948;

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I.18643
 Dated 22nd November, 1948
 2325
 Rec'd. 22nd November, 1948
 1635 hours.

JSH:JSH

CYPRER FROM

THE AUSTRALIAN DELEGATE TO UNITED NATIONS,
PARIS.

AUSDEL 261. (PART 2) RESTRICTED.

Draft resolution submitted by Australia
to establish Commission for Conciliation for Palestine.

The General Assembly, having in mind the resolution of the General Assembly on the future Government of Palestine of 29th November, 1947.

Taking note also of resolution 186(3/11) of 14th May, 1948, providing for the appointment of the United Nations Mediator in Palestine and of the resolution of the Security Council of 15th November, 1948 calling for the negotiation of an armistice in Palestine, and having considered the progress of the United Nations Mediator of 16th September, 1948 (A/548 Part 1).

Being of opinion that the Assembly's resolution of 29th November, 1947, is the basic starting point of settlement by the Assembly of the Palestine question.

Being further of opinion that the final settlement in Palestine as regards boundaries should be in conformity with the principles of the recommendation contained in the Assembly resolution of 29th November, 1947 but should also take into account subsequent proposals including those in the Mediators report.

Noting the establishment since 15th May, 1948 of Civil and Military authority under the provisional Government of Israel over substantially the area which, under the resolution of 29th November, 1947, was recognised as eliminating the Jewish State in Palestine envisaged in that resolution.

Noting further that the establishment of a provisional Government of Israel and the exercise by it of autonomous defence and administrative functions is in conformity with the spirit and intention of the resolution of 29th November, 1947 and that this Government has been described by the Mediator as "A living solidly entrenched and vigorous reality".

Requests the Security Council to give sympathetic consideration to an application for the admission of the State of Israel to the United Nations if and when such application will be submitted.

Establishes a Commission of Conciliation for Palestine composed of not more than five members with the following functions:

To assist the interested parties to enter immediately into direct negotiations to reach a permanent settlement which shall include final designation of the boundaries...

191/2/1

CABLEGRAM.

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- 2 -

boundaries of the State of Israel and in relation to the rest of the area of Palestine shall take into account the wishes of the people therein.

(2) To promote good relations between the State of Israel, the Arabs of Palestine and the neighbouring Arab States.

(3) To appoint under its supervision, a boundaries Commission which shall draw up the final boundaries of the State of Israel in conformity with any agreement arrived at between that State, the neighbouring states concerned, and the people interested reporting in the event of failure to secure agreement between the parties on boundaries and related matters to the General Assembly with a view to final determination by the Assembly of the question.

(4) To consult with all Governments and parties concerned and with the Trusteeship Council in order to protect and preserve the spiritual and religious interests involved with a view to the carrying out of the plan for the future Government of Jerusalem and Bethlehem in conformity with the principles of the resolution of 29th November, 1947.

(5) To call into consultation all those organs and agencies of the United Nations which may assist in working out plans both for the resettlement of Palestinian refugees and displaced persons and for their repatriation where feasible in the areas from which they have come.

Requests the Commission to begin its functions at once with a view to the establishment of contact between the parties themselves and the commission at the earliest possible date.

Calls on the parties concerned to cooperate with the Commission in the discharge of its functions and of the purposes of this resolution.

Authorises the Secretary General to put at the disposal of the Commission such administrative and advisory staff and other facilities as may be required.

Syria, Guatemala Yamen and Poland (supporting U.S.S.R.) have also spoken.

Text of our statement only slightly amended was despatched by air bag on 19th November.

ADMIN & DEPT OF E.A.
MIN. & DEPT OF DEFENCE.

26th November, 1948.

CABLEGRAM.

I. 18582.

Dated: 22nd November, 1948.
0030.

Rec'd: 22nd November, 1948.
3.00.p.m.

We are making statement November 23rd along the general lines of maintaining the principle of the 1947 resolution and suggesting a Mediation Commission to help both parties to agree to final settlement broadly on that basis. This attitude is in line with Canada and New Zealand and many other delegations.

22nd November, 1948.

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PALESTINESTATEMENT BY AUSTRALIAN REPRESENTATIVE

What has happened in Palestine since the last regular Session of the Assembly, and particularly since the Special Session in April and May of this year, gives the present Assembly an opportunity to take a definite step towards the ultimate settlement of this question.

One thing that has become clear throughout the debates dealing with the Palestine question is that consistency in principle, and resolution in maintaining the authority of United Nations decisions once they are arrived at, offers the only chance of opening the way to a final and just settlement. Any departure from such ideas means uncertainty and strikes a blow at the United Nations.

Once again, in this present Session, it is the duty of the Political Committee to separate essentials from non-essentials in this problem and to bring out in the clearest possible form the considerations which will have a cardinal influence on peace and justice in the Near East and assist the authority of the United Nations.

This Committee must necessarily keep itself in touch with the developments that have arisen from the current handling by the Security Council of certain military and security aspects of the question. The Council has taken specific steps towards the negotiation of an armistice. Should this be brought about in the near future, it would provide a very different background for this Committee's discussions from that which has existed, and the Committee would naturally wish to take every advantage of such a development.

→ M. F.

191/2/1

However, the responsibility for the political settlement in Palestine is a matter for the exclusive determination of the Assembly, which laid down the basis of such a settlement twelve months ago; a basis which should have been accepted, but by one party was not, as the considered judgment of the United Nations derived from the report and recommendations of the Special Committee.

The Committee's starting point should be the decision of the Assembly, which has not been altered and which retains full force and effect.

Moreover, this Assembly is bound to recognise the outstanding fact which has emerged since the Assembly's recommendations in May of **this year** - namely, the establishment *de facto* of the Jewish State. By every practical test, whether in respect of its capacity for self-defence, its governmental organisation, its control of all forms of administration within specified areas, its voice before the Security Council and the Assembly itself, the fact that the Government of Israel is a reality must by now be clearly recognised by everybody. Count Bernadotte himself recognised this in the following terms:-

"... the Jewish State is a living, solidly entrenched and vigorous reality The Provisional Government of Israel is today exercising, without restrictions on its authority or power, all the attributes of full sovereignty."

No purpose is to be served by allowing such a fact to lie hidden in the background. On the contrary, there is a definite and tangible advantage to be had from explicitly bringing it into the foreground and considering other aspects of the question in relation to it.

The proposals of this Committee should, therefore, take into account the existence as an entity of Israel, either

by way of recommendation respecting its admission to the United Nations or in some other manner. Taking this as a starting point, it is clear that the establishment of a Jewish State in Palestine is a direct consequence, and an intended consequence, of the General Assembly resolution on Palestine of 29th November, 1947.

It is true that certain parts of that resolution intimately connected with the creation of a Jewish State could not be carried into effect, largely because of the attitude of the Arab States. None the less, the establishment of a separate Jewish State in Palestine is an essential part, and in the minds of many delegations, the essential part, of the intention of the 1947 resolution.

In the opinion of the General Assembly, the separation of Jewish territory from the rest of Palestine and its establishment as an independent State was an inescapable act of justice. Now that it has come into being, even though some of the means used were not premeditated in this Assembly, it cannot possibly be taken otherwise than as a development in full and strict conformity with the intention of the 1947 resolution.

The principles of the 1947 resolution were in no way affected during the Special Session earlier this year, which rejected an attempt to undermine its previous decision by a proposal of trusteeship. On the contrary, the November resolution was the implied basis of the procedure for mediation which that Assembly set up. To give any thought to setting it aside now would only lead to confusion of purpose, and occasion doubt as to the determination of the United Nations to follow through consistently a line which it has decided for itself

after the fullest consideration.

Furthermore, the 1947 plan was worked out in an atmosphere conducive to fair and reasonable conclusions. Should the whole issue now be reopened afresh, it would have to be dealt with in conditions distorted by military activities and warlike emotions on both sides, and in the day to day fluidity of armed contact.

The Committee has before it the report of the Mediator in Palestine. This is a sincere and valuable document and a tribute to the distinguished personal efforts of its originator. None the less, it has to be interpreted in its proper perspective. The Mediator's work derived from the recommendations of the Special Assembly, which itself was, as I have said, acting within the broad intention of the 1947 resolution. There is nothing whatever in the Mediator's report which could result in setting aside the principles of the November resolution as the true reflection of the general will of the Assembly. On the contrary, it recommended as a basis, first, political partition, comprising a Jewish State, and, second, an international arrangement for the government of Jerusalem. The Mediator's proposals deserve to be, and will be, taken account of through appropriate means, specially in respect of boundaries, but we should be entirely misled if we allowed them at this late stage and in the present disturbed conditions to displace the Assembly's original resolution.

Therefore, we should not attempt now to make any recommendations, especially as regards the boundaries of the Jewish State, at variance with those contained in the 1947 resolution, unless this is done with the agreement of the parties concerned. It is, however,

the obligation of the Committee to suggest means whereby any such agreement to vary the conditions can be facilitated if the circumstances make the change a just one. For this purpose, starting from the two basic points of recognition of the establishment of a Jewish State and of maintenance of the intention of the 1947 resolution, our suggestion would be, in respect of further provisions which might be included in an eventual resolution, the establishment by the Assembly of a Commission of Mediation and Boundaries, with something like the following functions:-

First of all, to assist and encourage the interested parties in Palestine to enter at once into direct negotiations to replace the existing truce or an armistice by a permanent settlement. This settlement should be in conformity with the principles of the recommendation as regards boundaries contained in the resolution of 1947, but would also take into account amended territorial proposals, including those in the Mediator's report.

Secondly, the Commission should operate on a long-term basis as an agency to help in the furtherance of good relations between Israel and the neighbouring Arab States.

Thirdly, at the proper time the Commission could appoint or act as a Boundaries Commission to draw up the final boundaries of the State of Israel in agreement with Israel and its immediate neighbours.

Fourthly, if there is no agreement as regards boundaries, or if the Commission should decide that justice in all the circumstances required it, the Commission should report to the next Assembly, with a view to final determination.

It might be thought desirable to allot certain other functions to the Commission as well, such as to assist in economic adjustments or to co-operate with other agencies and the Governments concerned in the long-term resettlement or repatriation of refugees from the Jewish-held territory. In this connection we have noted particularly the reference made by Mr. Shertok to the intention of the Israeli Government to give careful consideration to the repatriation of Arab refugees displaced from their homes in Palestine.

More especially, it might be proper for such a Commission to direct itself, again in co-operation with the Governments concerned, and with other organs of the United Nations, such as the Trusteeship Council, to the implementation of one of the most important parts of the Assembly's resolution of 1947, namely, that dealing with the status of Jerusalem and Bethlehem. The principles of the Assembly's resolution last year in respect of Jerusalem and Bethlehem had the whole-hearted assent then of nearly every country and the same is, no doubt, the case also this year. Here is a clear obligation on the part of the Assembly to proceed further with a measure which is of the deepest concern to religious conviction throughout the world.

To sum up, Australia feels that this Assembly is bound to recognise the 1947 resolution as not only being in force, but also as being just in principle and, indeed, far more in keeping with the practical realities of the present situation in Palestine, including the military realities, than had been anticipated. Secondly, we consider that this Assembly should not attempt to lay down at present any amended plan of boundaries in Palestine except by consent. If we tried to do this, many differences of detail would prolong our discussions indefinitely and these would all,

in any event, have to be gone over again in the event of the direct negotiations between the parties which we hope the Assembly will strongly enjoin on both sides.

Finally, we propose that the interests of the United Nations will be most efficiently maintained, and the positive co-operation of both parties in Palestine most effectively promoted, by the setting up on the part of the Assembly of a small Commission of Mediation and Boundaries, of which the terms of reference would be as flexible as possible, but which would have regard to what is common sense; that is to say that the Arab States now have a political entity in the State of Israel to negotiate with. These suggestions derive from our opinion that there exists room for conciliation and agreement between the parties concerned.

Although circumstances have made attainment of full economic union in Palestine unlikely, at least for the time being, we believe that the logic of events will inevitably force acceptance by both parties of the close economic collaboration essential to mutual well-being. It is not our view that acceptance of the Bernadotte plan would either increase or reduce the economic interdependence of the various parts of Palestine, and of the Middle East generally, or that the original partition plan is invalidated and made impracticable by deferment of the implementation of that part of the original partition plan dealing with economic union. An essential part of the original plan, however, was that the Jewish State should have at least a reasonable prospect of standing on its own feet economically. The adoption of proposals such as those of the Mediator would, by the subtraction of Negeb from the Jewish State, greatly impair the ability of that

State to achieve a workable economy.

We would be the first to hope that the Security Council will succeed in its endeavours to promote peace in Palestine through an armistice, and we would agree with the representative of the United Kingdom that the degree of success of one organ of the United Nations must be affected by that of another. At the same time, support for this contention does not lead logically, as suggested by the United Kingdom delegate, to disposing the General Assembly towards support of the Bernadotte plan. The Security Council should not exercise its authority to take action tending to lend to the Bernadotte plan the strength of a fait accompli. Having in view the only existing and endorsed plan of settlement for Palestine, the Security Council should have taken, and this Committee should now take, the resolution of 1947 as its basic starting point.

It is in the belief that the ultimate best interests of Palestine will be best served by adherence to the United Nations decision arrived at last year that Australia urges now that there should be no turning back in principle from that decision, and that this Assembly should lay a clear injunction on both parties to abandon sterile antagonism and to pay heed to the force of judgment and opinion which the Assembly's recommendation represents. In this respect, nothing is to be gained either by continued attitudes of defiance of the authority of the United Nations decision on the part of the Arabs in Palestine and the Arab States themselves, or by any disposition on the part of the new State of Israel to profit by the most advantageous aspects of all proposals, forgetting the immense debt they owe to the United Nations by virtue of last November's resolution which sanctioned its very existence.

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19.11.48

CABLEGRAM. **SECRET.**

NFR:EGM:

I. 18530

DECYPHER FROM:

Dated: 19th November 1948

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HIGH COMMISSIONER'S OFFICE,
LONDON.

Rec'd: 21st November 1948

0900

SECRET.

4131.

Addressed External number 4131 repeated Paris 21, secret from Mighell.

At High Commissioner's meeting today the following points were discussed.

1. Germany.

Mr. Mayhew said that following the Western Powers reply to Evatt-Lie note on Berlin, The United Kingdom had learned that President of the Security Council is pursuing further exploratory negotiations. It was also stated confidentially that the United Kingdom with other Western Powers is working out terms of what it is hoped would be generally acceptable currency programme for Berlin should the blockade be lifted and is considering terms of an announcement to calm Russian fears of black market currency deals damaging their economy in any interim period between the lifting of the blockade and the introduction of currency reforms.

On the question of elections for Berlin City Assembly on 5th December, United Kingdom has decided to allow the elections to take place although the exclusion of the Soviet zone may give rise to difficulties in the new Assembly.

2. Palestine.

While waiting for reply to Security Council note of November 13th the United Kingdom is seeking collaboration of United States in support of Bernadotte proposals. United States is expected to move amendments by which Conciliation Commission will encourage direct negotiations between Jews and Arabs on frontier question instead of laying down frontier limits. Meanwhile Arab Governments are thought to be gradually reaching acquiescence to settlement proposals but in view of Jews militant attitude, pressure is constant on the United Kingdom Government to meet obligations under Transjordan Treaty in the event of Jewish "attack" on Transjordan. When Mr. Mayhew stated that truce had worked entirely to the advantage of the Jews and that large quantities of arms and planes had been received by them from Czechoslovakia, the High Commissioner for Pakistan said he understood armoured cars from United States had also been received by the Jews. Mayhew thought this most unlikely.

Closing the discussion Mayhew said that any fresh proposals were likely to encourage Jews to go further and profit by settlement delay as they had after delay in implementation of the Bernadotte Plan. Solution to the problem in his view depended on us taking a firm stand and refusing any form of financial and economic support to the Jews. Under which pressure he thought that Jewish attitude might change very rapidly.

CABLEGRAM.

I. 18405.

Dated: 17th November, 1948.

Rec'd: 18th November, 1948.

Secret.

First Committee 17th November, 1948. Palestine.

Debate in Committee was confined to long statement by Iraq and Syria which added nothing new. We are not likely to speak before Friday when position will be clearer and no decision yet made as to whether resolution will be put in supporting 19th November resolution as basis for direct negotiation between parties under United Nations supervision. This will in any case be our line. Deviations therefrom whether along lines of Bernadotte report or not should be subject to agreement of parties.

18th November, 1948.

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to paragraph 3 (111) namely to add at the end of the paragraph the words "which is to be applied to the Galilee Area" rejected by 3 for (Belgium, China, Syria) with 8 abstentions. Paragraph 3(111) then adopted by 8 for, with 3 abstentions. Paragraphs 3(17) and (V) adopted by 8 for, one against (Syria) and 2 abstentions (Slavs).

E.A.

18th November 1948.

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MD:MC

I. 18311.

DECYPHER FROM:

Dated 16th November, 1948.

AUSTRALIAN DELEGATION
TO UNITED NATIONS
PARIS.

1900
Rec'd 17th November, 1948.
9.35.

Austdel.230. Unclassified.

1st Committee 15th November, 1948.

Palestine.

Committee heard Arab higher committee and preliminary statements from Syria and Egypt. No new ground was covered, Arabs adopting the usual uncompromising anti partition line. Both parties appear to be strongly opposed to the suggestions of the Mediators report.

E.A.
DEFENCE.

17th November, 1948

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DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS.

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DECRYPTER TO:

AUSTRALIAN DELEGATION
TO UNITED NATIONS,
PARIS.

O. 16124.

Dated 12th November, 1948.

14.30.

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UNF. 74. Restricted. Your Ausdel 161. Para.3.

Please confirm figures on appropriation for U.N. -
Mission for Palestine. Would appreciate fuller information
on this item.

E.A.(852/14).
Treasury.

12th November, 1948

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Note for 191/2/1

"Testament of Bernadotte"

An excellent summary of
the Palestine question up to
Sept. 1948, appearing in
Economist of 25th September

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MD:MG

DECRYPTER TO:

AUSTRALIAN HIGH COMMISSIONER
L O N D O N.

O. 16105.

Dated 11th November, 1948.

5.30.

Secret. Palestine. 4442.

Paragraph 3 of your 3948.

1. You should bring to the attention of the Secretary of State for Commonwealth Relations our previous communications relating to the provision of arms to the parties involved in the Palestine dispute and re-state our view that it would be most unfortunate if the United Kingdom were unilaterally to lift the arms embargo imposed as result of Security Council decision.

2. You should inform him that in our view the stage has been reached when a Boundary Commission should be appointed to negotiate a settlement of territorial differences. Such Commission would take the previous Assembly Resolution as its basis, taking account also of Bernadotte's tentative proposals. The Commission would be empowered to accept any change in existing proposals agreed to by the parties. In the event of no agreement being reached by both parties the proposed Boundary Commission might recommend to a future session of the General Assembly any changes which it considered necessary in the territorial positions proposed in the Assembly's Resolution and Bernadotte's proposals. The acceptance of the above proposals leading to the establishment of territorial limits of Jewish and Arab States, recognised and guaranteed by the United Nations, might be an immediate powerful influence in averting further armed conflict.

3. Early recognition of a Jewish State would assist such a proposal. A firmly established Jewish State may exercise considerable stabilising influence in the Middle East at the present time.

4. We would appreciate an indication of United Kingdom's reaction to the above proposals.

A/Min. & Dept. E.A. (UN. 852/10/11).

12th November, 1948

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I.18031
Dated 10th Nov. 1948
2230
Recd. 11th Nov. 1948
1430

DECYPHER FROM:

The Secretary of State for
Commonwealth Relations,
LONDON.

E.449. Confidential.

Palestine. Oil Supplies via Haifa.

French Government recently approached United States and United Kingdom Governments with suggestion that operation of oil pipeline to Haifa from Iraq might be resumed. The object of this suggestion was to assist E.R.P. by obtaining oil from non-dollar source.

2. Both United Kingdom and United States Governments agreed to proposal in principle and it was decided that a joint United Kingdom-French approach should be made to Jewish and Iraqi authorities to be followed in each case by similar United States approach. United Kingdom Ambassador in Bagdad has now been instructed to take action on these lines in consultation with his French and United States colleagues.

3. Proposals are on following lines:-

- (1) Pipeline to be re-opened for export of crude oil though refinery to remain closed.
- (2) Flow of crude oil through port to be controlled by daily check of quantity pumped through a pumping station (to be nominated by Iraqi Government against tanker bills of lading at Haifa).
- (3) Refinery to be isolated by removing sections of all connecting pipelines.
- (4) Maximum holding of crude oil at Haifa to be limited to 40,000 tons.
- (5) Neutral firm of inspectors to be employed to supervise and undertake check outlined in sub-paragraph (2) above.

4. Although we have readily consented to these measures we doubt whether Iraqi Government will be ready to accept proposals. They might claim that system and checks envisaged at paragraph 3 above could not prevent Jews from seizing working stock of 40,000 tons of crude oil by a simple breach of the projected agreement. Iraqi Government might also not feel confident that United Nations could take any effective measures in the event of such action by Jews. Jewish Authorities on the other hand have already informally assured French Government that they would agree to scheme if it is proposed; this may however be a tactical move and they might prove more exacting when final proposals are made to them.

A. Min & Dept of E.A.
Min & Dept of Defence
Treasurer & Treasury
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Min & Dept of C & A (Canb)
P.W.R.

11th November 1948.

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I. 17947.

DECRYPTER FROM:

Dated: 9th November, 1948.
2358.THE AUSTRALIAN DELEGATION
TO THE UNITED NATIONS,
PARIS.Rec'd: 10th November, 1948.
0100.

Austdel 193.

Your 892.

RS fin

I think that a telegram should be sent from Australia. In addition I think that the Bernadotte plan as starting point is quite out of the question and that basis of territorial settlement must be the existing Assembly Resolution of last year. The proper course would be to appoint a Boundary Commission which taking the Assembly Resolution as the basis also takes account of Bernadotte's resolutions (which were tentative in any event) and any other recommendations with the proviso imposed on the Boundary Commission to accept any change agreed by interested parties and if not so agreed to recommend any changes to the future assembly. In the meantime the state of Israel would have to be recognised. The success of the Israel army have been very considerable if approach mentioned herein were adopted there is no real reason why state should not be a stabilizing influence in Middle East.

A/Minister and Department of External Affairs.

NA B
10th November, 1948.

191/2/1

Successes due to systematic and comprehensive breaches of the truce - in the matter of importation of armaments - while supplies to Arab forces from normal source - UK - have been suspended. See Q174 and Q175. A poor basis for recognition.

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DEUTHER PRON

Dated 26th November, 1948

THE HIGH COMMISSIONER'S OFFICE,
S.O. 1 P.O. K.Recd. 26th November, 1948
0900Addressed Canberra 3948 repeated Australian Delegate
to the United Nations NY. For Bosley from Duffy. Secret.

At High Commissioners meeting this morning it was announced that revised corrected copies of minutes of Prime Ministers meeting would be forwarded shortly to the Commonwealth Governments.

2. Recommendation from Home Secretary is at present before the King that High Commissioners would henceforth rank with Foreign Ambassadors and have the title of Excellency. Foreign Government will be informed when the King's approval has been given.

3. CURRENT:

In present stalemate on Berlin question in Security Council Trygve Lie is now taking initiative in working out system of quadripartite currency control for Berlin for presentation to Four Powers. Examination will also be made by United Nations Secretariat of reasons for failures in practice of directive of 20th August. Secretary of State expressed doubts as to whether United Nations Secretariat solutions on currency use would be practicable without calling in currency experts from Berlin which again would necessitate negotiation and might well lead to new stalemate. United Kingdom Government were confident about morale in Berlin and ability of airlift to carry on through the winter.

Copies of United Kingdom draft Statute for control of Ruhr to be discussed at meeting this month by Western Powers and Ruxlux countries will be forwarded by air bag.

In regard to new police organisations in Soviet zone it was stated that since July 50,000 have been organised and trained in light arms. It was not thought that this force was equipped with tanks or artillery. Besides this special force it was estimated that there were between 100,000 to 200,000 other police in Soviet zone.

4. PALESTINE:

Secretary of State emphasised gravity of situation in Palestine and possibility of Jews proceeding to further attacks on Jerusalem area or even attempting seizure of Palestine. United Kingdom Government was under considerable pressure to assist Arabs under terms of treaty with Transjordan and stage might be reached where United Kingdom might have to consider lifting of arms embargo.

5. INDONESIA:

United Kingdom Government is hopeful that Dutch Foreign Ministers visit to Batavia and Djokjakarta will lead to resumption of negotiations and United Kingdom and United States Governments were strongly urging Dutch to reach early settlement.

Indian High Commissioner then said that according to his information Dutch had definite plans for commencing military action before 30th November, thereby hoping for "military solution" before monsoons set in. High Commissioners for India and Taylor urged United Kingdom to take still stronger action and

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questioned whether arms supplied to Netherlands for Western European defence were not being diverted to Indonesia or at least freeing existing Dutch stocks of arms for transfer there. Both India and Ceylon it was stated might be fit to take further action to prevent military supplies and personnel from using transit facilities. In this connection High Commissioners for India and Ceylon commended action taken in Australia to prevent delivery of war supplies to Indonesia.

ADMIN. AND DEPT. OF E.A.

25th November, 1948

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FF:HP

I.17744

DECRYPTER FROM:

Dated: 6th November, 1948.
1330AUSTRALIAN DELEGATION,
TO THE UNITED NATIONS,
P A R I S.Rec'd: 7th November, 1948.
9 a.m.Austdel 176. Security Council 4th November,
see immediately preceding telegram.Following is text of Resolution adopted by
Security Council -

"The Security Council -

1. Having decided on the 15th July that subject to further decision by the Security Council or the General Assembly the truce shall remain in force in accordance with the Resolution of that date and with that of 29th May, 1948 until a peaceful adjustment of the future situation of Palestine is reached.
2. Having decided on the 19th August that no Party is permitted to violate the truce on the ground that it is undertaking reprisals or retaliations against the other Party and that no Party is entitled to gain Military or Political advantage through violation of the truce, and,
3. Having decided on the 29th May that if the truce was subsequently repudiated or violated by either Party or by both the situation in Palestine could be reconsidered with a view to action under Chapter VII of the Charter.
4. Takes note of the request communicated to the Government of Egypt and the provisional Government of Israel by the acting mediator on the 26th October (S/1058) following on the Resolution adopted by the Security Council on 19th October, 1948, and
5. Calls upon the interested Governments without prejudice to their rights claims or position with regard to a peaceful adjustments of the future situation of Palestine or to the position which the members of the United Nations may wish to take in the General Assembly on such peaceful adjustment:
 - (1) To withdraw those of their forces which have advanced beyond the positions held on 14th October, the acting Mediator being authorised to establish provisional lines beyond which no movement of troops shall take place.
 - (2) To establish through negotiations conducted directly between the Parties or failing that through the intermediaries in the service of the United Nations permanent truce lines and such neutral or demilitarized zones as may appear advantageous in order to ensure henceforth the full observance of the truce in that area failing an agreement the permanent lines and neutral zones shall be established by decision of the acting mediator, and
6. Appoints a Committee of the Council consisting of the five permanent members together with Belgium and Colombia

/to.....

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to give such advice as the acting mediator may require with regard to his responsibilities under this Resolution and in the event that either Party or both should fail to comply with sub paragraphs (1) and (2) of the preceding paragraph of this Resolution within whatever time limits the acting Mediator may think it desirable to fix to study as a matter of urgency and to report to the Council on further measures it would be appropriate to take under Chapter VII of the Charter".

External Affairs.

8th November, 1948.

DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS.

OUTWARD TELEPRINTER MESSAGE.

MESSAGE NO. 1355. 8.11.48. 4.00..
TO SECRETARY DEPARTMENT OF DEFENCE MELBOURNE.
FROM SECRETARY DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS CANBERRA.
YOUR 1089 OF 4TH NOVEMBER. Q163 OF 2ND SEPTEMBER AIR MAILED
YOU BY REGISTERED POST TODAY MONDAY.
MSG ENDS. 4.00.
MESSAGE RECD OK TKS
THANKS

94/1

P.H.B - PND

191/2/1 Part III

8th November, 1948

SECRET.

MEMORANDUM for:

The Secretary,
Department of Defence,
Victoria Barracks,
St. Kilda Road,
MELBOURNE, S.C.I.

--- I refer to your teleprinter message No. 1089 of
--- 4th November and enclose copies of cablegrams Q163 and
Q158 which refer to the sources from which the Israeli
Government are said to have obtained aircraft and other
equipment. It is regretted that these were not made
available earlier and steps will be taken to keep you
informed of any further developments in this matter.

Secretary.

TELEPRINTER MESSAGE

MESSAGE NO. _____

TO ~~Secretary, Department of Defence, Melbourne.~~

FROM ~~Secretary, Department of External Affairs, Canberra.~~

ROUTE VIA _____

Your 1089 of 4th November. Q163 of 2nd September
air mailed you by registered post today Monday

DIVISION	APPROVED BY	DATE	FILE NO.	OPERATOR

DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS.

INWARD TELEPRINTER MESSAGE

D 1089

1416 4/11/1948

TO SECRETARY, DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS.

FROM SECRETARY, DEPARTMENT OF DEFENCE.

COULD COPIES OF CABLEGRAM Q163 OF 2ND SEPTEMBER REFERRED
TO IN CABLEGRAM Q174 OF 16TH OCTOBER FROM THE SECRETARY OF STATE
FOR COMMONWEALTH RELATIONS BE MADE AVAILABLE TO THIS DEPARTMENT
PLEASE?

MESSAGE ENDS

1417

191/2/1

Q175 Palestine Dated 29/10/1948

C.R.O. on Q TELEGRAMS FILE

CABLEGRAM

SECRET.

FF:MC

O. 15373.

DECYPHER TO:

Dated 27th October, 1948.

AUSTRALIAN DELEGATION
TO THE UNITED NATIONS,
PARIS.

8.25.

UNP.54. Palestine. Your Austdel 117. Secret.

It seems to us that the Assembly should concentrate its initial effort upon establishing formal peace in the terms of the first conclusion to Bernadotte's report. The continued presence of hostile armies in Palestine will inevitably lead the parties to contest by force of arms a political settlement which does not meet their full requirements. Urgent need therefore is for withdrawal and demobilisation, or the creation of demilitarized zones.

Assembly might also advise the Council under Article 10 that repeated instructions to cease fire, when the Council has already determined to employ sanctions in the event of further breaches of the peace, will gravely weaken the effect of similar reference to Chapter VII of the Charter which the Council may desire to make in the future.

E.A. (UN.852/10/11).

28th October, 1948

NA

191/113

191/2/1

Secretary	
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191/2/1.

22nd October, 1948

MEMORANDUM for:

The Secretary,
Department of Defence,
Victoria Barracks,
MELBOURNE, C.I.

I enclose herewith for your information a copy
of Q telegram No. 174. dated 18th October, 1948 , regarding
the expansion Israeli Forces in Palestine.

Secretary.

191/2/1

Q174 Top Secret Dated 18th October

Expansion of Jewish Air Force in Palestine
on Q telegrams File.

CABLEGRAM.

SECRET.

MAL/MB

1.16565

Dated 15th October, 1948

2100

Recd. 16th October, 1948

1000

DECYPHER FROM -

The Australian Delegation,
United Nations,
PARIS.

Austdel.83.

Committee 1 to-day began consideration of Palestine. Almost without discussion Committee agreed to allow Bunche (Acting Mediator) to sit at table and to allow representatives of Transjordan and provisional Government of Palestine to take part in debates without voting rights.

2. In general debate Sweden supported Bernadotte Plan. Bunche outlined Bernadotte's views and supported them. Syria and Lebanon attacked Jewish "atrocities".

3. Debate was spasmodic and general. United Kingdom, Poland and other members pointed out that no one wished to speak until parties directly concerned had expressed themselves. Israel was not ready to speak to-day and Committee therefore adjourned until Saturday or Monday, whichever date will find Shertok (Israel Foreign Minister) ready.

E.A.

16th October, 1948

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CABLEGRAM.

MAL/ET

O.14622

Dated : 12th October, 1948.
5.15 P.M.

ENCYIPHERED TO :

AUSTRALIAN DELEGATION
TO THE UNITED NATIONS ASSEMBLY,
PARIS.

UNP.34.

Our telegram No.30 of 7th October.

C.R.O. have advised that they do not propose to reply to telegram of Palestine-Arab Government since any acknowledgment might be taken as involving some measure of recognition. In the event of enquiries from the Press U.K. intend to state that message has been received, that no acknowledgment has been sent and that they do not intend to recognise this so called Government.

-----OO-----

E.A. (U.N. 351/12/5)

13th October, 1948.

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CABLEGRAM.

SECRET.

CW/LB.

I. 15901.

DECYIPHER FROM:

Dated: 1st October, 1948.
2140.THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR
COMMONWEALTH RELATIONS,
L O N D O N.Rec'd: 2nd October, 1948.
10.10.a.m.

H. 415. Confidential.

My telegram 22 nd September, H. 404.

Palestine.

It will have been seen that Arab Higher Committee have announced formation of a "Palestine Arab Government" under Ahmed Hilmi Pasha, previously Transjordan Military Governor in Jerusalem. This "Government" has established its Headquarters under Egyptian auspices at Gaza wither according to press reports, ex-mufti has proceeded. United Kingdom representatives in Baghdad and Cairo have been asked to take such action as they may find possible again to impress on Arab Leaders undesirable consequences of an increase of ex-mufti's influence.

2. We have reason to believe that many of the Arab Leaders are already convinced of dangers inherent in increase of ex-mufti influence, but that they feel themselves unable to go against the decision of political committee of Arab League.

Minister and Department of External Affairs.

" " " " Defence.

2nd October, 1948.

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DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS.

CABLEGRAM.

/LB.

I. 15382.

TELEGRAM FROM:

Dated: 30th September, 1948.
2210.AHMAD HILMI PASEA,
PREMIER /ND ACTING
FOREIGN SECRETARY,
CAIRO.Rec'd: 1st October, 1948.
8.30.p.m.

In virtue of the natural right of the people of Palestine for self determination, which principle is supported by the Charters of the League of Nations, the United Nations and others, and in view of the termination of the British Mandate over Palestine, which had prevented the Arabs from exercising their independence, the Arabs of Palestine, who are the owners of the country and its indigenous inhabitants, and who constitute the great majority of its legal population, have solemnly resolved to declare Palestine in its entirety and within its boundaries as established before the termination of the British Mandate, an independent state, and constituted a Government under the name of the all Palestine Government, deriving its authority from a representative council based on democratic principles and aiming to safeguard the rights of minorities and foreigners, protect the Holy Places and guarantee freedom of worship to all communities. I wish to take this opportunity to express to your Excellency the earnest desire of the all Palestine Government to establish relations of cordiality and co-operation with your country.

A/Minister and Department of External Affairs.

2nd October, 1948. *ND*

191/2/1

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191/2/1

28th September, 1948.

TOP SECRET

PERSONAL

My Dear High Commissioner,

I acknowledge with thanks the receipt of your letters (Ref. 2/149) dated 15th, 21st and 22nd September respectively regarding Count Bernadotte's proposals. I am communicating with Dr. Evatt regarding the matter.

Yours sincerely,

Prime Minister

The High Commissioner
for the United Kingdom in Australia,
CANBERRA. A.C.T.

DRAFT TELEGRAM TO AUSTRALIAN DELEGATION, PARIS

Date:

No:

Immediate.

Top Secret.

Personal for Minister from Burton.

You will have noted United Kingdom and United States comments on Count Bernadotte's proposals for Palestine.

United Kingdom have now approached us in the following terms:

"The United Kingdom Government are anxious that all Governments who, having studied Count Bernadotte's conclusions, find themselves in general agreement with them, should publicly express support for them. Such statements, besides increasing the chances that the conclusions will be rapidly and sympathetic considered by the Assembly, should serve to convince all parties in the Middle East that the majority of world opinion favours these conclusions, and should thereby help to influence both Arab and Jewish leaders towards acquiescence in any solution based on these conclusions which the United Nations may eventually adopt.

I have been asked to express the hope of the United Kingdom Government that, having studied Count Bernadotte's conclusions, the Australian Government will find themselves sufficiently in agreement to feel able also to issue a supporting statement."

Prime Minister would be glad to have your views as soon as possible.

Distribution: 191/2/1

Department of E.A.

JA/JL

27th September, 1948.

Authorised by.....



COMMONWEALTH OF AUSTRALIA.

CANDERRA.

With the Compliments

of the

Prime Minister

*Seen
M
23/9/48*

for Mr Bedman's personal



OFFICE OF THE HIGH COMMISSIONER
FOR THE UNITED KINGDOM
CANBERRA

TOP SECRET AND PERSONAL.

G.P.

Ref. 2/149

22nd September, 1948.

My dear Prime Minister,

With reference to my letter of the 21st September regarding Palestine, I have been asked to let you know that the United Kingdom authorities were informed that the United States Secretary of State proposed to issue a statement on Count Bernadotte's conclusions in Paris on the afternoon of the 21st September. I enclose the advance text of the statement which was communicated to the United Kingdom Government by the United States Delegation to the General Assembly. It is understood that Mr. Marshall has in fact made the statement.

2. The Foreign Secretary proposes to make a statement supporting Count Bernadotte's conclusions in the course of the Foreign Affairs debate in the House of Commons today, 22nd September. The gist of his proposed statement is also enclosed.

3. The United States and United Kingdom Representatives in Arab countries are being instructed to bring these statements to the notice of the Arab Governments, and to urge them, in the general interests of the Arabs, not to obstruct a solution for Palestine on the lines recommended by Count Bernadotte. The United Kingdom Government are giving similar advice to the Jews through such contacts as they have.

" The United Kingdom Government are anxious that all Governments who, having studied Count Bernadotte's conclusions, find themselves in general agreement with them, should publicly express support for them. Such statements, besides increasing the chances that the /conclusions

THE RIGHT HONOURABLE J.B. CHIFLEY, M.P.,
PRIME MINISTER OF THE COMMONWEALTH OF AUSTRALIA.



OFFICE OF THE HIGH COMMISSIONER
FOR THE UNITED KINGDOM
CANBERRA

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conclusions will be rapidly and sympathetically considered by the Assembly, should serve to convince all parties in the Middle East that the majority of world opinion favours these conclusions, and should thereby help to influence both Arab and Jewish leaders towards acquiescence in any solution based on these conclusions which the United Nations may eventually adopt.

5. "I have been asked to express the hope of the United Kingdom Government that, having studied Count Bernadotte's conclusions, the Australian Government will find themselves sufficiently in agreement to feel able also to issue a supporting statement."

Yours sincerely,

S E C R E T.

MAIN OUTLINES OF THE FOREIGN SECRETARY'S
PROPOSED STATEMENT.

After paying tribute to Count Bernadotte's great and disinterested services the Foreign Secretary will state that Count Bernadotte's proposals, like all proposals ever put forward for Palestine, can be criticised, but they take account of the realities of the Palestine situation and even if neither side welcomes them we must hope that both will acquiesce in them if backed by the full authority of the United Nations. The United Kingdom Government, after careful consideration, have decided that the conclusions considered as a whole, represent the best solution for all concerned and therefore support them wholeheartedly and without qualification. They announce this forthwith because of the grave dangers inherent in any delay in consideration of the proposals.

2. Mr. Bevin will then draw attention to two particular points in Count Bernadotte's conclusions -

- (i) His recommendation that the United Nations should attempt to meet Arab fears of a Jewish expansionism by specially guaranteeing frontiers of new States, and
- (ii) His suggestion that disposal of Arab Palestine should be left to the Arab States.

3. On (i) Mr. Bevin will express agreement; on (ii) he will express the view that since a separate Arab Palestine could not be viable, the United Nations should specifically endorse Count Bernadotte's recommendation that it should be incorporated in Transjordan. He will also support Count Bernadotte's plea for urgent consideration by the United Nations of the refugee problem.

4. Finally, Mr. Bevin will urge all parties in the Middle East to study proposals calmly and to acquiesce in them, and will undertake that United Kingdom influence will be fully exerted towards securing their implementation.

Office of the High Commissioner
for the United Kingdom,
CANBERRA.

22nd September, 1948.

SECRET.

ADVANCE TEXT OF STATEMENT BY THE UNITED STATES
SECRETARY OF STATE.

The United States considers that the conclusions contained in the final report of Count Bernadotte offer a generally fair basis for settlement of the Palestine question. My Government is of the opinion that the conclusions are sound and strongly urges the parties and the General Assembly to accept them in their entirety as the best possible basis for bringing peace to a distracted land.

No plan could be proposed which would be entirely satisfactory in all respects to every interested party. The United Nations has endeavoured to achieve a solution by peaceful adjustment and entrusted the task to its mediator, Count Bernadotte. He energetically, courageously and with a spirit of complete fairness, we feel, canvassed all the possibilities and proposed as his last contribution towards the world of peace a sound basis for settlement. He gave his life to this effort.

The complexities of the problem and the violent emotions which have been engendered are such that the details of any plan could be debated endlessly. As a matter of fact the debate on this question has been carried on for years in almost every kind of public forum. It is our sincere hope that the parties concerned will realise that their best interests and the interests of the world community will be served by accepting in a spirit of fair compromise the judgment of Count Bernadotte.

United Kingdom High Commissioner's Office,
CANBERRA.



OFFICE OF THE HIGH COMMISSIONER
FOR THE UNITED KINGDOM
CANBERRA

G/M.

Ref:2/149.

21st September, 1948.

TOP SECRET AND PERSONAL.

My dear Prime Minister,

With reference to my letter of 15th September on the subject of Palestine, I have been asked to let you know that the United Kingdom and United States representatives saw the Mediator in Rhodes on 14th September and spoke to him on the lines of their respective briefs. After considerable discussion with them, the Mediator finally produced his Report and conclusions which he sent to the Secretary-General of the United Nations. It was expected that the Report would be circulated to all Delegations in Paris on 22nd September but, as you will no doubt have observed from the Press, the Report has already been released. A summary of the Mediator's conclusions is enclosed. It is hoped that early consideration of the Report by the United Nations will not be affected by the Mediator's assassination.

I have been asked to emphasize the importance of keeping strictly secret the fact that the Mediator's Report was communicated to the United Kingdom authorities in advance.

Yours sincerely,

The Right Honourable J. B. Chifley, M.P.,
Prime Minister of the Commonwealth of Australia,
CANBERRA. A.C.T.

TOP SECRET AND PERSONAL.

PALESTINE.

The Mediator's report to the Secretary-General is in three parts dealing respectively with (i) the Mediator, (ii) his efforts to maintain the truce and (iii) the Refugee problem. The following is a summary of his conclusions to (i) setting forth his proposals for a political settlement.

2. He recalls that the suggestions which he put forward to the Arabs and Jews on 28th June were rejected by both parties and states that his subsequent conversations with Arab and Jewish leaders have convinced him that his proposal for a political and economic union in Palestine is in present circumstances impracticable.

3. While he does not regard it as his province to formulate proposals for a settlement he feels it his duty to put forward for the guidance of the United Nations certain conclusions based on his experience in Palestine which, while unlikely to be approved by both parties, would in his opinion not be forcibly resisted by either if approved and formally backed by the Assembly.

4. His conclusions are based on the following six premises:-

- (a) A Jewish State exists and there seems no reason to assume that it will not continue.
- (b) The boundaries of the Jewish State must be fixed either by formal agreement between the parties or failing that by the United Nations.
- (c) The frontiers between the Arab and Jewish territories should be established according to the principle of geographical homogeneity and integration and should not therefore necessarily be those laid down in the Assembly resolution of 29th November, 1947.
- (d) The right of innocent refugees to return to their homes or to be adequately compensated should be affirmed.
- (e) Jerusalem requires special treatment because of its religious and international significance and the complexity of the interests involved.
- (f) International guarantees should be given where necessary especially with regard to boundaries and human rights.

5. The following conclusions in his view provide a reasonable equitable and workable basis for settlement:-

- (a) Hostilities should be pronounced formally ended either by mutual agreement of the parties or failing that by the United Nations. The truce should be transformed into a formal peace or at least an armistice involving either the withdrawal and demobilisation of armed forces or their separation by the creation of

broad demilitarised zones under United Nations supervision.

- (b) Failing Arab-Jewish agreement on frontiers these should be established by the United Nations and delimited by the United Nations Boundaries Commission. The frontiers should differ from those of the Assembly resolution of 29th November, 1947, in that Negeb and the towns of Ramleh and Lydda should be in Arab territory and Galilee should be in Jewish territory.
- (c) The disposal of areas not allotted to Jews should be determined by the Arab Governments in consultation with the Arab inhabitants with a recommendation, however, that in view of the historical connexion and common interests of Transjordan and Palestine, Arab Palestine should be joined to Transjordan subject to any necessary frontier rectifications with other Arab States.
- (d) The United Nations should give a special assurance that the frontiers between Arab and Jewish territories shall be respected except where modifications are mutually agreed upon.
- (e) Haifa, including the oil refineries, although included in Jewish territory, should be declared a free port with the assurance of free access for interested Arab countries and an undertaking on their part not to obstruct the flow of oil by pipe line to refineries whose distribution would continue on an historical basis.
- (f) Lydda airport should be declared a free airport with an assurance of access and use for Jerusalem and interested Arab countries.
- (g) Jerusalem as defined in the Assembly resolution of 29th November should be given separate treatment and be placed under United Nations control with maximum local autonomy for Arab and Jewish communities and safeguards for the protection of Holy Places and free access to them and for religious freedom.
- (h) All parties should respect the right of unimpeded access to Jerusalem by road, rail or air.
- (i) The United Nations should affirm the right of Arab refugees to return to their homes in Jewish territory at the earliest possible date and the United Nations Conciliation Commission (see (k) below) should supervise their repatriation and resettlement and the payment of adequate compensation for the property of those electing not to return.
- (j) The political, economic, social and religious rights of all Arabs in Jewish territory and of all Jews in Arab territory should be fully guaranteed.

A Conciliation Commission should supervise the observance of this guarantee and should lend its good offices on invitation to any efforts towards exchanges of population with a view to eliminating minority problems and on the basis of adequate compensation for property.

- (k) In view of the special and dangerous complexity of the Palestine problem the United Nations should establish a Palestine Conciliation Commission responsible to it and acting under its authority to undertake any measures it might consider appropriate with a view to ensuring the peaceful adjustment of the Palestine situation and the promotion of friendly relations between Arabs and Jews; to supervise the observance of such arrangements as may be made by the United Nations in regard to frontier communications, minority rights etc.; and to report promptly to the United Nations any development likely to alter the arrangements provided by the United Nations or to threaten peace.

6. It will be observed that the Mediator's conclusions differ little from those in the note enclosed in Mr. Price's letter of 30th August, except that his proposals in regard to Jerusalem are more vaguely worded than in the note in question, that he proposes the transformation of the truce into a formal peace or armistice and a United Nations Conciliation Commission to supervise settlement, and that he does not indicate subsequent sanctions in regard to the infringement of new frontiers.

United Kingdom High Commissioner's Office,
CANBERRA.

21st September, 1948.



G:JC

OFFICE OF THE HIGH COMMISSIONER
FOR THE UNITED KINGDOM
CANBERRA

TOP SECRET AND PERSONAL.

15th September, 1948.

Ref. 2/149.

My dear Prime Minister,

With reference to my letter of the 30th August, I have been asked to let you have for your Top Secret and Personal information the enclosed message from the United Kingdom Government about Palestine.

Yours sincerely,

The Right Honourable J.B. Chifley, M.P.,
Prime Minister of the Commonwealth of Australia,
CANBERRA. A.C.T.

(4) If the Mediator should decide to propose a settlement on the above lines we should be prepared to give his proposals all possible support -

- (a) by urging the Arab Governments and, so far as our contacts permit, Jewish leaders to acquiesce in the imposition of the Mediator's plan under the United Nations authority
- (b) by using our diplomatic influence with other Member States of the United Nations, and
- (c) by supporting proposals in the Security Council or General Assembly or, if necessary, both.

3./

P A L E S T I N E.

1. The United States Government recently informed us that having reached conclusions regarding territorial settlement in Palestine which are very similar to our own they had instructed their representative in Tel Aviv to discuss certain suggestions on the subject with the Jewish leaders. These suggestions formed a considerably abridged version of the proposals contained in paragraph 5 of the note enclosed in Mr. Price's letter of the 30th August, merely specifying that the Jews might expand into Galilee in return for relinquishing a large portion of Negeb to Transjordan and that Jerusalem should form an international enclave.

2. While the United States Government were awaiting the Jewish response to these representations it was learnt that the Mediator was proposing to send a report to the Security Council on 14th September and to leave Rhodes himself on 15th September en route for Paris. The State Department therefore decided to send an official to Rhodes to convey to the Mediator their views on the lines of the preceding paragraph. We also decided to send the Head of the British Middle East Office to Rhodes to see the Mediator in conjunction with the United States representative and to speak to him on the following lines:

- (1) In our view the proposals for a settlement in Palestine must take account of (a) the United Nations Assembly Resolution of 29th November, 1947, (b) the Mediator's suggestions of 28th June, to arab and Jewish leaders and (c) the military situation existing at the renewal of the truce on 18th July.
- (2) Taking the above factors into account we consider that a settlement must be found in accordance with the general principle of partition endorsed by the Assembly last November; but that subsequent events have shown that the frontiers recommended by the Assembly are in many respects impracticable.
- (3) We therefore put forward suggestions on the general lines of paragraph 5(c) to (e) inclusive and paragraph 6 of the note enclosed in Mr. Price's letter of the 30th August with the additional suggestion that the Mediator might offer his good offices in regard to the negotiation of a new frontier agreement between Egypt and Transjordan in connection with the disposal of the Arab areas of Palestine.
- (4) If the Mediator should decide to propose a settlement on the above lines we should be prepared to give his proposals all possible support -
 - (a) by urging the Arab Governments and, so far as our contacts permit, Jewish leaders to acquiesce in the imposition of the Mediator's plan under the United Nations authority
 - (b) by using our diplomatic influence with other Member States of the United Nations, and
 - (c) by supporting proposals in the Security Council or General Assembly or, if necessary, both.

3. We regard it as vitally important that if the Mediator adopts our proposals the source of his recommendations shall not become known. For this reason our representative has also been instructed to discuss with the Mediator the problem of Arab refugees and if any comment is made on his or the United States Representative's visit the impression will be given that they are in Rhodes to study the refugee problem.

OFFICE OF THE HIGH COMMISSIONER
FOR THE UNITED KINGDOM,
CANBERRA.

15th September, 1948.



TOP SECRET AND PERSONAL.

OFFICE OF THE HIGH COMMISSIONER
FOR THE UNITED KINGDOM
CANBERRA


30th August, 1948.

Ref. 2/149.

My dear Prime Minister,

With reference to my letter of the
16th August, I have been asked to let you have for your
Top Secret and Personal information the enclosed message
from the United Kingdom Government about our policy on
Palestine.

Yours sincerely,



Anthony Eden

o

The Right Honourable J.B. Chifley, M.P.,

Prime Minister of the Commonwealth of Australia,

CANBERRA. A. C. T.

TOP SECRET AND PERSONAL.

P A L E S T I N E.

The mediator has now asked for the views both of the United Kingdom Government and the United States Government on the problem of a permanent solution for Palestine. The United States Government have also expressed a considerable measure of agreement with the views described in the message enclosed in Mr. Price's letter of the 16th August. We have therefore decided to proceed along the following lines:

- (i) We should seek a settlement on the basis of the stabilisation of the existing de facto situation in Palestine.
- (ii) We should continue discussions with the United States Government regarding the proposed settlement and the procedure to be adopted in pursuit of it with a view to agreement on details and to the expression of the joint United Kingdom and United States views to the mediator in response to his enquiry. *answered*
- (iii) If the mediator decides to sponsor proposals of this kind, we should endeavour to obtain support for them from other members of the United Nations.

2. In determining this policy we have taken account of the following considerations -

- (a) The present truce in Palestine is not being fully observed by either side, and is in constant danger of finally breaking down. It is therefore imperative to make progress towards a political settlement before it does so.

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- (b) The mediator's attempts to find a basis on which both Arabs and Jews would be willing to negotiate with him in pursuance of the Assembly's decision of the 14th May have failed. Direct negotiations between the two sides also seem doomed to failure as no Arab leader would negotiate on terms which imply recognition of the existence of a Jewish State, whereas the Jews would negotiate on no other basis.
- (c) The only practicable course is therefore for the United Nations to authorise the mediator to put the settlement into effect, and to declare that use of force by either party to frustrate this settlement would be regarded as a breach of the truce, calling for the imposition of sanctions under Chapter VII of the United Nations Charter.
- (d) Any proposals for a settlement must conform generally with the existing situation, and must take account of major changes which have taken place since the Assembly's Resolution of the 29th November, 1947. These changes include Jewish occupation of all Galilee; Egyptian occupation of the Negeb; Arab abandonment of Jaffa; and de facto partition of Jerusalem between Arabs and Jews.

3. The procedure which we are suggesting to the United States Government would be to advise the mediator to make recommendations to the Security Council on the lines described in paragraph 5 below. The Security Council would be asked to endorse these recommendations, and issue the necessary instructions. Before the mediator's report was published, we and the

/United States

United States Government would explain the situation fully to the Arab and Jewish authorities, and would endeavour to ensure that they acquiesced in the recommendations. We would make it clear that we would not support any attempt to modify or infringe them.

4. If the recommendations failed to secure the necessary majority in the Security Council, or were vetoed there, the matter would probably have to be taken to the Assembly.

5. An outline of the proposals which we have in mind to recommend to the mediator is as follows:

- (a) No further attempt to be made to negotiate with the two parties about general principles of a settlement, but a permanent frontier line to be laid down as quickly as possible, failure to observe it being regarded as breach of ^{the} truce.
- (b) Arab and Jewish authorities to have complete independence on their respective sides of the boundary. Observers to be maintained on the boundary for six months to ensure that the Security Council were immediately notified of any infringement.
- (c) The boundary to follow generally the division between the area now held by the two sides, the Jews thus gaining Western Galilee and Jaffa, and the Arabs, the Negeb. The Jerusalem municipal area to be autonomous under neither Arab nor Jewish sovereignty, but under a governor responsible to the United Nations and assisted by a force of international police responsible to him. The United Nations to lay down the division between the Jewish and (groups omitted ? Arab sectors) of Jerusalem each of which would have its own municipal administration, subject only to the overriding authority of the governor. The governor would have special responsibility with regard to the

/rights

rights of the Christian communities, and the preservation of and access to the Holy places. In view of the proposed international status of Jerusalem, there would not be a Jewish corridor linking it with the coastal plain, but the governor would make necessary arrangements with the authorities of Arab and Jewish Palestine to ensure transit facilities to and from Jerusalem for the benefit of all the inhabitants. A free port would be established at Haifa through which sealed trains and road transport would move to and from Arab territories under agreed regulations; Arabs would not obstruct the transit of oil through the pipeline to the free port. Both Arabs and Jews would have access to Lydda airport.

- (d) As regards the disposal of the Arab areas of Palestine, the recommendation in the Assembly's Resolution of the 29th November that they should form a separate Palestine-Arab State was bound up with the proposal for an economic union of all Palestine; this now seems impracticable, since such a union is evidently out of the question at present, and without it the Arab areas could not be viable. The Arab areas should therefore be incorporated in Transjordan subject to any modifications of the southern frontier in favour of Egypt.
- (e) The mediator then to ask the Security Council to endorse the above recommendations as the only means of ensuring international peace and security, and to inform all parties concerned:

- (i) that they should give the mediator or other United Nations authorities all possible

/assistance

5.

assistance in carrying out their task

- (ii) that they should respect the special status of Jerusalem and Haifa
- (iii) that any attempt during the truce to infringe the new boundaries once laid down would be treated by the Security Council as a breach of the truce, and dealt with under Chapter VII of the Charter.

6. The mediator's recommendations would presumably include provisions regarding Arab refugees; possibly to the effect that the Jewish authorities should be made to permit the return of the refugees or should pay them compensation for property left behind.

United Kingdom High Commissioner's Office,

CANBERRA. A.C.T.

30th August, 1948.

DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS.

CABLEGRAM. SECRET.

"2"
LB/IT

I.15837
Dated 27th Sept. 1948
2300
Recd. 28th Sept. 1948

DECYPHER FROM:

The Australian Delegation,
United Nations Assembly,
PARIA.

E.14.

Your 370. Following for Burton from Minister.

I do not think we should at present make any commitments to Bernadotte's conclusions otherwise we may not be sufficiently free to influence an Assembly decision. Last Assembly's recommendations were proposed to be modified by Mediators in certain respects but essential features of his suggestions in conformity with Assembly decision of 29th November, namely, political partition of Palestine, creation of Israel and international trusteeship for Jerusalem and Bethlehem. I had long conversation with Bernadotte at Geneva meeting and was impressed by his ability and sincerity. At the same time his recommendations will almost certainly be revised as to territorial adjustment.

Dr. Burton.

28th September 1948.

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CABLEGRAM.

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EF/MB

0.13875

Sent: 27th September, 1948
4.30 p.m.

DECYPHER TO -

The Australian Delegation
to the United Nations,
PARIS.

TOP SECRET.

IMMEDIATE.

UN.P.13.

Personal for Minister from Burton.

You will have noted United Kingdom and United States comments on Count Bernadotte's proposals for Palestine.

United Kingdom High Commissioner has now approached the Prime Minister in the following terms:

"The United Kingdom Government are anxious that all Governments who, having studied Count Bernadotte's conclusions, find themselves in general agreement with them, should publicly express support for them. Such statements, besides increasing the chances that the conclusions will be rapidly and sympathetically considered by the Assembly, should serve to convince all parties in the Middle East that the majority of world opinion favours these conclusions, and should thereby help to influence both Arab and Jewish leaders towards acquiescence in any solution based on these conclusions which the United Nations may eventually adopt.

I have been asked to express the hope of the United Kingdom Government that, having studied Count Bernadotte's conclusions, the Australian Government will find themselves sufficiently in agreement to feel able also to issue a supporting statement."

Prime Minister would be glad to have your views as soon as possible.

E.A. (draft 27/9/48 JA/JL)

28th September, 1948.

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I.15448

Dated 23rd Sept. 1948

1947

Recd. 24th Sept. 1948.

FROM:

The Secretary of State for
Commonwealth Relations,
LONDON.

H.405.

PALESTINE.

Following is extract from Foreign Secretary's speech during Foreign Affairs debate in Commons on 22nd September outlining United Kingdom attitude towards Mediator's proposals.

"Anyone who makes proposals about Palestine always arouses criticism and disappointment and has always done so in the past. We do not expect that either side will welcome these proposals in toto; but the world cannot wait for ever for the parties to agree; it is now time in the view of His Majesty's Government for a final solution to be found by the United Nations.

His Majesty's Government have carefully studied these proposals and they believe that the conclusions must be considered as a single, integrated plan and that it would be best for all concerned that this plan should be put into operation in its entirety. The recommendations of Count Bernadotte therefore have the whole-hearted and unqualified support of His Majesty's Government. The House will have seen from the press that a similar view has already been expressed by Mr. Marshall on behalf of the United States Government. This problem cannot be solved by polemics. It is our hope that the United Nations will lose no time in throwing the full weight of their authority behind these proposals but there are two particular points to which I should like to call attention.

Count Bernadotte refers in his Report to the apprehension of the Arabs about future Jewish expansion and concludes that every reasonable assurance must be offered them, not only by the Jews, but by the United Nations. I have always felt that the Arab case has been insufficiently appreciated and I entirely agree that the United Nations should give special guarantees. In one other matter I would insist on the unity of Count Bernadotte's conclusions even more emphatically than he did himself. He recommended that the Arab areas of Palestine or the greater part of them should be incorporated in Trans-Jordan, but he suggested that the final decision might be left to the Arab States. In the past when His Majesty's Government have considered this problem they have always been faced with the difficulty that the Arab parts of Palestine by themselves, which are an unfertile area would not form a viable state.

We therefore believe that the United Nations should avoid the risk of creating a state which could not support itself and should therefore endorse the Mediator's arguments in this matter. Count Bernadotte's recommendations about the Arab refugees deserve the most urgent study and action by the United Nations. The situation of these refugees is a great human tragedy. The measures which

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Count Bernadotte initiated before his death and which his organisation are carrying on, provide only for their immediate needs. There is the vital long-term problem which requires the concerted efforts of all the nations to solve.

Finally I would urge all those concerned in the Middle East to study Count Bernadotte's proposals calmly and seriously and to lay aside all the influence of extremist propaganda. Though I cannot anticipate that either party will spontaneously express their acceptance of the plan I would urge them with all the strength at my command to acquiesce in it and do nothing to upset it or prevent its implementation. We, for our part, are determined to do everything we can to see these recommendations brought to fruition. In the past we have been slanderously accused of encouraging the use of force to settle the Palestine problem. I declare categorically that we have never done anything of the kind and that we never will do so. We are resolutely opposed to any attempt to prolong the present instability or to secure any other settlement by force or threat of force. The influence of His Majesty's Government is placed squarely behind the Mediator's recommendations."

A. Min & Dept of E.A.
Min & Dept. of Defence.

24th September 1948.

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1551

Dated 22nd Sept. 1948
Recd. 23rd Sept. 1948

DECRYPTER FROM:

The Secretary of State for
Commonwealth Relations,
LONDON.

H.404. Confidential.

PALESTINE.

According to our information the Political Committee of the Arab League at its recent meeting in Alexandria passed a resolution stating that if Palestine Arabs proclaimed a Government for the whole of Palestine the League would recognise it. Press reports have appeared in Egypt suggesting that the ex-Mufti would head the "Palestine Arab State".

2. His Majesty's Representative in Arab countries have been instructed to take suitable opportunity of informing Arab leaders that we should regard any attempt to set up an "Arab Government for Palestine" as most ill-timed and that any such proposal seems open to the further objection that the ex-Mufti could hardly fail to be associated with it with consequent adverse effect on world opinion. Representatives are to add that claim of such a "Government" to the whole of Palestine would inevitably provoke a counter-claim by Jewish "Government" to the whole of Palestine and possibly even the Transjordan; i.e. it would force Jewish Authorities to adopt the extreme programme of revisionists which they have not hitherto done. This would not be conducive to a peaceful settlement of the Palestine question.

A. Min & Dept of E.A.
Min & Dept of Defence.

23rd September 1948.

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DEPARTMENT OF SUPPLY AND DEVELOPMENT, MELBOURNE
DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS, CANBERRA

Your OSD 673.

It is confirmed that Count Bernadotte's death does not in any way affect despatch of relief supplies to Middle East.

New consignee should be Count Bernadotte's successor, Dr. Ralph. Bunche.



CB320

E.A. & M.E.

21.9.48

CABLEGRAM.

JG:MC

O. 13421.

DECODE TO:

Dated 18th September, 1948.

AUSTRALIAN EMBASSY
PARIS.

12.10.

E.54. For E. Evatt from Barton.

My following telegram contains text of statement just made to press by the Prime Minister. He would like you to convey to Swedish Government and to widow of Count Bernadotte, appropriate messages of sympathy.

E.A. (PI).

20th September, 1948.

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O. 13422.

DECODE TO:

Dated 18th September, 1948.

AUSTRALIAN EMBASSY
PARIS.

12.15.

No. 1.55.

Following is text of statement referred to in preceding telegram:

Begins.

Draft statement by Prime Minister.

The news of the assassination of Count Bernadotte has come as a profound shock to the Government and people of Australia who have been following closely his energetic efforts to restore peace to Palestine.

Count Bernadotte was mediator appointed by the United Nations to assist the peoples of Palestine in arriving at a just and peaceful solution of their problems. As a mediator, he was acting as a servant of the United Nations, which makes the attack against the person of Count Bernadotte all the more outrageous.

The Government and people of Australia express their sympathy to the Secretary General of the United Nations and to the Government and the people of Sweden, who, while having little direct concern in the dispute in Palestine, sent Count Bernadotte as a peace-maker.

E.A.(PI).

20th September, 1948

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Q165 Secret Palestine

Military Aircraft Brought into Palestine

on Q telegram File

DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS.

CABLEGRAM.

1.18191
Dated 18th Sept. 1948
0500
Recd. 19th Sept. 1948

FROM:

Mr. Sobolev,
Acting Secretary General,
United Nations Assembly,
PARIS.

1.

With profound regret I inform you that Count Folke Bernadotte, United Nations Mediator in Palestine, was killed September 17th in the New City of Jerusalem. I have instructed Ralph J. Bunche, personal representative of the Secretary General, to assume full authority over Palestine Mission pending decision by the General Assembly or the Security Council. I have also requested General Lundstrom to carry out fullest investigation into all circumstances of the shooting of Count Bernadotte.

A Min & Dept of E.A.

19th September 1948.

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I.14141

Dated 31st August, 1948

1707

Rec'd. 1st September, 1948

MEMORANDUM

RECEIVED FROM:

THE AUSTRALIAN DELEGATE TO UNITED NATIONS,
NEW YORK.

UN. 731.

Security Council.

Though Council agreed on 20th August that it would not meet until 15th September, except in case of Emergency, Malik convened a meeting held yesterday to discuss violation of Palestine Truce (Document 8/985) and steps taken to settle Kashmir dispute (Document 8/987). Council summarily rejected U.S.S.R. demand for immediate discussion by not adopting the agenda (9 abstentions). The meeting which lasted only 70 minutes was little more than a series of tart curt criticisms of Malik as President interspersed with acid enquiries why meeting called.

E.A.

1st September, 1948.

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Q 163

Palestine

Dated 2nd September.
on Q Telegrams

REF B 6/9

Q 161 Dated 28/8/48

Palestine
U.K. Relations with Transjordan.

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19/8/48

Q Telegram 159
Increasing Aggressive Attitude by
Jews
is held on Q Telegrams
file in E division

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I.18601

DECYPHER FROM:

Dated: 20th August, 1948.
1705

AUSTRALIAN DELEGATION,
UNITED NATIONS ASSEMBLY,
NEW YORK.

Rec'd: 21st August, 1948.

UN.718.

Security Council 19th August received a special report from Mediator warning that situation in Jerusalem was gradually getting out of hand and that further deterioration there might lead to a general resumption of hostilities. Resolution introduced subsequently by United Nations, United Kingdom, France, and Canada called on both Israeli and Arab Forces to take all steps necessary, including punitive measures against individuals, to prevent violations of the Truce by either regular or irregular forces.

2. Resolution was adopted in sections by majorities of from seven to ten with Syria abstaining on all clauses and Ukraine and Soviet on some.

3. Council took no positive action on any other aspect of the Palestine situation beyond requesting the United Nations Mediator to continue efforts at demilitarisation of Jerusalem and, on the question of refugees, agreeing to transmit a record of its discussions to the Economic and Social Council and the International Refugee Organisation.

EXTERNAL AFFAIRS.

22nd August, 1948.

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FOR THE SECRETARYPALESTINE

The United Kingdom's proposal contained in their memorandum of 16th August is that a solution could be found along the lines of the Mediator's previous proposals, omitting the suggestion for a union between future Arab and Jewish States, and including some form of international responsibility for Jerusalem which might possibly, though not necessarily, be placed under Arab sovereignty.

2. The United Kingdom contemplates:

- (a) An independent sovereign state of Israel, including most of Galilee, and an Arab state including Megeb.
- (b) The frontiers of the new states would be subjected to some form of international guarantee.
- (c) Haifa would be either a free port or under some form of international responsibility.
- (d) The future of Jaffa would require to be determined.
- (e) Solution of the problem of Jewish displaced persons in Europe and Arab displaced persons in the Middle East.
- (f) Economic aid to the Arab states.

3. It is suggested that the following difficulties might arise out of the United Kingdom proposals in their present form:

- (a) It is unlikely that the Jews would agree to Arab sovereignty over Jerusalem. Their reply to the Mediator on this point was categoric. Agreement might be reached on an international regime along the lines contemplated in the original partition proposal.
- (b) The Jews are also likely to resist free port proposals for Haifa.
- (c) Economic aid for the Arabs may develop into military aid. It is suggested that any economic aid made available to the Arab states should be supervised under United Nations control.

4. The United Kingdom propose implementing their suggestions by -

- (a) seeking United States support;
- (b) advising the Mediator that the United States and United Kingdom desire settlement along the suggested lines;
- (c) joint United States/United Kingdom proposals to the United Nations based on the suggestions of the Mediator (presumably those suggested to the Mediator by the United Kingdom and United States).

5. If both parties can agree to the proposals offered

Mr. Allen
For information, 21/8

by the United Kingdom all will be to the good. Middle East Section have commented that Arab leaders may find difficulty in reconciling their people to a compromise agreement.

6. It would seem that no action is called for on our part until the following points are clarified:

- i. Response of Arab and Jewish authorities to the Mediator's modified proposals, which are said to be ready for presentation.
- ii. Response of the Mediator to the United Kingdom's proposals.
- iii. The Mediator's report to the Security Council arising from the submission of proposals to the parties.

19th August 1948

T. 19 AUG 1948

This telegram must be paraphrased if the communication of its contents to any persons outside the Government service is authorized.

TELEGRAM

COMMONWEALTH RELATIONS

From: THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR DOMINION AFFAIRS

To: THE HIGH COMMISSIONER FOR THE UNITED KINGDOM, CANBERRA

Despatched: 18th August, 1948 (10.06 p.m.)

Received: 19th August, 1948 (11 a.m.)

Q. No.158 SECRET.

PALESTINE Information received from very reliable sources indicates that Jews have systematically violated truce in Palestine by bringing in military aircraft. Of types of aircraft seen at Jewish airfields since inception of truce up to 17 Messerschmitts 109's, two Curtis Commando transport aircraft, a Halifax, three Flying Fortresses, and eight Dakotas have been counted at one time and it is estimated that Jews now possess appreciably more than these. A few may have been acquired between 15th May and inception of truce but majority have certainly been brought in since.

Curtis Commando's appear to have been used to bring in crated Messerschmitts which have then been reassembled in Palestine.

2. We are bringing above information to notice of mediator and his staff pointing out that in view of small scale of forces and operations in Palestine these Jewish violations of truce constitute a considerable change of balance of strength between the two sides in spite of mediator's declaration that this balance should not (repeat not) be disturbed during truce. We are unable to

191/2/1

/publish

This telegram must be paraphrased if the communication of its contents to any persons outside the Government service is authorized.

TELEGRAM

From : THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR DOMINION AFFAIRS

To : THE HIGH COMMISSIONER FOR THE UNITED KINGDOM, CANBERRA

Despatched :

Received :

-2-

publish our information or authorise mediator to do so or to divulge it to other parties but we are sure of its accuracy and have suggested that his observers may use it or might make it as a basis for enquiries into arrival of Jewish aircraft in Palestine. We hope that in any event observers will now be in a position to ensure that arrival of any further military aircraft or armaments is observed, investigated and denounced.

SECRETARY OF STATE
FOR COMMONWEALTH RELATIONS.

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1-13466

Dated 18th Aug. 19

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Recd. 19th Aug. 19

DECYPHER FROM:

The Australian Delegation,
United Nations Assembly,
NEW YORK.

UN711.

PALESTINE.

1. Recent Security Council discussions have dealt with the questions of the Jerusalem water supply, of Jewish immigrants still detained in Cyprus and of Arab refugees from the Jewish area, but no definite attitude of the Council has far emerged. Debates on refugees and Cyprus immigrants have been particularly inconclusive. As regards the latter, the United Kingdom line has been that it would be incompatible with the truce provisions to allow the seven or eight thousand men of military age now in Cyprus, some of whom have had military training, to enter Palestine at this stage. The Council as a whole has not yet made up its mind on this.

2. In reports to the Council on Arab refugees, Bernadotte stated these number some three hundred and thirty thousand persons, most of whom are under immediate threat of destitution or disease. The Mediator has already accepted a United Kingdom contribution of one hundred thousand pounds worth of tents and medical supplies and in a special communication to the United States Government, quoted by Austin yesterday the Council, has appealed for similar direct American aid.

3. Meanwhile the general position is more obscure than it has been for some time past. The efforts at demilitarization of Jerusalem have been held up by intermittent fighting. The Arabs have rejected the Israeli suggestion of direct negotiations while the Israeli Government, for its part has formally requested the Security Council that the truce be terminated if neither a peace settlement nor the withdrawal of Arab forces is brought about within a specified period. Some signs are reported that Israel is preparing to take unilateral action in Jerusalem with a view to incorporation in the Jewish area.

E.A.

19th August 1948.

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1. 1948. **SECRET.**Dated 14th August, 1948.
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15th August, 1948.

SECRETARY OF STATE

FOR COUNCIL OF THE
LONDONTHE QUOTATION OF THIS CABLEGRAM WITHOUT
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H. No. 349. Confidential. Palestine; General situation.

1. Since the present truce in Palestine came into force on 18th July there has been continual firing in Jerusalem mainly apparently by Jewish dissident elements. Members of the United Kingdom and United States Consulate-Generals have been fired on by Jews and United Kingdom Consular car was wrecked by Jews whilst Consul was engaged on official duties in Jewish zone. Official Jewish assertions that they are willing and able to control their own dissident elements seems thus untenable. Alternatively there are some grounds for believing that the Jews wish to provoke Arab reaction on such a scale as would give them an excuse to resume open hostilities in the Jerusalem area. The mediator has privately expressed agreement with this view and has stated that the Jews are constantly increasing their demands which now include claim to the whole of Western Galilee as well as Negeb and are showing an increase disposition to reject out of hand any suggestions that he puts forward. (Clear evidence as to the responsibility for Latrun Waterworks destruction is not yet available).

2. The Mediator has now addressed strong representations to both Arab and Jewish authorities in Jerusalem urging them to put a stop to all firing immediately.

3. We have the impression that line of main causes of difficulty or maintenance of truce is that neither side is made sufficiently aware of the activities of the United Nations observers in relation to alleged breaches of truce and of results of their investigations and that both sides would be more convinced of efficiency and impartiality of observers if public reports of results of their investigation were periodically issued; moreover if these results showed a heavy balance against one or other side the guilty party would be exposed to world criticism with possible arbitrary effects. We are privately hinting this view to the Mediator.

4. The Mediator has informed the Secretary-General of the United Nations that the supervision system remains inadequate as less than half the number of promised observers has arrived; that he has instructed observers that no party may take the law into its own hands merely because in its opinion the other party has violated the truce; that the Jerusalem situation is particularly tense owing to rumours of impending aggression by irregular elements which regular forces assert are uncontrollable; but that both sides have now agreed to start conversations with a view to arranging to keep Jerusalem out of the conflict. Mediator has now 50 observers at Jerusalem and has stated privately that he is asking for a force of 6000 well armed men to enforce demilitarization of Jerusalem; any lesser number would, in his opinion, be liable to attack by I.Z.L. elements. He is causing strong representations to be made to United States Government to furnish their quota of this force. If they fail to do so he will be obliged to refer to Security Council.

5. Demilitarisation of Jerusalem. Arab Legion Commander in Jerusalem has now made to truce Commission apparently with the authority of King Abdullah but not that of the Arab league proposals for the demilitarisation of Jerusalem which appear to us at first sight to be reasonable.

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We are endeavouring to ascertain from Transjordan Government whether there is any objection to these proposals being published. They cannot in any case be considered by the United Nations until the mediator has made further report.

6. Arab Refugees. It will be known that when the United Kingdom permanent representative to United Nations raised the problem of refugees on 2nd August (my telegram 1st August H No. 330) Security Council decided to ask the Governments and authorities concerned as well as the Mediator to furnish further information. It is, however, important that these refugees should receive immediate assistance. The Mediator is informing Secretary General that he is taking steps to give them aid and proposes to call upon appropriate international organisations for assistance. We are anxious to assist him in this and have already offered in the Security Council to provide up to £100,000 immediately as an advance of whatever contribution might be eventually required of us for this purpose. The main urgent need is understood to be for tents and medical supplies both of which are available from the United Kingdom Military stocks in Middle East. We have informed the Mediator and Arab Government that, if the Mediator can arrange for Red Cross or other suitable organisations to undertake administration of relief we are prepared to arrange for this organisation to issue tents or medical supplies up to the limit of £100,000. The Mediator has gratefully accepted this offer.

7. Mediator's movements. Mediator was to leave Rhodes for Sweden on 13th August for a short visit.

A/Min. & Dept. E.A.
Min. & Dept. Defence.

16th August, 1948.

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EF/LB.

I. 11818.

DECRYPTER FROM:

Dated: 21st July, 1948.

THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR
COMMONWEALTH RELATIONS,
L O N D O N.

2110.
Rec'd: 22nd July, 1948.
11.25.a.m.

H. 312. Confidential.

My telegram 10th July, H 291 paragraph 3, Palestine.

In the light of recent events it seems to us that mediator's decision to establish his headquarters at Rhodes has been unfortunate. It is difficult for leaders on either side to travel so far from territories for which they are responsible. Thus mediator must either isolate himself from direct contact with them or waste much time in travelling with result that organisation of his staff is impaired.

2. We feel that if "cease fire" is maintained in Jerusalem this should provide favourable conditions for mediator to establish his headquarters there. He could then bring his influence to bear more effectively on situation as a whole.

3. His Majesty's Consul General, Jerusalem, has on instructions put these considerations before Truce Commission, and His Majesty's Ambassador Cairo and His Majesty's Consul Rhodes have been instructed to take first suitable opportunity of putting these views before Count Bernadotte himself. In addition, Sir A. Cadogan has been asked to consider whether anything can usefully be said on this matter in New York.

Minister and Department of External Affairs.

22nd July, 1948.

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Mr. C. G. Dwyer	
Mr. G. H. Dwyer	
Mr. J. H. Dwyer	
Mr. K. H. Dwyer	
Mr. L. H. Dwyer	
Mr. M. H. Dwyer	
Mr. N. H. Dwyer	
Mr. O. H. Dwyer	
Mr. P. H. Dwyer	
Mr. Q. H. Dwyer	
Mr. R. H. Dwyer	
Mr. S. H. Dwyer	
Mr. T. H. Dwyer	
Mr. U. H. Dwyer	
Mr. V. H. Dwyer	
Mr. W. H. Dwyer	
Mr. X. H. Dwyer	
Mr. Y. H. Dwyer	
Mr. Z. H. Dwyer	



AUSTRALIAN EMBASSY
WASHINGTON, D. C.

DEPARTMENT OF
EXTERNAL AFFAIRS

Memorandum No. 721/48

Rec'd 21 JUL 1948

12th July, 1948

File No.

MEMORANDUM FOR:-

The Secretary,
Department of External Affairs,
Canberra, A. C. T.

PALESTINE

Attached is copy of a circular
note which has been received from the Special
Representative in Washington of the State of
Israel.

The note has not been acknowledged.

Ralph Harry
Ralph Harry
First Secretary

*Mr. Hay
has been a return
msg*

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191/2/1

STATE OF ISRAEL
PROVISIONAL GOVERNMENT
Office of the Representative

No. 358.

Washington 8, D. C.

The Special Representative of the State of Israel presents his compliments to their Excellencies and Messieurs the Chiefs of Mission and has the honor to submit on behalf of his Government the following excerpts from an address by the Prime Minister to the Israeli Provisional Council of Government concerning the City of Jerusalem and its Holy Places

"The Christian world has paid lip-service only to the inviolability of Jerusalem, leaving to Jewish forces alone the task of protecting its Holy Places. Both Moslems and Christians have for centuries claimed this City, sacred to Israel, and also to them. Because of its sanctity to the three faiths, the United Nations decided to place Jerusalem under an international regime. Now the City has been savagely shelled for several weeks by Moslem forces led by British officers, with a complete disregard for its Holy Places.

"The Christian world looks on in silence. The Anglican Church failed to protest while British guns blasted the Holy City. Other churches saw and heard and remained deaf. The sanctity of Jerusalem is forgotten and the spiritual ties by which the City is linked to the great creeds, ignored. The Jewish inhabitants of Jerusalem by their heroic stand have shown to whom the City is truly precious".

The Special Representative of the State of Israel kindly requests that this communication be transmitted to your Government.

July 7, 1948

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Office of the Representative

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ALH:HS

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July 7, 1948

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MG/FF

1.11657
Dated 19th July 1948
1506
Recd. 20th July 1948
10 a.m.

DECYPHER FROM:

The Australian Delegation,
United Nations Assembly,
NEW YORK.

UN646.

PALESTINE.

My UN639. So far as reports here
show both Israeli Government and Arab States have accepted
Security Council cease fire order within time limit set
by the Council. In communication with the Secretary General
the Arab League add the following requirements to their
acceptance:-

(a) That Jewish immigration stop immediately
pending attempts by the United Nations to reach solution
of the Palestine question.

(b) Three hundred thousand Palestine refugee
Arabs be allowed to return to their homes in the Jewish
held areas.

(c) That the period of the truce be fixed
and not be left indefinite.

Min & Dept of E.A.

20th July 1948.

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1529
Rec'd. 17th July, 1948
1310 hours.

MD:JSH

DECYPHER FROM:

THE AUSTRALIAN DELEGATION TO UNITED NATIONS,
NEW YORK.

UN 640.

Security Council 15th July.

The following is the text of the United States resolution ordering Israel and Arab Governments to stop fighting in Palestine within three days, which was adopted tonight by the United Nations Security Council. The Security Council taking into consideration that the provisional Government of Israel had indicated its acceptance in principle of a prolongation of the truce in Palestine; - that the States members of the Arab League have rejected successive appeals to the United Nations Mediator and of the Security Council in its resolution of 7th July, 1948, for the prolongation of the truce in Palestine; - and that there has consequently developed a renewal of hostilities in Palestine.-

Determines that the situation in Palestine constitutes a threat to peace within the meaning of Article 39 of the Charter.

Orders the Governments and authorities concerned, pursuant to Article 40 of the Charter of the United Nations to abstain from further military action and to this end to issue cease-fire orders to their military and para-military forces, to take effect at a time to be determined by the mediator, but in any event not later than three days from the date of the adoption of this resolution.

Declares that the failure by any of the Governments or authorities concerned to comply with the preceding paragraph of this resolution, would demonstrate the existence of a breach of the peace within the meaning of Article 39 of the Charter requiring immediate consideration by the Security Council with a view to such further action under Chapter VII of the Charter as may be decided upon by the Council.

Calls upon all Governments and authorities concerned to continue to co-operate with the Mediator with a view to the maintenance of peace in Palestine in conformity with the resolution adopted by the Security Council on 29th May, 1948.

Orders as a matter of special and urgent necessity an immediate and unconditional cease-fire in the city of Jerusalem to take effect 24 hours from the time of adoption of this resolution, and instructs the Truce Commission to take any necessary steps to make this cease-fire effective.

Instructs the mediator to continue his efforts to bring about demilitarization of the City of Jerusalem /without.....

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without prejudice to the future political status of Jerusalem
and to assure the protection of, and access to the Holy places,
religious buildings and sites in Palestine.

Instructs to Mediator to supervise the
observance of the truce and to establish procedures for
examining alleged breaches of the truce since 11th June, 1948,
authorizes him to deal with breaches so far as it is within
his capacity to do so by appropriate local action, and requests
him to keep the Security Council currently informed concerning
the operation of the truce and when necessary to take
appropriate action.

Reiterates the appeal to the parties
mentioned in the last paragraph of its resolution of 22nd May
and urges upon the parties that they continue conversations
with the mediator in a spirit of conciliation and mutual
concession in order that all points under dispute may be
settled peacefully.

Requests the Secretary-General to provide
the Mediator with the necessary staff and facilities to assist
in carrying out the functions assigned to him under the
resolution of the General Assembly of 14th May, and under this
resolution.- and,

Requests that the Secretary-General make
appropriate arrangements to provide necessary funds to meet the
obligations arising from this resolution.

MIN. & DEP'T OF E.A.

19th July, 1948.

CABLEGRAM.

SECRET.

MD:FF:MQ

I. 11565/62.

DECY:HER FROM:

Dated 16th July, 1948.
1652.

Rec'd 17th July, 1948.

AUSTRALIAN DELEGATION
UNITED NATIONS ORGANISATION
NEW YORK.

UN.639. Palestine. My UN.628.

Security Council July 15th by 7 affirmative votes adopted United States resolution ordering cease fire in Palestine within three days. Resolution also calls on parties to continue to cooperate with the mediator with a view to the maintenance of peace in conformity with May 29th resolution and urges them to continue conversations "in a spirit of conciliation and mutual concession". Mediator was instructed to continue efforts to bring about demilitarisation of Jerusalem without prejudice to own future political status. Text in my following telegram.

Terms of resolution are substantially the same as originally presented. Soviet amendment which would have provided for setting up of international regime in Jerusalem as provided for in partition resolution was supported only by Soviet Union and Ukraine. United Kingdom amendment to substitute the term "other party" for "provisional Government of Israel" in preamble got only three votes. On the other hand a British amendment instructing the Mediator to investigate charges of violation of previous truce as well as of the new one was incorporated as was likewise a United States amendment calling on both sides to show a "spirit of conciliation and mutual concession" offered as a substitute to a Chinese amendment calling for "mutual concessions" regarding both the political organisation of Palestine and immigration. The final vote was affirmative Belgium, United Kingdom, Canada, China, Colombia, France, United States against Syria, abstentions Argentina, Soviet, Union and Ukraine.

Argentina was opposed to coercive measures. Soviet and Ukraine while endorsing coercive provisions objected to renewal of restrictions on Israel contained in previous truce argument and also to any implication that mediator would have the right to suggest any departure from the original partition resolution.

Renewed truce if accepted is for an indefinite period during which time the mediator will continue efforts at settlement. Mediators staff however with whom I have talked show little optimism and some to take it for granted that the whole question will have to come up again in the Assembly. They feel that in a sense the previous truce was premature in that it precluded a military decision which they believe would certainly have gone against the Arabs. Now the Arabs states are in an extremely difficult political position. They can neither fall back on admission of military defeat nor even if they wanted to find any other reason for calling off the United Nations propaganda and agitation which has so aroused popular feeling in the Arab countries.

In the case of yesterday's session Cadogan stated that United Kingdom Governments only object in supporting the resolution was to secure an extension of the truce during which negotiations for a peaceful solution could proceed. United Kingdom Government fully reserved their views on the nature of such a solution. "His Majesty's Government cannot but feel that in their view the Arab interest in Palestine has so far been insufficiently appreciated by the United Nations. There is a danger that the Arab rightly or wrongly feel that the Security Council is not a forum in which they can count on proper consideration of their views. It would be wrong to inform from His Majesty's Government desire to help in bringing the fighting to a stop that they have committed themselves to any set proposals for a final solution. They reserve judgment on this point until the outcome of the mediators negotiations. They emphatically reject the

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L. 11565/62

the suggestions that the United Nations has no power to modify its previous recommendations if it wishes or to adopt as it must whatever recommendations seem to it best and most impartial. In voting for the resolution His Majesty's Government do not endorse any suggestion that the Arabs are the aggressors or that justice in the dispute is all on one side.

Min. & Dept. E.A.

18th July, 1948

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FP:FGM:

DECRYPTER FROM:

AUSTRALIAN DELEGATION TO
UNITED NATIONS ASSEMBLY,
NEW YORK.

J. 11414

Dated: 14th July 1948

1344

Rec'd: 15th July 1948

1000

IMMEDIATE.

Palestine.

1. Security Council in all-day session July 13th heard Bernadotte amplify his written report and answer questions raised mainly by Soviet, Ukraine and Arab representatives. Gromyko and Manilsky expressed some mistrust that Bernadotte had exceeded his functions and departed from the lines of the partition arrangement but did not press their accusations.

2. Bernadotte himself seemed to make a good impression on the Council. He said that he thought every possibility for voluntary agreement between the parties not to resume hostilities had been exhausted unless the Arab attitude changed. If hostilities were permitted to continue they might assume more serious proportions than before the truce. Mediation could make little headway during hostilities and his opinion was that firm and quick intervention by the Security Council at this time would be decisive in the situation. He said that two steps should be taken immediately -

(1) A firm and unequivocal order for an immediate cease-fire.

(2) An order for the demilitarisation of the whole city of Jerusalem. Such orders would need to be backed by a firmly expressed and fully understood determination to have prompt recourse to Articles 41 and 42 in the event of non-compliance.

3. Towards the close of Session the United States produced a resolution framed in consultation with United Kingdom of which essential part reads as follows:-

"Security Council determines that the situation in Palestine constitutes a threat to the Peace within the meaning of the Article 39 of the Charter. Orders the Governments and authorities concerned pursuant to Article 40 of the Charter to desist from further military action and to this end to issue cease-fire orders to take effect at a time to be determined by the Mediator but in any event not later than three days from the date of the adoption of this resolution. Declares that failure by any of the Governments or authorities concerned to comply with the preceding paragraph would demonstrate the existence of a breach of the Peace within the meaning of Article 39 of the Charter, requiring immediate consideration by the Security Council with a view to such further action under chapter 7 as may be decided on by the Council."

4. General support was given to this resolution by the United Kingdom which will propose however certain minor amendments. Debate is being resumed today.

MIN. & DEPT: E.A.

15th July 1948

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CABLEGRAM.

MB

I.11417

Dated 14th July, 1948

1950

FROM -

Recd. 15th July, 1948.

The Secretary of State
for Commonwealth Relations,
LONDON.

IMPORTANT.

H. No. 299.

Palestine.

In reply to question in Commons to-day, 14th July, as to what steps we have taken in support of continuance of renewal of Palestine truce, Parliamentary Under Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs made the following statement - (begins)

Shortly before the expiry of the period of truce in Palestine the United Nations Mediator requested both parties to agree to an extension of the truce.

The Jewish Authorities agreed to this extension but the Arab League refused it.

On the 7th July, Sir Alexander Cadogan introduced in the Security Council a resolution calling upon the parties to comply with the Mediator's request.

The resolution was adopted but it came too late to be taken into account by the Political Committee of the Arab League before they decided against prolongation of the truce.

H.M.G., who had already used their influence with the Arab Governments in support of the Mediator's request now urged them to reconvene the Political Committee in order to consider the resolution of the Security Council.

I am glad to inform the House that the Arab Governments have decided to take this step, and I am informed that the Political Committee will meet in the next day or two.

It is the earnest hope of H.M.G. that in view of the backing given to the Mediator by the Security Council they will reach a different decision at this meeting.

Meanwhile the Security Council is considering a further resolution introduced yesterday by the Delegate of the United States and generally supported by the United Kingdom Delegate requiring the renewal of the truce within three days and threatening sanction if this is refused. (ends)

Min. & Dept. E.A.
" " Defence

15th July, 1948.

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LB:MD

X.11277.

DECRYPTER FROM:

Dated: 13th July, 1948.
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THE SECRETARY OF STATE
FOR COMMONWEALTH RELATIONS,
LONDON.

Rec'd: 14th July, 1948.

S.293.

IMMEDIATE.SECRET.

MIN. & DEF.

My telegram 10th July X.2915. PALESTINE.

In light of recent developments in Palestine situation
guidance on following lines has been sent to United Kingdom
Representative to United Nations.

2. Our immediate objective must remain to bring fighting to an end in conditions which will ensure as far as possible that it will not be renewed. We have indications from reliable sources that more than one of the Arab leaders consider that a threat of sanctions against Arabs by Security Council would be an advantage as it would allow moderate elements in Arab League to persuade its more extreme members to accept a further truce. We, therefore, see advantage in adoption by Security Council of resolution containing this threat. In order, however, that it may stand a chance of securing acquiescence of at least a majority of the Arab leaders it is essential that resolution should contain a reference to accusations which have been made about breaches of the truce. In our view it should also specify that hostilities are not to be resumed pending a definitive political settlement and should instruct mediator to establish machinery for examining alleged breaches of truce both past and future in order that he and Security Council may be enabled to take appropriate action without delay. We also consider that resolution should refer to a breach of the peace but not at this stage to an act of aggression within meaning of article 39 of the charter.

3. Final political settlement must of course be arrived at either by agreement between parties under auspices of mediator or by action of United Nations. In latter event action would presumably have to be taken by General Assembly since it appears to us that Security Council would have no right to make radical modifications in plan contained in Assembly's resolution of 29th November. We are inclined to view that settlement to aim at as roughly on lines indicated by Count Bernadotte though if this were to have any chance of acceptance by Arabs the proposal for a political Union between Arab and Jewish states would have to be abandoned.

MIN. & DEF. EXTERNAL AFFAIRS.
DEFENCE.

14th July, 1948.

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I. 11207.

DECYFHER FROM;

Dated: 10th July, 1948.
1800.

THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR
COMMONWEALTH RELATIONS,
LONDON.

Rec'd: 11th July, 1948.
10.00 a.m.

H. 291. Secret.

My telegram 8th July H. 289. Palestine.

His Majesty's Representatives on Arab States have been instructed again to impress on Arab Governments, the grave danger to Arabs if they persist in refusing appeals of the Security Council for an extension of truce particularly in view of the fact that the Jews have accepted. In these circumstances, we feel that the Security Council may well consider action under Chapter VII of Charter against the Arab States and we should be bound to conform to any decision taken to this end.

2. The Representatives are to point out to the Arab Governments that since the decision of the political committee of the Arab League was taken on the basis of the mediator's proposal only and before the committee had considered the Security Council resolution of 7th July the way is still open to them to withdraw from the dangerous position in which they have placed themselves by their refusal.

8. The Arab Governments are also to be told that in view of their contention that truce has been operating to military advantage of Jews we have instructed our representative at United Nations to ensure that proper consideration should be given by Security Council to operation of truce as a whole and to possible improvements in its machinery if it is extended. Thus Arabs, if they would agree to a brief extension of truce, would be given an opportunity to explain to the Security Council their grounds for believing that truce is operating to their disadvantage and to propose if they so desire modifications of its terms.

Minister and Department of External Affairs.

ii iii iv v Defence.

11th July, 1948.

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I.11104.

DECRYPTER FROM:

Dated: 8th July, 1948.
2130.

Rec'd: 9th July, 1948.

THE SECRETARY OF STATE
FOR COMMONWEALTH RELATIONS,
LONDON.

H. 289. SECRET. IMMEDIATE.My immediately preceding telegram. PALESTINE.

General effect of Mediator's proposals seems to us to make whole situation in Palestine more fluid and to open possibility for further discussions. First essential, however, in order that negotiations may continue is that truce should be extended in accordance with appeal which on United Kingdom initiative, Security Council decided on 7th July to address to Jews and Arabs.

2. His Majesty's Representatives in Arab states have consequently been instructed to convey to Arab Governments our strong advice to do everything in their power to avoid a breakdown by truce. Representatives are to make the point that even if proposals as a whole are unacceptable to Arabs they should if they have not already done so offer counter proposals. In our view Arabs would be well advised to concentrate on securing by negotiation both territorial adjustments and guaranteed for future in return for their acquiescence in Jewish independence in a part of Palestine. Alternative to proceeding with negotiations would be to resume fighting. It cannot be foreseen what action Security Council would take in that event but Representatives are to emphasize that United Kingdom Government for their part would act in accordance with their obligations as a member of the United Nations.

MIN. & DEPT. EXTERNAL AFFAIRS.
" " " DEFENCE.

9th July, 1948.

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MC:MD

I.11116.

DECRYPTER FROM:

Dated: 8th July, 1948.

2145.

Rec'd: 9th July, 1948.

THE SECRETARY OF STATE
FOR COMMONWEALTH RELATIONS,
LONDON.

H.288.

SECRET.IMMEDIATE.My telegram 23rd June H.255. PALESTINE.

Following are preliminary comments on Mediator's
suggestions to Jews and Arabs for solution of Palestine problem.

2. In our view more significant than any of Mediator's specific suggestions is fact that in submitting his proposals he has shown that he believes that peace can be re-established in Palestine only by means of a settlement founded upon acquiescence if not upon consent and that in consequence this settlement must depart in some measure from plan adopted by United Nations in November, 1947. He has made it clear that his suggestions are not intended to be precise or final and that he is ready to examine alternative proposals.

3. His suggestions of possible frontier changes contain advantages for both sides implied exchange of Western Galilee for Negev would in our view be economically favourable to the Jews. On the other hand taken in conjunction with proposed inclusion of Jerusalem in Arab area it would have effect of re-establishing direct land communications between Cairo and the Arab capital in Asia. Jerusalem proposal in itself obviously represents an advantage to Arabs though the Jewish population would receive autonomy. The suggestions recognize the importance of Haifa and the Lydda airport to the whole country.

4. Both Arabs and Jews will no doubt take greatest exception to Mediator's suggestion of a Union or Confederation of Arab and Jewish states having a central organ in which immigration policy of either member can be questioned by the other after two years. Plan also had effect which Mediator may have overlooked of denying self-determination to population of Arab parts of Palestine for while incorporation of all Arab Palestine in Transjordan may well be best solution it is surely for Arabs and not United Nations to make decision to this effect.

MIN. & DEPT. EXTERNAL AFFAIRS.
" " " DEFENCE. NA

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9th July, 1948.

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I.11546/48.

DECEMBER FROM:

Dated: 13th July, 1948.
1546.THE AUSTRALIAN DELEGATION,
UNITED NATIONS ASSEMBLY,
NEW YORK.

Rec'd: 14th July, 1948.

UN.621.

PALESTINE.

My UN.618.

1. Security Council is meeting today to receive Bernadotte's account of his truce and mediation efforts.

2. In a long written report submitted to the Council Bernadotte states that the four week's truce spared Palestine from much bloodshed and destruction and also provided a limited opportunity for a mediation effort. It had not been expected that agreement of the parties to a permanent settlement could be achieved in this four weeks, however, the period did give mediation effort an opportunity to get under way. It was clear that the resumption of hostilities on 9th July would certainly diminish for the time being at least the chances for successful mediation. The Arab rejection of the appeal for extension of the truce was consequently "a source of great disappointment". At the time he left Amman on 10th July he had received no reply from either side regarding his further appeal for an unconditional cease fire for a period of ten days commencing 10th July.

3. Discussing his mediation proposal Bernadotte says that it early became apparent that it was impossible at that stage to bring the two parties together round a common table. The Jews were willing to but the Arabs were not. He, therefore, decided to advance certain tentative ideas with a view to exploring the possibilities for finding some common ground for further discussion. He said that the indispensable condition for carrying out his functions as laid down in the General Assembly resolution of 14th May was to find a common framework of reference within which the parties would be willing to accept further mediation. He could not call on either party to surrender completely its position not only because this would be a betrayal of his role as mediator but also because there was no sound basis for doing so in the light of the existing circumstances in Palestine. With these objectives he advanced suggestions which in their main outfit provided for a "two member union" one Arab and one Jew, the Arab member including Transjordan should that country be favourably inclined toward the arrangement. He also thought it necessary to suggest that the Jews should voluntarily accept an element of international regulation of immigration in the vital interests of Jews with their Arab neighbours.

4. The parties were not called on to accept or reject the suggestions in the form in which they were offered but were invited merely to indicate whether further discussions

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I.11346/48.

might be profitably carried on within the general framework outlined and if not to indicate in which general direction such discussions might usefully proceed. Both parties rejected the framework suggested as a basis for discussion. The Jews offered no counter suggestions but urged a reconsideration of mediator's "whole approach to the problem". The Arabs offered counter suggestions which incorporated the basic idea of a unitary state for the whole of Palestine offering little or no compromise. Report states "despite the unwillingness of the two parties to carry on discussions within the framework suggested and in this regard the Arab refusal was more categorical than the Jewish, both have urged that the mediation effort continue."

5. Report concludes by observing that the Arabs are fighting to eliminate the de facto situation which has followed the November 1947 resolution of the General Assembly "but the plain fact remains that it is there". While the Arabs are bitterly opposed to the partition of Palestine and the establishment of a Jewish state and have demonstrated their willingness to employ armed force to the limit of their capacities, the Jews, on the other hand, are intensely nationalistic and apparently fearless in the face of the Arab threat. In the circumstances the question must be answered whether the international community is willing to tolerate resort to armed force as the means for settlement of the Palestine issue. If armed force is forbidden in the settlement of the problem and it is made prohibitively unprofitable for the Arab states to employ it, there will be in Palestine a Jewish community with a separate cultural and political existence a Jewish state whose strength and prosperity and capacity for development by the admission of its own leaders must largely depend on its ability to cultivate friendship with its Arab neighbours. If the employment of armed force is not forbidden the issue of the Jewish state in Palestine will be settled on the field of battle.

MIN. & DEPT. EXTERNAL AFFAIRS.

14th July, 1948.

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CABLEGRAM SECRET.

THE QUOTATION OF THIS CABLEGRAM WITHOUT
PARAPHRASE EXCEPT IN A SECRET DOCUMENT WILL
COMPROMISE THE CYPHER USED, REGARDLESS
OF CONTENT IT MUST ALWAYS REMAIN SECRET.

MC:MD

I.11109.

DECIPHER FROM:

Dated: 8th July, 1948.

1844

Rec'd: 9th July, 1948

THE AUSTRALIAN DELEGATION,
UNITED NATIONS ASSEMBLY,
NEW YORK.

UN. 611. IMMEDIATE.PALESTINE.

My telegram UN. 610.

1. Bernadotte reported today that Jews had accepted but Arabs rejected proposal for extension of truce. At the same time Secretary General was informed by Shertok that early this morning Egyptian forces launched attack on Israeli positions in South Palestine.
2. The Security Council meet adjourned this afternoon but will probably adjourned discussion until receipt of further information from Bernadotte.

MIN. & DEPT. EXTERNAL AFFAIRS.

ND

9th July, 1948.

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CABLEGRAM

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I. 11203.

PP. 11

DECRYPTER FROM :

THE QUOTATION OF THIS CABLEGRAM WITHOUT
PARAPHRASE EXCEPT IN A SECRET DOCUMENT WILL
COMPROMISE THE CYPHER USED, REGARDLESS
OF CONTENT IT MUST ALWAYS REMAIN SECRET.

Dated: 10th July 1940

1445.

Rec'd: 12th July 1940.

AUSTRALIAN DELEGATION TO THE UNITED NATIONS
ORGANISATION,
NEW YORK.

UNCLC.

Palestine.

My telegram 611.

1. Bernadotte is expected to arrive here July 12th to make personal report to the Security Council. Council will probably meet July 13th. Bernadotte has meanwhile had a further request for a truce of 10 days.

2. Text of replies of Israeli and Arab Governments to mediator's proposals have now been received here. Israeli Government finds proposal regarding Jerusalem unacceptable and states that it cannot agree to any provision regarding immigration, which would take full decision out of its own hands. It also refuses to commit itself in advance to arrangements with an Arab state regarding defence or foreign policy.

3. Arab reply alleges that Israel has violated previous truce conditions and states that solution proposed by mediator based on continuation of a separate Jewish State is "most disappointing". Arabs therefore consider that prolonged truce based on status quo could not lead to peaceful settlement.

4. Full text by mail.

Min. & Dept. E.A.

12th July 1940.

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For useful summary of Palestine
Question, see article entitled

"ABC of JEWISH - ARAB STRUGGLE"

on page 22 of issue dated 11th June
of

United States News should report

DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS.

CABLEGRAM.

1.10705
Dated 30th June, 1948
2105
Rec'd. 2nd July, 1948
0820 hours.

MC:JSH

DECODE FROM:

THE AUSTRALIAN DELEGATION TO UNITED NATIONS,
NEW YORK.

UN. 591. CONFIDENTIAL.

My UN.581.

1. Contrary to what was generally expected here, proposals submitted by Bernadotte to Tel Aviv and Cairo go much further than preliminary approaches to attempted eventual settlement. I understand suggestions comprise the whole outline of a settlement on the following basis.

- (a) Recognition of Israel Sovereignty.
- (b) Arab state to comprise Arab area of Palestine plus Trans-Jordan.
- (c) Jerusalem to be included in Arab State.
- (d) Some form of special regime for Haifa making it a free port.
- (e) Arrangements for economic union between Arab State and Israel together with provision for concerting defence and foreign policy.
- (f) Some territorial rearrangement in the Negev in favour of Arabs and in Galilee in favour of the Jews.

2. American quarters here seem somewhat surprised, especially with the idea of scrapping United Nations regime for Jerusalem and handing over to Abdullah. Israel representatives are as yet without word of Tel Aviv reaction but say they cannot imagine how proposal to install Abdullah in Jerusalem could be acceptable, nor do they like in any way the suggestion of common defence and foreign policy with Arab State.

3. So far as I can discover, Bernadotte has given himself a free hand in putting proposals forward and they are not to be taken as emanating from Lake Success. He has asked the parties not to reject the suggestions out of hand but to send representatives to Rhodes to discuss with him on basis of proposals.

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2nd July, 1948.

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Asst. Sec'y (UE)	
Asst. Sec'y (UF)</	